Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria.[55]
RUSSIA AND THE BLACK SEA
Piccadilly, 26th April 1855.
Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to state that the Members of the Cabinet who met yesterday evening at the Chancellor's were of opinion that the Austrian proposal adopted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys,AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS even with his pretended modification, could not be described more accurately than in the concise terms of H.R.H. the Prince Albert, namely, that instead of making to cease the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, it would perpetuate and legalise that preponderance, and that instead of establishing a secure and permanent Peace, it would only establish a prospective case for war. Such a proposal therefore your Majesty's Advisers could not recommend your Majesty to adopt; but as the step to be taken seems rather to be to make such a proposal to Austria than to answer such a proposal which Austria has not formally made, and as M. Drouyn's telegraphic despatch stated that he thought that Lord John Russell would recommend such an arrangement to his colleagues, the Cabinet were of opinion that the best course would be simply to take no step at all until Lord John Russell's return, which may be expected to-morrow or next day, especially as Lord Clarendon had already, by telegraphic message of yesterday, intimated to the French Government that such an arrangement as that proposed by M. Drouyn, and which would sanction a Russian Fleet in the Black Sea to any amount short by one ship of the number existing in 1853, could not be agreed to by the British Government. Such an arrangement would, in the opinion of Viscount Palmerston, be alike dangerous and dishonourable; and as to the accompanying alliance with Austria for the future defence of Turkey and for making war with Russia, if she were to raise her Black Sea Fleet up to the amount of 1853, what reason is there to believe that Austria, who shrinks from war with Russia now that the Army of Russia has been much reduced by the losses of the last twelve months—now that her Forces are divided and occupied elsewhere than on the Austrian frontier, and now that England and France are actually in the field with great Armies, supported by great Fleets, what reason is there to believe that this same Austria would be more ready to make war four or five years hence, when the Army of Russia shall have repaired its losses and shall be more concentrated to attack Austria, when the Austrian Army shall have been reduced to its Peace Establishment, and when the Peace Establishments of England and France, withdrawn within their home stations, shall be less ready to co-operate with Austria in war? What reason, moreover, is there for supposing that Austria, who has recently declared that though prepared for war she will not make war for ten sail of the Line more or less in the Russian Black Sea Fleet, will some few years hence, when unprepared for war, draw the sword on account of the addition of one ship of war to the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea?
Such proposals are really a mockery.
[Footnote 55:] It had long become evident that Russia would refuse assent to the Third Point, terminating her preponderance in the Black Sea, but Austria now came forward with a proposal to limit the Russian force there to the number of ships authorised before the war. This was rejected by Russia, whereupon the representatives of England and France withdrew from the negotiations. Count Buol, representing Austria, then came forward again with a scheme the salient features of which were that, if Russia increased her Black Sea fleet beyond its existing strength, Turkey might maintain a force equal to it, and England and France might each have a naval force in the Black Sea equal to half the Russian force, while the increase of the Russian fleet beyond its strength in 1853 would be regarded by Austria as a casus belli. These terms were satisfactory neither to the British Government nor to the French Emperor, so that it was learned with some surprise that Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys (the French Plenipotentiary) had approved of them. Upon the Emperor definitely rejecting the proposals, M. Drouyn de Lhuys resigned; he was succeeded as Foreign Minister by Count Walewski, M. de Persigny becoming Ambassador in London. Lord John Russell tendered his resignation, but, at Lord Palmerston's solicitation, and most unfortunately for himself, he withdrew it.
Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon.
Buckingham Palace, 28th April 1855.
The Queen returns these very important letters. She thinks that it will be of great use to ask the Emperor to send M. Drouyn de Lhuys over here after having discussed the plans of peace with him, in order that he should hear our arguments also, and give us his reasons for thinking the terms acceptable. The influence of distance and difference of locality upon the resolves of men has often appeared to the Queen quite marvellous.