Plutarch's Lives, Volume 3 (of 4)

by Plutarch

LVII. After this Pompeius had a dangerous illness at Neapolis, from which he recovered. Upon the suggestion of Praxagoras, the people of Neapolis offered sacrifices for his restoration to health. The neighbouring people followed their example, and the thing thus going the round of Italy, every city, small and great, celebrated a festival for several days. No place was large enough to contain the people, who flocked together from all parts, but the roads were filled and the villages and ports with the people rejoicing and sacrificing. Many persons also with chaplets on their heads and lighted torches received Pompeius, and accompanied him throwing flowers over him, so that his journey and progress was a most beautiful sight and very splendid. However, it is said that this circumstance contributed to bring about the war as much as anything else. For an arrogant feeling entered the mind of Pompeius, and, with the greatness of the rejoicing, carried off all reflection on the present state of affairs; and throwing away the caution which had always secured his good fortune and his measures, he fell into a state of such unmingled confidence and contempt of Cæsar's power, as to suppose that he would require neither arms to oppose him nor any troublesome preparation, but that he could put him down much easier than he had raised him. Besides this, Appius came from Gaul with the troops which Pompeius had lent to Cæsar; and he greatly disparaged Cæsar's exploits there, and uttered much abuse against Cæsar; and he said that Pompeius did not know his own power and reputation, if he intended to strengthen himself against Cæsar by other troops, for that he could put down Cæsar with Cæsar's own troops, as soon as he made his appearance; so great, as he said, was their hatred of Cæsar and their affection towards Pompeius. Accordingly Pompeius was so much elated, and through his confidence filled with such contempt, that he even ridiculed those who were afraid of the war; and to those who said that, if Cæsar advanced against the city, they saw no troops sufficient to repulse him, with smiling countenance and tranquil mien he bade them give themselves no trouble about that, "for in whatever part of Italy," he said, "I stamp the earth with my foot, there will spring up forces both men and horse."

LVIII. And now Cæsar also stuck to public affairs more vigorously, himself keeping at no great distance from Italy, and continually sending his soldiers to the city to attend the elections, and with money insinuating himself into the favour of many of the magistrates and corrupting them; among whom was Paulus[337] the consul who changed sides for fifteen hundred talents, and Curio[338] the tribune who was released by Cæsar from countless debts, and Marcus Antonius who through friendship for Curio was involved in his obligations. Now it was said that one of the centurions who had come from Cæsar, while standing near the Senate-house and hearing that the Senate were refusing to allow Cæsar a prolongation of his term of government, said as he struck his hand on his sword, "But this will give it." And all that was doing and preparing had this design in view. Yet the claims and reasons urged by Curio in favour of Cæsar were of a more constitutional character. For he asked one of two things, either that they should require Pompeius also to give up his force, or they should not take Cæsar's troops from him: he said, "Whether they become private persons on fair terms or continued a match for one another by each keeping what he had, they would remain quiet; but he who proposed to weaken one of them would double the power which he feared." Upon this Marcellus the consul called Cæsar a robber, and urged the Senate to vote him an enemy, if he should not lay down his arms. Yet Curio with the assistance of Antonius and Piso, prevailed so far as to have it put to a regular vote. Accordingly he proposed that those senators should move off to one side who were in favour of Cæsar alone laying down his arms and Pompeius remaining in command; and the majority went over to that side. Again, upon his proposing that all should withdraw who were of opinion that both should lay down their arms and that neither should hold a command, only two-and-twenty were in favour of Pompeius, and all the rest were on the side of Curio. Curio considering that he had gained his point, rushed forth to the people exulting with delight, and the people received him with clapping of hands and threw on him chaplets and flowers. Pompeius was not in the Senate, for those who are in command of an army do not enter the city. But Marcellus rose up and said that he would not sit still to listen to words, but that as he spied ten legions already appearing in sight above the Alps and on their march, he also would dispatch a man to oppose them and to defend their country.

