A still more important little action of the same nature took place on the 16th: a party of about sixty of all ranks went out from the trench in the morning and attempted the occupation of a point about 450 yards in advance of the line. This enterprise was successfully accomplished and, in the words of Sir Stanley Maude, “with great gallantry,” but with severe loss considering the number engaged, and it was hard that, after the sacrifice made, the party was by superior authority ordered back again after dark. Lieut. Jeffreys and four men were killed, and Lieut. MacFadyen, 2nd Lieut. Gibson and twenty-seven men wounded—more than fifty per cent of the two platoons becoming casualties.
On the 18th another advanced point was reached by 2nd Lieut. Tustin and his platoon, and this time the place was consolidated and a communication trench dug. Later in the day the battalion was relieved from the trenches, but it was back again in four days’ time, suffering the loss of three men killed on the 22nd and Captain Usher, 2nd Lieut. Western and nine men wounded on the 24th. On the next day an attack was made in conjunction with the 3rd Indian and 13th British Divisions, with a view to clearing up the corner of the east bank of the Hai. This operation, however, was not successful and the Buffs lost some casualties to no great purpose, one officer and eighty other ranks being wounded in the business. The next day, however, the 36th Brigade attacked with great success and the 35th was able to come into line: Lieut. Sergeant and four men of the Buffs being wounded. The first blow of a hammer will often not drive in a nail, but it prepares the way for a successful second or third blow. The next two or three days were spent in consolidating and improving the new line.
The 31st of the month brought a fresh attack, and the brigade was progressing with its work when orders came that it was to move no further till the 37th Brigade came up on its left. This move, however, never materialized and, in consequence, the advance came to a standstill. Two men were killed and eleven wounded on the 1st February, but 2nd Lieut. Tustin and a party of bombers established themselves in a forward position. A further attack was prepared and was to be executed on the 2nd, but the dense fog, rendering all work impossible, made postponement necessary on the part of the 35th Brigade. The Turk was making fairly resolute counter-attacks, but they were broken by our artillery or met resolutely by our advanced troops.
On the 3rd the Devons and Ghurkas carried the enemy’s first and second lines, and in the evening there were signs that he contemplated withdrawal. In fact, it seemed a little later as if this retreat had actually taken place, for everything was very quiet, so much so that things looked like a withdrawal, partial at any rate, from the other bank as well; and the Buffs, Ghurkas and Dogras all sent forward strong patrols, while the whole brigade stood ready to move forward at a moment’s notice. On the 4th February the whole of the left bank of Hai had passed into our hands and the enemy was found to have fallen back to the Liquorice Factory and a line east and west across the Dahra Bend. On this day the Buffs took up a line of picquets facing the enemy in the bend, being relieved at nightfall.
It was not Maude’s intention to let any of the enemy remain on the south side of the Tigris, in case such could resist his contemplated march on Baghdad by saving the communications with that city, and so enabling the Turkish army to keep the field. Obviously, therefore, the next task was to clear the Dahra Bend and drive its occupants across the main river. With this object in view, the King’s Own Regiment effected a lodgment in the centre of the enemy’s line on the 9th February, and the same day the Worcestershire, capturing some advanced posts, established a line 2,500 yards or so south of the river at the southern end of the Shumran Bend, and on the 10th our infantry, lying west of the Liquorice Factory, after being attacked all night by bombing parties, began early to assail the Turkish position. In this connection the Buffs moved from their line against that of the enemy with the 2/4th Ghurkas on their right. The move was successful because the Turks would not abide the issue but vacated their trenches, and, after occupying them, the Buffs pushed forward patrols and bombing parties who, on the 11th, in pouring rain, took up a line well forward, from whence a communication trench was started towards the north. Four men were killed during these two days, and 2nd Lieuts. Tustin and Sergeant and fourteen men were wounded. On the 12th there was severe fighting over the job of driving in the enemy’s picquets and covering troops, and the 102nd Grenadiers of the 35th Brigade greatly distinguished themselves by gallantly capturing a redoubt and holding it against all counter-attacks.
THE RECAPTURE OF KUT-EL-AMARA
On the right a company of the Buffs is seen advancing on the Turkish position, which rests on the right bank of the river, roughly indicated by the bursting shrapnel. Kut, with its tall minaret, is seen in the dark palm-grove across the river. Beyond are the Pushtikuh Hills and the snow-capped Persian mountains. The tall yellow column (centre) is spray from lyddite bursting in the river.
From a sketch made from the parapet in foreground by Herbert Alexander, A.R.W.S.
But the principal day of battle in the Dahra Bend was the 15th February, and it was the date of a complete and glorious success. Quite early the Loyal North Lancashires carried a strong point opposite our left; then the South Wales Borderers and Welch Fusiliers captured the enemy’s right centre, taking many prisoners; and later, about 1.30 p.m., the Buffs and the Dogras, of their brigade, took up the work. On the occasion of occupying the forward position referred to above, A Company of the Buffs had been detached a little distance from the rest of the battalion and on the morning of the 15th patrols, sent out from this company, reported that the enemy’s line in front was strongly held. Nevertheless when the hour came, the remaining three companies, with the good and faithful Dogras, rushed forward and nothing could stay their onslaught. It was most successful and together they reached the river line, isolating the Turkish extreme left and taking one thousand prisoners, of which six hundred, together with five machine guns, surrendered to the Buffs. Tactically this success was of the greatest importance, for the Dahra Bend was cleared and nothing was left but to cross and try conclusions on the left bank of the Tigris. Our casualties were twelve men killed and 2nd Lieut. Brooke and sixty-seven men wounded. As Sir Stanley Maude pointed out in his despatches: “To eject the enemy from his horse-shoe bend, bristling with trenches, and commanded from across the river on three sides by hostile batteries and machine guns, called for offensive qualities of a high standard on the part of the troops.” To take the army across the river it would be necessary to keep the Turk fully occupied at Sanna i Yat and all along the bank from there to Kut, while preparations were made to pass the great obstacle as far to the westward as possible; so orders were issued to Lt.-General Cobbe to attack the lines at Sanna i Yat on the 17th.