[1] For English regard for commerce see Blackstone, I, 260; "Indeed the law of England as a commercial country pays very particular regard to foreign merchants in innumerable instances." He also quotes Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, XX, 13; "That the English have made the protection of foreign merchants one of the articles of their national liberty." See also navigation Acts of 1650, Scobell, 152, of 1651, Scobell, 176, of 1660, 12 Car. II c 18.
[2] See discussion of the rule of 1756, and England's opposition to the armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800 in Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations. On her opposition to the immunity of enemy property on neutral vessels, see Ward, Treatise on the Rights and Duties of Neutrals, and Bowles, Maritime War. England is today the strongest opponent of the movement to abolish the right to capture enemy private property at sea, see Report of meeting of Institut of International Law, Revue de Droit International, 1875, vii, 275, 329; also official report of the Second Hague Conference.
[PART 2. EFFECTS OF LAW.]
a. The Navy
To discuss the effects of England's prize money law is a very difficult task. However a few remarks may be made considering the question with reference to its effect, first, on the English navy and second, on international law.
It might be thought that the encouragement of mariners by the hope of private gain would tend to increase the efficiency of the navy and this is the avowed purpose of distribution in all the statutes authorizing it. England has undoubtedly always had a very efficient navy but she has almost always found it necessary to use the press gang[1] to man her vessels in her important naval wars. The hope of prize money has not been sufficient to furnish enough volunteers to fill the navy.
In connection with privateering there can be no doubt but that the generous giving of prizes has enabled England to make effective war with little national expense. Elizabeth's wars cost her nothing, rather they were a source of income. The same was true of the wars of the eighteenth century. The hope of gain seemed always sufficient to enlist private enterprise in privateering war. However privateering is now abolished. Modern naval strategy demands a few men-of-war rather than many cruisers. Captain Mahan[2] considers commercial war as of comparatively small importance. An effective blow can only be struck by conflict with the enemy's armed vessels. Any amount of commerce destroying can not conclude the war in his opinion, though he by no means takes the stand that commerce destroying should be abolished. It would seem that the small share of prize which might possibly be received by a sailor in a modern ship would be a negligible factor in increasing naval efficiency. Rather it would be a deterrent as it would attract vessels into commercial war instead of into the more effective conflicts with the enemy's armed vessels. With the abolition of privateering it would seem that the value of prize money as a means of increasing the efficiency of the navy departed.