LIX. Upon this they changed their garments as was usual in a public calamity. Marcellus[339] advanced to Pompeius through the Forum with the Senate following him, and standing in front of him said, "I bid you, Pompeius, defend your country and employ the forces that are in readiness and raise others." Lentulus also said the same, who was one of the consuls elect for the coming year. But when Pompeius began to raise recruits, some refused and a few came together tardily and without any readiness, but the greater part cried out that some terms should be come to. For Antonius in spite of the Senate had read a letter of Cæsar to the people which contained proposals likely to conciliate the mass; for Cæsar proposed that both he and Pompeius should give up their provinces and dismiss their troops, and so put themselves in the hande of the people and render an account of what they had done. Lentulus who was now consul would not assemble the Senate; but Cicero who had just returned from Cilicia[340] attempted an amicable settlement on the terms, that Cæsar should quit Gaul and give up all his army except two legions with which he should hold Illyricum and wait for his second consulship. As Pompeius was dissatisfied with this, the friends of Cæsar so far yielded as to agree that Cæsar should dismiss one of these two legions; but as Lentulus made opposition and Cato called out that Pompeius was blundering again if he allowed himself to be deceived, the attempt at a settlement came to no conclusion.

LX. In the mean time intelligence arrived that Cæsar had taken Ariminum,[341] a large city of Italy, and was marching straight upon Rome with all his force. But this was false; for he was advancing with only three hundred horsemen and five thousand legionary soldiers, and he did not wait for the rest of his force which was beyond the Alps, choosing to fall upon his enemies when they were in confusion and did not expect him, rather than to give them time to prepare to fight with him. Upon reaching the river Rubico, which was the boundary of his province, he stood in silence and lingered, reflecting, as we may presume, on the magnitude of the risk. Then, like those who throw themselves into a huge abyss from a precipice, closing the eyes of calculation and wrapping himself up to meet the danger, he called out in Greek to those who were present these words only, "Let the die be cast," and took his army over. As soon as the report reached Rome, and tumult and fear, such as were never known before, together with consternation filled the city, the Senate immediately hurried in a body to visit Pompeius, and the magistrates with them; but upon Tullus[342] asking about an army and force, and Pompeius after some delay saying in a tone of no great confidence, that he had the men in readiness who had come from Cæsar, and he thought he should soon be able to get together those who had been before enrolled to the number of thirty thousand, Tullus cried aloud, "You have deceived us, Pompeius," and he advised to send commissioners to Cæsar. One Favonius,[343] in other respects no bad man, but who with his self-will and insolence often supposed that he was imitating the bold language of Cato, bade Pompeius strike the ground with his foot and call up the troops which he promised. Pompeius mildly submitted to this ill-timed sarcasm; and when Cato reminded him of what he had originally predicted to him about Cæsar, Pompeius replied that what Cato had said was in truth more prophetic, but what he had done was of a more friendly character.

LXI. Cato advised that Pompeius should be appointed general Imperator, adding, that it was the business of those who caused great mischief to put an end to it. Cato immediately left the city for Sicily, for he had obtained that island as his province; and of the rest each went to the province which had been assigned to him by lot. But as nearly all Italy was in commotion, the events that happened caused much perplexity; for those who were out of Rome hurried from all parts and crowded into the city, and the inhabitants of Rome hastened to leave the city, which in such tempest and confusion was weak in available means, but strong in insubordination and the difficulty that it caused to the magistrates. For it was not possible to allay the fear, nor did any one allow Pompeius to follow his own judgment, but in whatever way a man was affected, whether by fear, grief or perplexity, he carried it to Pompeius and filled him with it; and opposite measures prevailed in the same day, and it was impossible for Pompeius to get any true intelligence about the enemy, because there were many who reported anything that they chanced to hear, and were vexed if he did not believe them. Under these circumstances after declaring by an edict that he saw nothing but confusion, and bidding all the senators follow him, and giving notice that he should consider all who stayed behind as partisans of Cæsar, he left the city late in the evening; and the consuls fled without even making the sacrifices which were usual before wars. But even in the midst of danger Pompeius was fortunate in the general affection of the people, for though many blamed the generalship, there was not one who hated the general, but one might have found that those who were not willing to leave Pompeius were more numerous than those who left the city for the cause of liberty.

