CAN WE ANALYZE THIS WORLD BY ANALOGY WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE?
Let us now grant that symmetrical analysis by individual objects is impossible. Might we not, as a means of classification, then employ analogy? In this case the (intelligible, higher) "being" would here be represented by matter; and movement above, by form here, which would thus quicken and perfect matter. The inertia of matter would correspond to rest above, while the (intelligible) identity and difference would correspond to our earthly manifold resemblance and differences.[351] (Such an analogic method would misrepresent the state of affairs in this world). To begin with, matter does not receive form as its life or actualization, but (form) approaches and informs (matter) as something foreign (form deriving from being, while matter is only a deception; so that there is no kinship between them). Then in the (intelligible world) form is an actualization and motion, while here below movement is different, being accidental; we might far rather call form the halting or rest of matter, for form defines that which in itself is indefinite (unlimited). There (in the intelligible world) identity and difference refer to a single essence, which is both identical and different. Here below, essence differs only relatively, by participation (in the difference) for it is something identical and different, not by consequence, as above, but here below, by nature. As to stability, how could it be attributed to matter, which assumes all dimensions, which receives all its forms from without, without itself ever being able to beget anything by means of these forms? Such a division, therefore, will have to be given up.
PHYSICAL CATEGORIES ARE MATTER, FORM, COMBINATION, ATTRIBUTES AND ACCIDENTS.
3. What classification shall we adopt? There is first matter, then form, and further the combination which results from their blending. Then we have a number of conceptions which refer to the three preceding classes, and are predicated of them; the first, simply, as attributes; the others, besides, as accidents. Among the latter, some are contained within the things, while others contain them; some of them are actions, and the others experiences (passions) or their consequences.
THE THREE FIRST PHYSICAL CATEGORIES OF MATTER, FORM AND COMBINATION.
Matter is something common which is found in all things;[352] nevertheless it does not form a genus because it does not admit of any differences, unless its differences consist in appearing in different forms; as, here, fire, and there, air. Philosophers who consider that matter is a genus base this opinion on the fact that matter is common to all the things in which it exists, or that it stands in the relation of the whole to the parts of particular objects (or, "matters"). In this case, however, the term "genus" would be used in a sense differing from the one it bears usually. It would then be no more than an only or single element, if we admit that an element can be a genus. If, conceiving that matter is united to matter, or exists within it, we add form to matter, matter would thereby be differentiated from the other forms, but it will not comprehend every being-like form. Were we to call the generating principle of being "form," and were we to call the reason which constitutes the form "being-like reason," we shall not yet have clearly defined the nature of "being." Finally, if we give the name of "being" only to the combination of matter and form, the result will be that neither of these two (matter or form taken separately) will themselves be "being." If, however, we were to assert that not only their combination, but also each of them separately were "being," we then would be faced with the problem of what is common to all three.
DIFFERENT PHYSICAL CATEGORIES.
As to the things which are simply posited as attributes, they should, as principles or elements, be classified under relation. Among the accidents of things, some, like quantity and quality, are contained within them; while others contain them, as time and place. Then there are actions and experiences, as movements; then their consequences, as "being in time," and "being in place"; the latter is the consequence of the combination, the former is the consequence of movement.