[8.] It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison.
He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that the Lacedaemonians with their own forces in The rapid march of Epaminondas to Sparta, and back again to Mantinea. See Xenophon, Hell. 7, 5, 8 sq. B.C. 362. full were come to Mantinea, and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the intention of offering the Thebans battle; having Xenophon, Hell. 7, 5, 8 sq. B.C. 362. given orders to his men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters of the town which slope down to the river. A Cretan warns Agesilaus.Then however a contretemps occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what was going on. Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope. But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night march, arrived at Mantinea about midday, finding it entirely destitute of defenders.
But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking with some dissatisfaction of these events,[326] when they say that the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune.
[9.] Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in play,[327] and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the Lacedaemonians rushed off en masse at the first message and relieved Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit.
I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;[328] and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of deliberate thought....
TARENTUM
When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the people, B.C. 211. Livy, 26, 20. relief with a very large force; and being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the earnest supplication of the people to depart....