The time of service of one of his two regiments of infantry, the 5th Missouri, Salomon’s, had expired some days before the battle and they had clamored to go home. On the first of August he had induced them to remain with the army eight days more. This latter term had expired the day before the battle. The men therefore were under no obligations to fight, except that they had marched out to do so, and when the time came, suddenly remembered that “they did not have to fight.” The 3d regiment, Sigel’s own, was not the old 3d, that fought at Carthage; that regiment, its time having expired, had been mustered out, and the new regiment was composed of 400 new recruits and of but a few other men who had seen service. The men serving the artillery were new recruits who knew next to nothing of gunnery, and were commanded by two lieutenants whose only experience as artillerists had been in the Prussian army in a time of peace. Again it is stated that only about half of the companies were officered by men with commissions, which Sigel says, was the fault of the three months’ service.
But over all it is claimed that Sigel’s complete defeat was the result of an attack of vastly superior forces, the flower of McCulloch’s army, that was permitted to approach fatally near under the mistake that they were friends instead of enemies.
As explaining and detailing something of the retreat of that wing of Sigel’s command which turned to the east, the following statement of Captain (now General) E. A. Carr, who, as previously stated, commanded the advance guard of Sigel’s brigade, may be found of interest:—
“At about 9 o’clock Capt. Carr received word that Sigel’s infantry were in full flight and that he was to retreat with all haste. After galloping away as best he could for about a mile and a half to the rear, Carr came upon Sigel at the spring where the army had halted the first night when returning from Dug Spring some days before. After a brief consultation it was decided to move south on the Fayetteville road until there was a chance to go out and circle around the pursuing enemy and then strike for Springfield. There were then present at the spring Sigel, Carr, Lieut.-Col. Albert, Carr’s 56 cavalry, 200 of Sigel’s badly demoralized infantry, one piece of artillery, and two caissons. After “retiring” rather hastily for a mile or so a body of cavalry was observed in front, and Sigel sent Carr up to see the condition of affairs and report at once. Arriving at the front Carr discovered that the Confederate cavalry were coming in from the right and forming across the road, to stop the retreating Federals and send them back to the care of McCulloch’s division again. Reporting at once to Sigel, that officer directed Carr to turn off at the first right-hand road, which happened to be near the point where he (Carr) then stood. Retreating along this road in a brisk walk Sigel asked Carr to march slowly so that the footmen could keep up. Carr replied that unless they hurried forward they would be cut off at the crossing of Wilson’s Creek, and that the infantry ought to march as fast under the circumstances as a horse could walk. Sigel then said, “Go on, and we will keep up.” On arriving at the creek, however, and looking back, Carr saw that the infantry had not kept up, but that a large body of Texas and Arkansas cavalry was moving down and would form an unpleasant junction with him in a few seconds. “To use a Westernism,” says Gen. Carr, “there was no time for fooling then, and as I had waited long enough on the slow-motioned infantry to water my horses, and they were not yet in sight, I lit out for a place of safety which I soon reached, and after waiting another while for Sigel, I went on to Springfield. I was sorry to leave Sigel behind, in the first place, but I supposed all the time he was close to me until I reached the creek, and then it would have done no good for my company to have remained and been cut to pieces also, as were Sigel and his men, who were ambuscaded and all broken up, and Sigel himself narrowly escaped.”
CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF WILSON’S CREEK.—Concluded.
The Southern Side of the Story—The Part Taken by McCulloch’s Army—Preparations for a March on Springfield—A Light Rain Interferes—The Federal Attack—A Complete Surprise—McCulloch Thinks it “Another of Rains’ Scares!”—The Fight Against Lyon—Order of Battle—McCulloch Comes to the Rescue—The Missourians in Battle—Detailed Account of the Fighting—The Beginning of the End—Victory!—No Pursuit of the Retreating Federals—McCulloch’s Destruction of Sigel—After the Famous Victory—Comparative Strength and Losses of the Two Armies—The Federal Strength—The Confederate Strength—Price’s Army by Divisions—The Federal Loss by Regiments and Battalions—The Confederate Loss by Divisions—Disposing of the Dead—The Home Guards at Springfield—The Retreat from Springfield—Care of the Federal Wounded—The Army Sets out—Hundreds of Citizens Follow it—The Confederates Enter Springfield—McCulloch’s Proclamation—Price’s Proclamation—Joy and Congratulations.
THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE STORY.
As one side, the Northern, or Federal, or Union side, of the battle of Wilson’s Creek has been told it is but proper that the other, the Southern or Confederate, or secession side, should be given. The statements herein made have been derived from the most authentic sources possible to be consulted. The writer returns his sincere thanks to those Confederate officers, scattered from the Iowa line to the Rio Grande, who have responded to his request for information so promptly and so fully, and in such well written letters.
THE PART TAKEN BY M’CULLOCH’S ARMY.
It will be remembered that Gen. McCulloch had at last yielded to Gen. Price’s persistent and positive demands, and had agreed to march against Lyon at Springfield on the night of August 9th and attack him on the morning of the 10th. The march was to be made in four columns and to be begun at 9 o’clock at night.