Europe then (at least the Continental States) had also a strong desire to get rid of innumerable abuses which pressed heavily upon the people of all countries. Those abuses have now in general been removed; the people in many parts of Germany have been admitted, more or less, to a share in the management of their own affairs. A German feeling and a spirit of nationality has sprung up among all the German people, and the Germans, instead of receiving the French as Liberators, as many of them did in 1792-1793, would now rise as one man to repel a hateful invasion. Upon all these grounds Viscount Palmerston deems it his duty to your Majesty to express his strong conviction that the appeals made to your Majesty's good feelings by the King of the French, upon the score of the danger of revolution in France, unless concessions are made to the French Government, have no foundation in truth, and are only exertions of skilful diplomacy.
Viscount Palmerston has to apologise to your Majesty for having inadvertently written a part of this memorandum upon a half-sheet of paper. And he would be glad if, without inconvenience to your Majesty, he could be enabled to read to the Cabinet to-morrow the accompanying despatches from Lord Granville.
Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston.55
THE STATE OF FRANCE
Windsor Castle, 11th November 1840.
The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord Palmerston's letter of this morning, which she has read with great attention. The Queen will just make a few observations upon various points in it, to which she would wish to draw Lord Palmerston's attention. The Queen does so with strict impartiality, having had ample opportunities of hearing both sides of this intricate and highly-important question.
First of all, it strikes the Queen that, even if M. Thiers did raise the cry, which was so loud, for war in France (but which the Queen cannot believe he did to the extent Lord Palmerston does), that such an excitement once raised in a country like France, where the people are more excitable than almost any other nation, it cannot be so easily controuled and stopped again, and the Queen thinks this will be seen in time.
Secondly, the Queen cannot either quite agree in Lord Palmerston's observation, that the French Government state the danger of internal revolution, if not supported, merely to extract further concessions for Mehemet Ali. The Queen does not pretend to say that this danger is not exaggerated, but depend upon it, a certain degree of danger does exist, and that the situation of the King of the French and the present French Government is not an easy one. The majority, too, cannot be depended upon, as many would vote against Odillon Barrot,56 who would not vote on other occasions with the Soult-Guizot Ministry.
Thirdly, the danger of war is also doubtless greatly exaggerated, as also the numbers of the French troops. But Lord Palmerston must recollect how very warlike the French are, and that if once roused, they will not listen to the calm reasoning of those who wish for peace, or think of the great risk they run of losing by war, but only of the glory and of revenging insult, as they call it.
Fourthly, the Queen sees the difficulty there exists at the present moment of making any specific offer to France, but she must at the same time repeat how highly and exceedingly important she considers it that some sort of conciliatory agreement should be come to with France, for she cannot believe that the appeals made to her by the King of the French are only exertions of skilful diplomacy. The Queen's earnest and only wish is peace, and a maintenance of friendly relations with her allies, consistent with the honour and dignity of her country. She does not think, however, that the last would be compromised by attempts to soften the irritation still existing in France, or by attempts to bring France back to her former position in the Oriental Question.