strong and more distinct. Here again our own language supplies us with an exact parallel: indeed this is the only way of accounting for the singular mixture of the two verbs shall and will, by which, as we have no auxiliary answering to the German werde, we express the future tense. Our future, or at least what answers to it, is, I shall, thou wilt, he will. When speaking in the first person, we speak submissively: when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously. In our older writers, for instance in our translation of the Bible, shall is applied to all three persons: we had not then reacht that stage of politeness which shrinks from the appearance even of speaking compulsorily of another. On the other hand the Scotch use will in the first person: that is, as a nation they have not acquired that particular shade of good-breeding which shrinks from thrusting itself[[61]] forward."
[§ 590]. Notice of the use of will and shall, by Professor De Morgan.—"The matter to be explained is the synonymous character of will in the first person with shall in the second and third; and of shall in the first person with will in the second and third: shall (1) and will (2, 3) are called predictive: shall (2, 3) and will (1) promissive. The suggestion now proposed will require four distinctive names.
"Archdeacon Hare's usus ethicus is taken from the brighter side of human nature:—'When speaking in the first person we speak submissively; when speaking to or of another, we speak courteously.' This explains I shall, thou wilt; but I cannot think it explains I will, thou shalt. It often happens
that you will, with a persuasive tone, is used courteously for something next to, if not quite, you shall. The present explanation is taken from the darker side; and it is to be feared that the à priori probabilities are in its favour.
"In introducing the common mode of stating the future tenses, grammar has proceeded as if she were more than a formal science. She has no more business to collect together I shall, thou wilt, he will, than to do the same with I rule, thou art ruled, he is ruled.
"It seems to be the natural disposition of man to think of his own volition in two of the following catagories, and of another man's in the other two:
Compelling, non-compelling; restrained, non-restrained.
"The ego, with reference to the non-ego, is apt, thinking of himself, to propound the alternative, 'Shall I compel, or shall I leave him to do as he likes?' so that, thinking of the other, the alternative is, 'shall he be restrained, or shall he be left to his own will?' Accordingly, the express introduction of his own will is likely to have reference to compulsion, in case of opposition: the express introduction of the will of another, is likely to mean no more than the gracious permission of the ego to let non-ego do as he likes. Correlatively, the suppression of reference to his own will, and the adoption of a simply predictive form on the part of the ego, is likely to be the mode with which, when the person is changed, he will associate the idea of another having his own way; while the suppression of reference to the will of the non-ego is likely to infer restraint produced by the predominant will of the ego.