History of the Nineteenth Army Corps

by Richard B. Irwin

Narrowly escaping the total failure of his plans and the destruction of his fleet, Farragut had so far succeeded in his objects that henceforth the Confederates practically lost the control of the Mississippi above Port Hudson, as well as the use of the Red River as their base of supplies. Save in skiff-loads, beef, corn, and salt could no longer be safely carried across the Mississippi, and the high road from Galveston and Matamoras was closed against the valuable and sorely needed cargoes brought from Europe by the blockade runners.

As for the army, it had gained some facility of movement, some knowledge of its deficiencies, and some information of great future value as to the topography of the unknown country about Port Hudson; more than this could hardly have been expected. Indeed, the sole object of the presence of the army was defeated by the movement of the fleet so many hours before the time agreed upon. This object was to make a diversion that might attract the enemy's attention and thus tend to reduce the fire of musketry on the exposed decks of the fleet, and to draw off or hold off the fire of the field-pieces that might otherwise be massed on the river front. The disparity between the relative strength of Banks's army and that of the garrison was too well known to justify the thought of an actual attack upon the works.

Such, however, was not the opinion of the government, which to the last seems to have taken for granted that all that was needed to insure the surrender of Port Hudson was a desire to attack it. Even after the surrender, Halleck, in his annual report for 1863, speaking of the position of affairs in March, said: "Had our land forces invested Port Hudson at this time, it could have been easily reduced, as its garrison was weak . . . but the strength of the place was not then known." In truth, the place was never so strong, before or after, as at this time; nor is it often in war that the information tallies so nearly with the fact. The effective strength of the garrison was more than 16,000. Gardner's monthly report accounts for 1,366 officers and 14,921 men present for duty, together 16,287 out of a total present of 20,388. Besides the twenty-two heavy guns in position, he had thirteen light batteries.

Morning found the army alone and in a bad position, either for attack or defence. Nothing was to be gained by staying there, and much was to be risked. As soon, therefore, as word came through the ever-active and adventurous signal-officers that all was well with what remained of the fleet, Banks once more took up the line of march for Baton Rouge, and went into bivouac in great discomfort on the soggy borders of the Bayou Montesanto, about eight miles north of the town.

Meanwhile, what had become of Farragut? The last seen of the Hartford and Albatross was on the morning of the 15th by the signal officers at Springfield Landing. The two vessels then lay at anchor beyond the bend above Port Hudson. Several attempts were made to communicate with the Admiral across the intervening neck of lowland. The first was on the 16th, by Parmele, with the 174th New York and a squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry. Next, on the 18th, Banks, eager to advance the effort, took Dudley's brigade, two sections of Rails's battery, and Magen's troop, and joined Parmele. But for a time these efforts accomplished nothing, since it was impossible to see far over the flat and wooded country; and the Confederates having cut the great levee at Morganza, the whole neighborhood was under water and the bridges gone. Finally, on the 19th, Colonel Charles J. Paine went out with the 2d Louisiana, the 174th New York, and a small squad of cavalry, and leaving first the infantry and then most of the troopers behind, and riding on almost alone, succeeded in crossing the bend and gained the levee at the head of the old channel known as Fausse River, about three miles above Port Hudson. There he had a good view of the river, yet nothing was to be seen of the Hartford and Albatross. Again, on the 24th, Dudley sent Magen with his troop to Hermitage Landing. Pushing on with a few men, Magen got a full view of the reach above Waterloo for five miles, but he too learned nothing of the fleet. Farragut had in fact gone up the river on the 15th, after vainly attempting to exchange signals with his ships below and with the army, and was now near Vicksburg in communication with Admiral Porter, engaged in concerting plans for the future. Before getting under way he had caused three guns to be fired from the Hartford. This was the signal agreed upon with Banks, but for some reason it was either not heard or not reported.

Just before separating at Baton Rouge, Banks had handed to Farragut a letter addressed to Grant, to be delivered by the Admiral in the event of success. This letter, the first direct communication between the two generals, Grant received on the 20th of March, and from it derived his first information of the actual state of affairs in the Department of the Gulf. After stating his position and force Banks wound up by saying: "Should the Admiral succeed in his attempt, I shall try to open communication with him on the other side of the river, and, in that event, trust I shall hear from you as to your position and movements, and especially as to your views as to the most efficient mode of co-operation upon the part of the forces we respectively command."

With the Hartford and Albatross controlling the reach between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as well as the mouth of the Red River and the head of the Atchafalaya, Banks might now safely disregard the movements of the Confederate gunboats. Accordingly, while waiting for Grant's answer, he turned to the execution of his former plan.

CHAPTER IX. THE TECHE.

In effect, this plan was to turn Port Hudson by way of the Atchafalaya. For the original conception, the credit must be given to Weitzel, who seems indeed to have formed a very similar scheme when he first occupied La Fourche. However, his force was, at that time, barely sufficient for the defence of the territory confided to his care. Not only was there then no particular object in moving beyond the Atchafalaya, but any advance in that direction would have exposed his little corps to disaster on account of the great facilities afforded by the numberless streams for a movement by detachments of the enemy into his rear. It was largely to prepare for an advance into Western Louisiana, as well as to defend his occupancy of La Fourche, that Butler, upon Weitzel's suggestion, had created the gunboat flotilla.

Soon after Banks took the command, Weitzel, who had opinions and the courage to enforce them, laid his ideas before his new chief. On the 18th of January, disturbed by hearing that Admiral Farragut meant to take one of the army gunboats, recently transferred to the navy, away from Berwick Bay, instead of sending more, Weitzel expressed himself strongly in a despatch to headquarters.