[SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.]
Plotino's Own Sense-Categories.
GENERA OF THE PHYSICAL ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE.
1. We have thus declared our views about (intelligible) Being, and shown how they agree with the doctrines of Plato. Now we have to study the "other nature" (the Being of the sense-world); and we shall have to consider whether it be proper to establish here the same genera as for the intelligible world, or to posit a greater number, by adding some to those already recognized; or whether the genera differ in each being entirely, or only partially, some remaining identical, while others differ. If any of them be identical in both beings, that can be understood only by analogy;[343] that is what will become evident when each of these beings are fully understood.
THE WORLD MUST BE STUDIED, JUST AS ONE WOULD ANALYZE THE VOICE.
This is by what we must begin. Having to speak of sense-objects, and knowing that all of them are contained in this world here below, we must first scrutinize this world, establish within it divisions according to the nature of the (beings) which compose it, and then distribute them into genera, just as we would do if we had to analyze the voice whose nature is infinite (by the diversity of sounds it produces), reducing it to a definite number of kinds.[344] Observing the elements common to many sounds, we would reduce them to one unity, then, to a superior unity, further to a supreme unity, in which these sounds appear as a small number of classes. Then, the elements common to these individuals would be called "species," and that common to various species would be called a genus. As to the voice, it is easy enough to discover each species, to reduce all the species to unity, and to predicate of all of them (as highest genus or category) the general element, the voice. But an analysis as summary as this is impossible with the (more complicated universe). In the sense-world we will have to recognize several genera, which will differ from those of the intelligible world, since the sense-world itself differs from the intelligible world so much that it is not its counterpart, but only its image, whose only element common (to its model) is the name.
WE MUST FIRST DISSECT AWAY THE SOUL FROM THE BODY, TO EXAMINE IT.
As here below in the "mixture" (or blend, the soul), and the composition (the body) (which form our nature) there are two parts, soul and body, the totality of which forms the living organism;[345] as the nature of the soul belongs to the intelligible world, and consequently does not belong to the same order of things as the sense-world, we shall, however difficult it may be, have to separate the soul[346] from the sense-objects which we are here alone to consider. (We shall illustrate this by a parable). He who would wish to classify the inhabitants of a town according to their dignities and professions, would have to leave aside the foreign residents. As to the passions which arise from the union of the soul with the body, or, that the soul experiences because of the body,[347] we shall later examine how they should be classified.[348] This however must follow our study of the sense-objects.
WHAT IS BEING IN THE INTELLIGIBLE IS GENERATION IN THE SENSE-WORLD.
2. First let us consider what mundane name "Being" must be applied to. To begin with, it must be explained that physical nature can receive the name of "being" only as a figure of speech;[343] or rather, should not receive it at all, since it implies the idea of perpetual flowing (that is, change[349]); so, the more suitable denomination would be "generation."[350] We shall also have to acknowledge that the things that belong to generation are very different; nevertheless all bodies, some simple (such, as elements), the others composite as mixtures), together with their accidents and effects, must, during the process of classification, be reduced to a single genus.
In bodies, one may besides distinguish on one hand matter, on the other, the form imprinted thereon; and we designate each of these separately as a genus, or subsume both under a unity, inasmuch as we designate both by the common label[343] of "being," or rather, "generation." But what is the common element in matter and form? In what manner, and of what is matter a genus? For what difference inheres in matter? In what sequence could we incorporate that which is composed of both? But in the case that that which is composed of both be itself corporeal being, while neither of the two is a body, how then could either be incorporated in a single genus, or within the same genus along with the compound of both? How (could this incorporation into a single genus be effected with) the elements of some object and the object itself? To answer that we should begin by the (composite) bodies: which would be tantamount to learning to read by beginning with syllables (and not with letters).