In Missouri, it has been said that information as to the way in which an injury was inflicted is of the greatest necessity for successful treatment; and that it is information which physicians universally demand and receive.[423] In another case, with reference to the cause of a patient’s condition, it was said that while knowledge of the cause may not be necessary, the disclosure of the cause cannot be made without a disclosure of the condition, and that as a medical person cannot tell indirectly what he is forbidden to tell directly, the physician’s evidence of the cause is inadmissible.[424] In another case it was said that any information, necessarily coming to a physician in order to treat his patient, is to be regarded as necessary information though unimportant, and that the test is how it was acquired, not whether it could have been acquired in a different way, and therefore it was incompetent for a physician to testify that his patient was drunk when he treated him.[425]
In New York, in an early case,[426] where a man consulted a physician with reference to committing an abortion and told him that a certain woman was pregnant by him, this admission was said not to be essential to enable him to prescribe, even if the relation of physician and patient were considered established; but this seems to be at variance with the later case of People v. Brower,[427] where the accused consulted a physician with reference to the treatment of a woman on whom he had attempted to commit an abortion, and admitted that he had done so, and the physician was not permitted to disclose it. A broader view is now taken of the word necessary. It has been held by the Court of Appeals that a physician could not testify that his patient had a venereal disease while under his care as a physician, the presumption being that he learned it for the purpose of prescribing;[428] and again, that it is assumed from the relationship that the information would not have been imparted except for the purpose of aiding the physician to prescribe.[429] But this presumption does not attach to information regarding a patient, communicated by a third person.[430]
Where a person went to a physician to call for medicine, and it appeared that he was not consulting for himself and was not representing any one else who needed or desired medical assistance, the physician was allowed to testify as to a conversation which took place at that time.[431]
In the case of Edington v. Ætna Life Insurance Company,[432] it was said that before the exclusion, the facts on which it is justified must appear in some way, and the Court must know somewhat of the circumstances; from the opinion it is easy to infer that it is only confidential communications and information as to secret ailments which may be regarded as necessary within the statute; but this view was overruled in Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,[433] and there it was distinctly stated that it is enough that the witness acquired the information in his character as physician and in the due and proper exercise of his calling, and that it is not incumbent on the person objecting, to show by formal proof that the information was necessary to enable the witness to prescribe. In this case the examination of the witness was as to the cause of his patient’s death, and the argument urged upon the attention of the Court was that information regarding the cause of death could not be necessary to enable the physician to prescribe, as the utility of the prescription ceased with the death and before the cause was determined; but the Court held that the privilege attached, because, although the death was the result of the cause, the facts constituting the cause were learned while the physician was attending the living patient in a professional capacity and from the symptoms manifested at that time.
In consonance with the decision in Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,[434] it has been held that a physician who amputated a patient’s leg could not testify as to its condition at the time it was amputated.[435]
The fact that the physician does not prescribe does not defeat the privilege; if the information is acquired in the course of professional employment the statute operates, for the decision that neither advice nor medicine is needed is a professional act within the spirit of the law.[436] Medicus optimus, medicamentum minimum, is the maxim used in another case to illustrate this point.[437]
But it cannot be predicated as matter of law that a physician cannot exclude from his consideration facts learned or opinions formed while attending as physician; therefore he can testify as to his opinion on hypothetical facts which might be deemed to relate to another person as well as the patient; and where the physician testified that he could so form an opinion, his opinion of such assumptions was held to be admissible in evidence as expert testimony.[438]
But it is not all information which will be presumed to have been necessary to enable the physician to act; it seems that where the knowledge is such that it is evidently immaterial to the physician’s decision, it will be admitted. Such a case is that of Hoyt v. Hoyt,[439] where the testimony of physicians was admitted to show the attitude of their patient toward his daughter and their advice to him concerning her, the evidence being for the purpose of showing the testator’s opinion and not the physicians’. It has also been held that a statement made by a patient on the physician’s last visit as to what occurred at the time the patient was injured, tending to show contributory negligence, was not necessary information.[440] And a physician’s evidence of the declaration of his patient as to making a will and the doctor’s advice on that subject have been admitted.[441]
THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT IN DEALING WITH THE PRIVILEGE.
All questions of the competency of evidence are solved by the Court and not by the jury.[442] The facts establishing the privilege are presented to the Court for its consideration. In Iowa it has been held that a fair trial demands that it should not be made to appear to the jury in an action that the patient is reluctant to waive his privilege, and that therefore the subject-matter of waiver has no place in the taking of testimony except when introduced by the party permitted to make it, and the Court should not allow the patient to be asked to answer under oath whether he is willing to waive his privilege.[443]