LXII. A few davs after, Cæsar entered and took possession of Rome.[344] He behaved with moderation to all and pacified everybody, except Metellus[345] one of the tribunes who attempted to hinder him from taking money out of the treasury, on which Cæsar threatened him with death and added to his threat still harsher words, for he said, That to say this was harder for him than to do it. Having thus put Metellus to flight and taken what he wanted, Cæsar pursued Pompeius, being anxious to drive him out of Italy before his troops from Iberia arrived. Pompeius who had got possession of Brundisium and had plenty of ships, immediately put on board the consuls and with them thirty cohorts and sent them over before him to Dyrrachium: Scipio his father-in-law and his own son Cneius he sent to Syria to get a fleet ready. After barricading the gates and placing on the walls the soldiers who were most lightly armed, he ordered the people of Brundisium[346] to keep quiet in their houses, and he then broke up all the ground in the city and intersected it with ditches, and filled up all the streets with stakes except two through which he went down to the sea. On the third day he had already embarked at his leisure all the troops with the exception of those who were guarding the walls, to whom he suddenly gave a signal, upon which they all ran down quickly and being taken on board got out to sea. When Cæsar saw the walls deserted, he concluded that the enemy were making off, and in his pursuit of them he narrowly escaped getting involved among the stakes and trenches; but as the people of Brundisium gave him warning, he avoided the city and, making a circuit round it, he found that all had got under sail, except two vessels which contained only a few soldiers.

LXIII. Now everybody else reckons the sailing away of Pompeius among the best military stratagems, but Cæsar[347] wondered that Pompeius, who was in possession of a strong city and was expecting his troops from Iberia and was master of the sea, should desert and abandon Italy. Cicero[348] also blames Pompeius for imitating the generalship of Themistokles rather than that of Perikles, the circumstances being like those of Perikles and not those of Themistokles. And Cæsar showed by what he did that he was greatly afraid of time:[349] for when he had taken prisoner Numerius, a friend of Pompeius, he sent him to Brundisium with instructions to bring about a reconciliation on fair terms; but Numerius sailed off with Pompeius. Upon this Cæsar, who in sixty days had become master of Italy without shedding any blood, was desirous of pursuing Pompeius immediately, but as he had no vessels, he turned about and marched to Iberia with the design of gaining over the troops there.

LXIV. During this time Pompeius got together a great force: his naval power was completely irresistible, for the fighting ships were five hundred, and the number of Liburnian vessels[350] and other small craft was immense; the cavalry, the flower of the Romans and Italians, was seven thousand, distinguished by family, and wealth and courage; his infantry, which was a mixed body and required discipline, he exercised in Berœa,[351] not sitting still lazily, but practising himself in gymnastic exercises[352] as if he were still in the vigour of his age. And it was a great motive to confidence, when men saw Pompeius Magnus, who was now sixty years of age save two, exercising himself among the infantry under arms, then mounting his horse and drawing his sword without any trouble while his horse was galloping and easily sheathing it again; and in the throwing of his spear showing not only an exactness of aim, but a strength of arm in the distance to which he sent it, which many of the young men could not surpass. Both kings of nations and governors came to him; and of the men of rank about him from Rome there were sufficient to make up a complete Senate.[353] There came also Labeo,[354] who left Cæsar though he had been his friend and had served with him in Gaul; and Brutus,[355] son of the Brutus who was put to death in Gaul, a man of noble spirit who had never yet spoken to Pompeius or saluted him because Pompeius had put his father to death, but now he took service under him as the liberator of Rome. Cicero,[356] though he had both in his writings and his speeches in the Senate recommended other measures, was ashamed not to join those who were fighting in defence of their country. There came also to Macedonia Tidius Sextius,[357] a man of extreme old age, lame of one leg; and while others were laughing and jeering, Pompeius on seeing him rose up and ran to meet him, for he considered it a great testimony for men of advanced age and feeble strength to choose danger with him in preference to safety.

