Historical records of the Buffs, East Kent Regiment (3rd Foot)

by R. S. H. Moody

A Russian advance from Persia began to make itself felt on the Turks, however, and on the 20th May the right bank of the Tigris as far as the Hai, with the exception of bridge guards on the latter water, was clear of the enemy. This, and the fact that the Turks still held the Sanna i Yat lines on the other side of the Tigris, materially influenced the plan of campaign which came later.

As far as the Buffs were concerned their summer work consisted mostly in harvesting barley early in the hot weather, and in road making. There was also a great deal of work in connection with the necessary supply of water. The battalion was between four and five miles from the river—the only supply, and consequently water had to be carried, Indian fashion, on mules in “packals,” which held about eight gallons each. These, made of zinc and covered with felt, soon got knocked about and, as they began to leak, much water was lost in transit. The so-called friendly Arabs were consistent and determined thieves, and if the water-carrying mules had been left under the sole care of their Indian drivers, they would soon have disappeared. Consequently water convoy work became a very heavy and regular duty amongst the many others our soldiers had to perform. The local Arabs were very enterprising marauders and gave considerable trouble sneaking about the camp. On one occasion some of them actually entered the orderly room tent, but they found nothing which they considered worthy of removal.

Sir Stanley Maude took over supreme command on the 28th August, 1916, a time of the year when active operations might soon be possible and when the improvement in communications, inaugurated by Sir Percy Lake, had begun to bear fruit. When early in the year every man’s mind was eagerly bent on the relief of Kut he could, as soldiers in former campaigns always had to, digest his bully beef and biscuit somehow and sustain life on it; moreover, when sick, he contrived to do without luxuries and to bear discomforts. But now all this was rapidly changing for the better, and with improved communications came greatly superior comfort. The Turks seemed very full of enterprise and to be planning various ambitious campaigns, and Maude very rightly considered that the best way to stop all that sort of thing was to aim at the heart of the beast and to make Baghdad the object of resolute and determined attack.

First of all, however, there was still a good deal to do in the way of preparation, and August was too early a date, in any case, for active work. The men were, of course, still suffering from heat and were not by any means fit for a strenuous campaign. Then the communications still wanted perfecting, and large reserves of ammunition and stores of all kinds must be brought up to the fighting area. “By the end of November,” he says, “preliminary arrangements were well advanced, a steady stream of reinforcements had been moving up stream and drafts joining. The health of the soldiers was improving and the training for war was advancing.” The general concentration was at Sheikh Saad. The River Tigris was by no means a straight line, but still it flowed from Baghdad to Sheikh Saad, and, in order to defend himself against an advance up it, it is plain that the Turk should continue to hold positions astride the river; for these positions could be selected to rest with their flanks on marshes so that they could not be turned, and so would necessitate one frontal attack after another.

II. Battle of Kut, 1917

As has already been seen, however, the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his troops from the main river’s right bank, though as a matter of fact he held a strong line of trenches across the Hai covering a bridge over that water just south of Kut and bending back to the Tigris at each end. His main line, however, was along the left bank of that river, his right flank, of course, being almost in the direction of Baghdad, while his left was thrown back along the Sanna i Yat lines, which he still held strongly. Seeing this, Maude determined to attack him up stream and so make him bolt back to his only road to his base or else cut him off from Baghdad altogether. One party of ours, under Lt.-General Cobbe, V.C., faced the Sanna i Yat lines on the left bank of the Tigris, and another, under Lt.-General Marshall, in which were serving the Buffs, were as much as eleven miles up stream of them and on the other side of the river. The first thing to do was to seize the Hai stream, and this was done by Marshall by surprise on the night of the 13th/14th December, 1916, while Cobbe demonstrated in front of the Sanna i Yat lines as if about to attack furiously. After getting possession of the Hai, which he crossed at Bessouia and Atab, Marshall extended towards the north and at the same time wheeled up the bulk of his command to attack the bridgehead. He broke through on the night of the 18th opposite Kut and reached the main river, thus securing command of the Tigris up stream of the Khadaira Bend. This was important because, after he advanced, his food and stores had to go up by land for some miles.

In connection with all this manœuvring the Buffs had on the 13th December struck their camp and marched out to reserve trenches, in support of the movement of that date, and had followed up and formed a backing to the troops in advance. At 7 a.m. on the 16th the battalion appeared to be going into a serious action and B Company was sent out to take a certain ridge in front, with C in support. Everything appeared to be working satisfactorily, but at 12.30 orders came for withdrawal to another position, where the men dug in as far as possible and connection was obtained with the 13th Division on the left of the Buffs. B Company had three men wounded in this advance and D had one during the retirement to the new position. On the 17th a concentration on Bessouia was ordered and carried out, and the next day a demonstration was made without much result, Captain Harrison receiving a shrapnel wound and the little expedition returning to Bessouia in the evening.

In connection with Maude’s plan of getting up stream of his enemy, Major-General Crocker with his command attempted on the 20th to throw a bridge over the Tigris at the Shumran Bend and the 35th Brigade marched up to that place to assist, the Buffs being in reserve; but somehow the enemy had got wind of this attempt, the enterprise proved a failure and the men returned to their old bivouac. The remainder of the old year and up to the 10th January was spent working west of the Hai and exercising in drill and musketry in the neighbourhood of Bessouia, the work being interrupted only on the 9th, when the cavalry attempted a raid supported by the Buffs; but the horsemen lost their way in a dense fog and the force returned to camp early, having effected nothing, on account of the weather.

During these early days of January, Cobbe’s party, which, in addition to demonstrating in front of the Sanna i Yat lines, had the task of manning the right bank of the Tigris up to the point where Marshall was working, got orders to clear the Khadaira Bend, which occasioned some heavy fighting by the 3rd Indian Division and necessitated a diversion on the Hai bridgehead by Marshall and his men; so on the 11th of the month the Buffs went into the trenches and had four men killed and as many wounded on the first day. The clearing of the bend by Cobbe proceeded satisfactorily after this and by the 18th all was ready for the final assault, which was arranged for the following day. When dawn broke, however, it was found that during the night the whole of the Turks who had occupied this portion of their defences had cleared out and crossed the Tigris.

The next job the British forces had to take in hand was to reduce the very extensive trench system that the enemy still held across the Hai stream in the immediate vicinity of Kut. This was a slow and somewhat tedious business, but by the 24th January, after steady and persistent pushing, our troops got to within four hundred yards of the enemy, and an assault was arranged for the following day. This slow approach consisted of a series of small advances at various points and subsequent consolidation of what was gained. Thus a new line was occupied by the Buffs on the 12th, and the next day, while this was made strong, 2nd Lieut. Hook made a reconnaissance to the front, which resulted in establishing an advanced post, which was occupied by a platoon under 2nd Lieut. Filmer. On the 15th two endeavours were made by 2nd Lieut. Angus to reach another point, but without success. Captain V. Arnold was killed on this date.