The notable characteristics of the several statutes which thus far have been pointed out are discernible in the express language of the acts. In writing or using any treatise or compilation on privileged communications between physician and patient, it is to be constantly borne in mind that the privilege is of statutory origin; that the statutes are often dissimilar; and that the value of a judicial interpretation of one law in the construction of another varies with the dissimilarity.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES.
The judicial decisions which are discussed here are those that deal with the privilege secured by the restrictive laws. The analogy between the privilege of a client with regard to his attorney’s disclosures, and that of a patient with regard to the testimony of his physician, is not so complete as to make it essential to present here, for the sake of their bearing upon the subject now under consideration, a study of the principles to be deduced from the numerous decisions with reference to attorneys as witnesses. The analogous cases of clergymen and priests are also beyond the scope of this treatment.
Rules of Construction.—The restrictions are in derogation of the common law[228] and in accordance with the rule of interpretation ordinarily adopted should be strictly construed,[229] but the courts have generally looked at the policy of the enactments, and have construed them so as to preserve inviolably the confidence existing between physician and patient, without narrowing their effect to a strict interpretation of their language.
In Indiana, under a former law which protected matters confided, it was said that the statute should be given a broader scope than the word confided in a strict sense imports, so as to cover matters learned by observation and examination.[230] But, though the statute in terms absolutely prohibits a disclosure, it has been said, in Indiana, that it gives no right to the physician to refuse to testify where the patient waives the privilege,[231] and that it creates no absolute incompetency, because to hold otherwise would result in obstructing justice without subserving the purpose of the statute.[232] In Missouri, there is a dictum that the privilege should be carefully limited to what the statute requires, not so much because it is in derogation of the common law as because it is in exclusion of the best evidence, on the ground of privilege;[233] but in this very case, the real question was whether the word oral should be construed into the statute so as to exclude from its protection information acquired by inspection and observation, and it was held that no such narrow interpretation was proper. In a later case the narrowing dicta of the foregoing opinion were disapproved,[234] and subsequently the disposition to make a liberal construction was shown by the highest court of the State, although a general rule of interpretation was not announced.[235] In New York, the rule that a statute in derogation of the common law is strictly construed does not apply to the Code of Civil Procedure.[236] But before the enactment of this statutory rule[237] there was a tendency to interpret liberally the law prohibiting disclosures.[238] In Arkansas the tendency seems to be to construe the law strictly.[239] The spirit of interpretation will be more fully illustrated in the discussion of particular cases which follows.
In New York it was claimed that the protection afforded by the statute is nullified by the provision for the examination of a party before trial,[240] but it was held that the statutes are consistent and the physician cannot be made to disclose, though his patient may be.[241]
Classes of Actions.
Criminal Actions and Evidence of Crime in Civil Actions.—The statutes confining the restriction to civil actions have been cited above.[242] In Iowa, in an action for breach of promise to marry, it was said that the privilege does not extend to the protection of advice for the commission of a crime.[243] In New York the rule was at first embodied in the Revised Statutes of the State,[244] but upon the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure it was included therein,[245] and subsequently the provision of the Revised Statutes was repealed.[246] In that State by law the rules of evidence in civil cases are applicable also to criminal cases, except as otherwise expressly provided;[247] and the statutes provide no different rule in criminal actions as to this class of evidence. Notwithstanding this fact, however, it has been said by the Court of Appeals, in a case where there was an attempt to screen a murderer by insisting that his victim’s physician was not a competent witness as to information acquired by him while attending his patient,[248] that the design of the law was to enable the patient to make known his condition to his physician without the danger of disclosing what would annoy his feelings, damage his character, or impair his standing while living, or disgrace his memory when dead, but that it was not intended to protect a murderer rather than to shield his victim; and quoting from the opinion of Talcott, J., in the court below,[249] the Court said: “The purpose for which the aid of the statute is invoked is so utterly foreign to the purpose and object of the act and so diametrically opposed to any intent which the legislature can be supposed to have had in enacting it, so contrary to and inconsistent with its spirit, which most clearly intended to protect the patient and not to shield one who is charged with his murder; that in such a case the statute is not to be so construed as to be used as a weapon of defence to a party so charged instead of a protection to his victim.” Accordingly it was held that the evidence was not to be excluded under the statute. But the rule is still applicable to criminal actions. In a later case, where the accused was indicted for abortion, the same court held, that where the patient was living and the disclosure tended to convict her too of crime or to cast discredit and disgrace upon her, the evidence of her physician as to information acquired by him in attendance upon her was inadmissible in the trial of the man charged with the crime.[250] In a still later case,[251] the General Term of the Supreme Court held, where the accused was on trial for murder and he had confided to a physician what he had done, that the physician could not disclose the confidence. The rule deducible from these decisions seems to be that in New York the privilege extends to criminal actions, even though they be trials for murder, and even though the person accused be the patient, but that the statute will be applied only for the protection of the patient, and where it is apparent that no injury can possibly be done to the patient or his memory by the admission of the evidence, and the interests of justice demand the disclosure, for the punishment of a person for an injury done to the patient involving a violation of the criminal law, and the patient is not alive to waive the privilege, that the disclosure is not forbidden.
In New York efforts have been made to exclude from the operation of the statute other classes of actions, to which it has been urged that the reasons for the enactment do not apply, or in which the mischief alleged to be wrought by its enforcement has been suggested as ground for believing that the legislature could not have intended to include them. Of these, actions for divorce on the ground of adultery are one class; but it has been held that they constitute no exception.[252]