Just after dark a light rain fell, and it was very dark and a heavy rain storm seemed to be coming up. McCulloch well knew that many of the Missouri troops were not supplied with cartridge boxes, or cartridges either, and that if they moved out from under shelter and it rained hard, as it promised to do, their ammunition would become wet and unserviceable, carried, as much of it would be, in powder-flasks, cotton sacks and shot-pouches. There was also danger that in the Egyptian darkness that had settled down over the land the marching columns would get lost or bewildered, and not come up to the proper place at the proper time. Accordingly, just as some of the troops were preparing to start, McCulloch countermanded the order to march at that time, and the army lay down to sleep, holding itself in readiness to move, however, the men with their guns by their sides. Not much sleep was had, however, for lack of all proper accommodations, and because of the myriads of mosquitoes on the warpath that night up and down the valley of Wilson’s creek.
Had Gen. Price been left to himself the day of the 9th, he would have taken “my Missouri boys” that night and marched toward Springfield over the very route that Lyon took from Springfield to the Confederate camp, via the Mt. Vernon road and over the prairie, and the two armies, Price’s and Lyon’s, would have met, to each other’s surprise, about midnight, somewhere near the present site of Dorchester.
In his official report to the Confederate Secretary of War, Gen. McCulloch states that his effective force at the battle of Wilson’s Creek was 5,300 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and fifteen pieces of artillery. The majority of the cavalry were armed only with rifles, revolvers, shot-guns, and old flint-lock muskets. There were hundreds of other horsemen along with the army, that were so imperfectly armed as to be of but little efficiency, and during the battle were only in the way.
THE FEDERAL ATTACK.
Col. T. L. Snead states that on the night of the 9th he sat up all night at Gen. Price’s headquarters, which were on the side of the creek, at the foot of the sloping, rocky, black-jack hills on whose summit the main battle was fought. About daybreak Gen. Price got up in great impatience and sent for McCulloch, who soon afterward arrived, accompanied by Col. James McIntosh (of the 2d Arkansas Mounted Riflemen), his assistant adjutant-general. “Gen. Price and I were just sitting down to breakfast,” says Col. Snead, “and they sat down with us.”
As the officers were eating, a messenger came running up from the front, where Gen. Rains’ division was posted, a mile or more away, and said that the Yankees were advancing, full 20,000 strong, and were on Rains’ line already, peppering his camp with musketry. “O, pshaw,” said McCulloch, laughingly, “that’s another of Rains’ scares,” alluding to the Dug Springs affair. “Tell Gen. Rains I will come to the front myself directly,” he added. The three officers went on eating, and in a minute or two another messenger came up and reported that the Federals were not more than a mile away, and had come suddenly upon Rains’ men as they lay on their arms and had driven them back. McCulloch again said, “O, nonsense! That’s not true;” but just then Rains’ men could be seen falling back in confusion. Gen. Price rose up and said to Col. Snead, “Have my horse saddled, and order the troops under arms at once.” He had hardly spoken when Totten’s battery unlimbered and sent its first shot, and about the same instant Sigel’s guns opened.
Dispositions for battle were quickly made. Price was ordered to move at once towards Rains with the rest of the Missourians. Pearce was ordered to form on Price’s left. Very soon Totten’s battery was in plain sight on the top of the hills in front and pounding away, while Sigel’s guns in the rear plainly gave notice that the Federals were on all sides.
The surprise was perfect. Most of the Southern troops were asleep. The few pickets that were out had mostly been called in to prepare for the early march, and this enabled Lyon to get close to the line,—upon the skirmishers, in fact,—before being discovered. The troops hurried out as fast and as best they could. The majority of Price’s Missourians had their horses with them. Nearly every secessionist, upon enlisting, wanted to ride and did ride. The idea of walking was distasteful in more ways than one,—it was laborious, to begin with, and it was considered somewhat plebeian and disgraceful. And the horsemen, so many of them, proved a serious disadvantage to the Southern cause. They stripped the country in many parts of this State and west of the Mississippi, not only of provisions but of forage and provender, cumbered the roads, and often in battle did more harm than good. At Wilson’s Creek the horses became frightened and unmanageable, and at one time they and some of their riders came near stampeding the entire Southern army. Hundreds of them tried to escape from the field by the Fayetteville road, but found it held by Sigel and his Germans.
THE FIGHT AGAINST LYON.
The Missourians under Rains were first attacked by Lyon. Rains had his division under arms and in line with commendable promptness. A great many of his men scattered, it is true, but the majority were soon in ranks and fighting the enemy. Rains’ division was a large one, including all the men from the populous secession counties of Saline, Lafayette, Jackson, Johnson, and Pettis, and it held that part of the line in front of Totten’s battery. Gen. Price instantly ordered the other division commanders,—Slack, McBride, Clark and Parsons,—to move their infantry and artillery rapidly forward to the support of Rains. Rains’ second brigade was in the extreme advance, and consisted of some 1,200 or 1,500 men, mounted and dismounted, temporarily under the command of Col. Cawthorn.