But where the district attorney sent a physician to jail to make an examination of a prisoner’s mental and physical condition, and he made such examination, and it did not appear that he prescribed for or treated the prisoner or that the prisoner accepted his services, the opinion of the physician as to his mental condition was admitted.[398]
Where the defendant employed a physician to examine the plaintiff, and he went as coming from the defendant for that purpose, and examined the plaintiff in the presence of his attending physician, but not as the plaintiff’s physician and not for the purpose of prescribing, the relation of physician and patient was not established.[399] Where a physician examined the plaintiff at the instance of the plaintiff’s physician, but it was not shown that he was requested or expected to treat or prescribe or to advise in respect to either, or that he did either, it was held that the relation was not established;[400] but a physician consulted by the patient’s regular physician for the purpose of advice concerning his treatment is a physician contemplated by the statute;[401] as is also the partner of a physician who is present during a conference with the patient or who overhears such a conference.[402] Attendance at the patient’s house is not contemplated as essential by the law, and it makes no difference where the examination is conducted.[403] But where the physician was also a county clerk and the alleged patient was an attorney, and the consultation took place in the clerk’s office and consisted of an examination of an eruption on the skin, which was made gratuitously and without a prescription being made or asked for, the relation was held not to have been established, notwithstanding that the clerk made use of his knowledge and learning as a physician in forming his opinion, and that it was in confidence that he possessed medical skill that the person requested the examination.[404]
It does not follow that the relation once established continues always; the secrecy growing out of the relationship, as to knowledge then acquired, always continues unless properly waived; and the physician will not be allowed to testify in regard to matter which is partly the result of such information, though another part may have been acquired independent of the relation;[405] but where it is clear that the matter desired is independent of the relation of physician and patient, such evidence is admissible if otherwise competent.[406]
“Professional Capacity.”—The States in which the statutes limit the privilege to information acquired in a professional capacity have been enumerated.[407] As to what constitutes a professional capacity, the discussion of the facts that establish the relation of physician and patient, and of the information necessary to enable a physician to prescribe or a surgeon to act, makes it unnecessary to discuss at length the meaning of this phrase. The decision in Lunz v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company[408] would make it appear that in Missouri information apparent on a casual inspection which any one might make is not received in a professional capacity, but this idea is disapproved in the later case of Kling v. City of Kansas.[409] Information acquired by the physician by observing the patient on the street anterior to his employment as a physician is not received by him in a professional capacity.[410]
In New York, where the physician had not seen the patient before or since his interview for the purpose of treatment, and he was asked what his opinion was, based on a general sight of the man before the examination, it was held that the physician could not properly answer, as all the information upon which the opinion would be based must have been acquired in a professional capacity;[411] but in another case a physician was permitted to express his opinion as to the mental condition of a patient whom he had seen at various times when not in attendance, excluding from his mind any knowledge or information obtained while acting as her medical attendant and confining his answer to such knowledge and information as he had obtained by seeing her when not his patient.[412] It has been said that where information is not such as is obtained on sight by any person, but by removing clothing and by percussion and listening to the action of the lungs, these are professional acts and the information may be considered as obtained professionally.[413] It has been said that information received in a professional capacity involves a decision, though it may be negative; and that signing as witness to a will is not a professional act.[414]
Matter Necessary to Enable a Physician to Prescribe or a Surgeon to Act.—A list of those States whose laws limit the privilege to matter necessary to enable the witness to prescribe or act for the patient is to be found in another place.[415]
In Arkansas, where six hours after delivery, the patient stated to her physician who attended at accouchement, that she had never been engaged to marry and never had promised to marry, the statements were held not to be necessary to enable the physician to act.[416]
In Iowa, a physician who had treated a patient for injuries was not allowed to testify whether his patient told him that the car on which he was injured was in motion at the time, because as the injury would be likely to be more severe if the car was in motion, that information was necessary to enable the physician to prescribe.[417]
In Michigan, a physician was allowed to contradict his patient as to when her trouble commenced, in the absence of evidence that such information was necessary to enable him to act.[418] Where a physician was asked whether he treated a person for typhoid fever, and he answered that she was not so diseased, it was held that this information was not necessary to enable him to act.[419] And the same was held to be true where a physician examined a prisoner at the jail and testified that he was diseased, the prisoner having been notified at the time of the examination that it was made by direction of the prosecuting attorney and there being no intention to prescribe or act for the prisoner.[420] But it has been stated that all disclosures by a patient to a physician respecting ailments are privileged whether necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or not.[421]
In Minnesota, a physician was allowed to disclose statements as to suffering made by his patient, but not for the purpose of enabling him to prescribe or act.[422]