I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL CRITICISM OF ART . . . . . 171
The higher activities of civilization, 171. The attempt to apply aesthetic standards to life, 172. The claim of art to exemption from moral criticism is based on misapprehension. Morality not a special interest, but the fundamental interest, 174. Morality does not substitute its canons for those of art, 175.
II. DEFINITION OF ART AND THE ESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . . 176
Art as the adaptation of the environment to interest, 176. Industrial art and fine art, 177. The aesthetic interest: the interest in apprehension, 179. The interest in sensation and perception, 181. The emotional interest, 182. Instinct and emotion in the aesthetic experience. Poetry and music, 183. The interest in discernment, 185. The representative element in art exemplified in Greek sculpture, 185. And in Italian painting of the Renaissance, 187. Levels and blendings of the aesthetic interest, 189. The moral criticism of the aesthetic interest, 190.
III. THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE AESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . 192
The aesthetic interest is capable of continuous development, 192. And is resourceful, 192. But tends on that account to be narrow and quiescent, 192.
IV. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE ESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . . . . 194
The aesthetic interest may supply interest where there is none, or enhance other interests, 194. But it must not be allowed to replace other interests, 195.
V. THE VICARIOUS FUNCTION OF THE AESTHETIC INTEREST . . . . 197
Other interests may be represented by the aesthetic interest, 197. The danger of confusing vicarious fulfilment with real fulfilment, 198. And of being aesthetically satisfied with failure, 199.