England's prize money laws can not be said to have imperiled neutral rights. England has always insisted on the most extreme belligerent rights but it can not be said that her courts often denied a neutral right that was really established by international law. The prize courts of Mansfield and Stowell have been considered models of fairness throughout the world. Though the utmost privileges were given to privateers and the sailors of the royal navy the even handed justice of the prize courts fully protected neutral rights by restoring illegal captures made with the hope of private gain. With a people of less law abiding disposition and less used to submission to law than the English this might not be true.
It might be supposed that the generosity toward the captors of prize would be calculated to decrease the destruction of prizes at sea. If the prize were destroyed of course the captor would obtain no prize money. English publicists are inclined to admit the right of destruction at sea. Thus Scott, Lushington and Holland say that it should not be resorted to except in cases of extreme urgency but on occasion it may be justifiable or even praiseworthy.[3] Continental writers on the contrary are inclined to disallow entirely the legality of the destruction of prizes. Bluntschli and Heffter greatly deprecate the practice.[4] In spite of the apparent authority for such action given by English publicists English cruisers have very seldom destroyed prizes. This may be due partly to her prize money law but probably to a greater extent to her widely scattered territories which make it almost always possible to get a prize to an English port. At present the destruction of neutral prizes is closely circumscribed by the provisions of the Declaration of London[5] on that point so it is not likely that the abolition of prize money would bring about an increase in this practice.
The movement toward the abolition of the right to capture enemy private property at sea, historically advocated by the United States, is coming into increasing favor in England, though England as a nation always has been and still is the leading opponent of the innovation.[6] As pointed out above, modern naval strategy deprecates commercial war as also does humanitarianism. A considerable number of English publicists are now advocating the abolition of this right not only on behalf of humanity but also as a matter of wise military policy for Great Britain. The increasing importance of unrestrained commerce to the island has influenced many to believe that England would gain more than she would lose by the abandonment of this belligerent right.[7]
It may be useful to consider how much effect the institution of prize money has upon England's attitude on this question. There is no doubt but that sailors and officers of the navy like to get prize money. There is the gambler's zest to money received in this way and undoubtedly the personnel of the navy would offer all the resistance in their power to the abolishment of prize money. A section in the proposed prize act of 1910 illustrates this.
The act was offered in order to permit of the appeal of prize cases to the international prize court provided for by the Hague conference of 1907. The section in question[8] authorized the admiralty to give prize money on estimated value even when the prize was liberated by the court. The object of this section was evidently to insure reward to the captors in case of a possible undue liberality on the part of the international prize court, and would seem to imply a certain lack of confidence in that court. This bill was lost with little discussion. However, the provision indicates that the element favoring prize money is ready to push its interests in legislation.
If the war right of capturing private enemy property at sea were abandoned the chance of getting prize money would automatically disappear except in the comparatively rare cases of contraband and breach of blockade. Is the naval sentiment in favor of prize money strong enough to keep England from falling in with other nations in this movement toward abolishing the right of capture at sea? It does not seem likely. The selfish, personal desires of a small portion of the population can not be sufficient to sway the policy of a great nation like England if broader considerations demand a change. England's resistance to the movement for abolishing the right to capture private property at sea can be traced to other causes. John Stuart Mill once called the right to attack commerce "our chief defensive weapon."[9] Phillimore, Twiss, Westlake, and Lorimer all favored the retention of the right. It is idle to suppose that these men had no stronger reason for their stand than that it permitted seamen to get prize money. From the standpoint of military science there has been in the past justification for the retention of this right by England, and many sincerely believe that even now England must retain it as a military defense.
In the vote on the American proposition for abolishing this right of capture taken at the Second Hague conference[10] the prize money laws of the different countries apparently had no effect on their vote. Italy and Sweden who give prize money as well as the United States and Germany who do not favored the resolution. On the other hand, Japan who has never given prize money voted against the proposal as also did Great Britain, France and Russia who have always given it. It should be remembered that the United States advocated the abolition of the right to capture private property at sea for a century before she abolished prize money. Italy also has consistently advocated that policy since 1870 though she still gives prize money.[11] It does not seem that the local law of prize money has any great effect on the countries attitude on the question of the right to capture private property at sea.
As stated there is a growing movement in England in favor of abandoning the right of capturing private property at sea. The discussion has been entirely based on considerations of broad national policy. The existence of prize money has not entered into the matter. It does not seem likely that England's laws of prize money have had or do now have any appreciable influence on her attitude in this question.
c. Conclusion.
It seems that under present conditions the giving of prize money in England has little effect either for good or evil. Since the abolition of privateering it appears to have had little value in increasing the efficiency of the navy or in decreasing the expense of war. Neutral rights have not been imperiled by it for in England it has not given rise to biased judgment on illegal captures. While it may have decreased the destruction of prizes before adjudication it does not appear likely that its abandonment would now have any effect on this matter. Neither does it seem probable that it has had much influence in determining England's stand on the question of the right to capture private enemy property at sea.