[10.] A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but by the virtue of its own inhabitants....
The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city and to leave nothing behind. Syracuse was taken in the autumn, B.C. 212. “The ornaments of the city, statues and pictures were taken to Rome.” Livy, 25, 40, cp. 26, 21. Whether they were right in doing so, and consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs to others, without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers. But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled. For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours, but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and such as belonged to the state to adorn the city....
SPAIN
[11.] The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had conquered their enemies, could not control The two Scipios fall in B.C. 212. themselves: and having made up their minds that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; Hasdrubal Gisconis tertius Carthaginiensium dux. Livy 24, 41, cp. 25, 37. among whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch of iniquity as to demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales, trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand, Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give up his daughters as hostages....
ON THE ART OF COMMANDING ARMIES
[12.] The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skillful use of opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience. Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy.
Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall under a scientific rule, and have no fixed design.
[13.] Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a period and place for its execution, The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method. secrecy, definite signals, persons by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole. Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant circumstance will suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail is barely enough.
Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such expeditions.
Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and not to allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or familiarity, Things necessary. 1. Silence. or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone without whom it is impossible to complete his plan, and not even to them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover, not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind. For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression of their countenances or by their actions.