LXV. A Senate being formed, upon the proposition of Cato they came to a resolution to put no Roman to death except in battle, and not to plunder any city that was subject to the Romans, which increased still further the popularity of the party of Pompeius; for those who were unconcerned about the war by reason of being far removed from it or who were disregarded on account of their weakness, gave Pompeius the benefit of their good wishes at least, and as far as words could go contended on his behalf in favour of the right, considering every man an enemy to gods and to men who did not wish Pompeius to be victorious. Cæsar also showed much moderation in his success, for after he had captured and defeated the forces of Pompeius in Iberia,[358] he let the generals go and employed the troops. After crossing the Alps again and hurrying through Italy, he arrived at Brundisium about the winter solstice. He then crossed the sea and putting in at Oricum sent Jubius,[359] a friend of Pompeius, who was his prisoner, to Pompeius[360] to propose that they should both meet together on the third day, disband all their forces, and after being reconciled and confirming their union by oath, return to Italy. Pompeius again considered this to be an ambuscade, and hastily going down to the sea he took possession of the posts and places which presented very strong positions for an army; he also seized the naval stations and landing places which were favourable for those who came by sea, so that every wind which blew brought to Pompeius corn or troops or money; but Cæsar being confined in straits both on the sea and land side was of necessity glad to fight, and he attacked the lines of Pompeius and continually provoked him to battle, in which Cæsar had generally the advantage and the superiority in the skirmishing. But on one occasion he narrowly escaped being completely crushed and losing his army, for Pompeius fought with great courage and routed all the enemy, who lost two thousand men; but he was either unable or was afraid to force his way into Cæsar's camp and to enter with the fugitives, which made Cæsar say to his friends, "To-day the victory would have been with the enemy, if they had had a commander who knew how to conquer."

LXVI. The partisans of Pompeius being greatly elated at this success were eager to have a decisive battle. Pompeius wrote to the distant kings and generals and cities to inform them that he was victorious, but he feared the risk of a battle, thinking that by delay and reducing the enemy to straits he should finally vanquish men who were invincible in arms and had long been accustomed to conquer together, but as to the other military duties, and marches, and change of position, and digging of trenches and building of walls, were not efficient by reason of age and on this account were eager to come to close fighting and to engage hand to hand. However, previous to the last contest Pompeius had been able in some degree to draw his men from their purpose by persuading them to keep quiet; but when Cæsar after the battle was compelled by want of provisions to break up his camp, and began his march into Thessaly through the country of the Athamanes,[361] the confidence of the soldiers of Pompeius could no longer be kept in check, and calling out that Cæsar was flying, some were for following and pursuing him, and others for crossing over into Italy, and others were sending to Rome their slaves and friends to get possession of houses near the Forum, with the intention of forthwith becoming candidates for office. Many of their own accord sailed to Cornelia who was in Lesbos bearing the good tidings of the war being at an end; for Pompeius had sent her there out of the way of danger. The Senate being assembled, Afranius gave his opinion that they should stick to Italy, for Italy was the chief prize of the war, and would bring to those who were masters of it the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Iberia, and all Gaul; and as to that which was the greatest concern to Pompeius, his native country who was stretching out her hands only at a short distance from them, it was not honourable to leave her to be insulted and enslaved by slaves and flatterers of tyrants. But Pompeius did not consider it to be consistent with his reputation to run away from Cæsar a second time and to be pursued, when fortune gave him the opportunity of being the pursuer, nor did he think it consistent with his duty to desert Scipio[362] and the consular men in Hellas and Thessaly who would immediately fall into Cæsar's hands with their military chests and large forces; he thought also that Rome was best cared for by fighting in her defence as far from her as possible, that she might wait for the conqueror without feeling or hearing of any misfortunes.