Testamentary Causes.—In New York it was long supposed that the policy of the law excepted probate proceedings; it was so held by the Surrogate of New York City;[253] and also by the General Term of the Supreme Court,[254] by which it was stated that the practice had prevailed for a half-century in will cases,[255] but the Court of Appeals,[256] has decided that testamentary cases constitute no exception to the rule, the judge who delivered the opinion stating that there is no more reason for allowing secret ailments of a patient to be brought to light in a contest over his will than in any other case, and that if mischief be wrought by the law the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. The legislature has since afforded the remedy,[257] but not to the extent of adopting the rule of the earlier cases. In Indiana, in an action to set aside a will, the testimony of the testator’s physician has been excluded.[258] And in Michigan and Missouri it seems that testamentary cases are no exception to the general rule.[259]
Lunacy and Habitual Drunkenness.—It has been claimed in New York that inquisitions of lunacy are an exception, and recently it has been held that the alleged lunatic’s physician may testify as to his mental condition because no one is better qualified to testify,[260] but this decision seems to be at variance with the principle of the decisions of the Court of Appeals with reference to testamentary cases, and presents no satisfactory reason for a distinction. In a similar case in the Supreme Court, Chambers, it was held that a medical attendant at an asylum could not testify.[261] It has also been held that a physician cannot make an affidavit as to the appearance and condition of his patient to support a petition for the appointment of a committee for him as an habitual drunkard.[262]
Fraud.—Still another class of actions in which contending principles have been invoked to make an exception in the law of privilege, is actions on life-insurance contracts. The contract of insurance is uberrimæ fidei, and the defence of fraud in the application is frequently interposed to defeat a claim under a policy. Medical testimony would often be the most satisfactory evidence to establish the fraud, and efforts have been made to introduce it under that excuse, but without avail. In the case of Dilleber vs. Home Life Insurance Company, in the Supreme Court of New York at General Term,[263] the question seems to have been directly before the court, and Davis, P. J., dissenting, insisted that the suppression of a physician’s testimony ought not to be permitted so as to cover up a fraud, but the majority of the court held otherwise; the case was subsequently overruled, but not on the ground urged by Justice Davis.[264] The number of insurance cases in which the rule has been enforced seems to leave it beyond question that it will not be relaxed for the purpose of establishing fraud,[265] although that announcement has not been specifically made. There seems no reason that the rule should be relaxed in that regard when it is not relaxed to establish the crime of the patient; though the mischief that may be done in such cases is apparent.[266]
The Witness.—The statutory provisions as to the professional status of the witness whose testimony is excluded have already been shown.[267] The facts which establish the relation of physician and patient will be treated later.[268] The witness is a member of a profession, but there is very little discussion in the cases as to what constitutes a physician or surgeon.[269] The language of the statutes as well as their policy and intent has been said to plainly embrace a physician who casually or in any way attends and prescribes for a patient, whether he be a family physician or the usual medical attendant or not.[270] The spirit of the acts would protect communications made to any person attending the patient in the accepted capacity of physician or surgeon wherever that might have happened, though the letter would confine it in some instances to duly authorized or duly licensed persons. It does not seem to have been established whether such authority or license must have been granted under the laws of the State where the trial is conducted, nor how the several statutes apply to communications made elsewhere, especially in States or countries where authority or license to practise is not required by law.
It has been said with reference to the New York law that it is absolutely necessary that the witness should be a duly qualified physician;[271] and it has been held that the words “duly authorized” mean those persons who are not prohibited by the penal code from practising, so that an unlicensed physician may be compelled to disclose confidential communications.[272] Whether the same rule would be applied with reference to information obtained in another State by a physician duly authorized to practise there although prohibited from practising in New York, is a question that is suggested as a case within the reason of the law but outside of its letter, and one which does not seem to have been answered.
In New York, in an action by a physician for compensation for his services, it was held that a person who merely answered for a physician at his office in his absence, and was not himself a physician, is not a witness whose testimony is privileged.[273]
In Missouri it has been held that a drug and prescription clerk is not a privileged witness.[274] The question arose in the same State, whether a dental surgeon is forbidden to testify under the statute, but its determination was not essential to the judgment and it was left unanswered.[275]
To establish the privilege it is necessary that the person who insists upon it to exclude testimony should show by competent evidence that the witness belongs to the class privileged under the law.[276] But where the physician testified that he was a regular practising physician and attended in that capacity, and he was not examined further as to his due authority, it was held that a failure to produce his license could not be urged on appeal as reason for compelling him to testify.[277] The Court said that if the privilege were the physician’s he might, if the objection were taken, be required to prove by the best evidence that he was duly authorized, but as it is the patient’s privilege, in the absence of objection to the sufficiency of the proof, the patient is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that the physician had the license which the law requires to entitle him to practise.