History of the Nineteenth Army Corps

by Richard B. Irwin

"With such a naval force in that bay, in co-operation with a suitable land force, the only true campaign in this section could be made. Look at the map. Berwick Bay leads into Grand Lake, Grand Lake into the Atchafalaya, the Atchafalaya into Red River. Boats drawing not more than four or five feet and in the force I mention [10 or 12], with a proper land force, could clear out the Atchafalaya, Red River, and Black River. All communications from Vicksburg and Port Hudson cross this line indicated by me. By taking it in the manner I propose, Vicksburg and Port Hudson would be a cipher to the rebels. It would be a campaign that 100,000 men could not so easily fight, and so successfully. It is an operation to which the taking of Galveston Island is a cipher and the capture of the Mobile Bay forts a nonentity."

With these views Banks was himself in accord, yet not in their entirety. The pressure of time led him to desire to avoid divergences into the Teche country. If it were possible, he wished to gain the Atchafalaya by some route at once speedier and more direct. While the explorations were in progress to discover such a route, Weitzel once more took occasion to urge his original plan. On the 15th of February, he wrote to Augur, his division commander:

"I feel it a duty which I owe you and my country to address you at this late hour in the night on the present proposed movement on Butte à la Rose and the Teche country. . . . In all honesty and candor, I do not believe the present plan to be a proper one. . . . Sibley's Texas brigade is somewhere in the Opelousas country. . . . Mouton's main body is in rear of intrenchments on Madame Meade's plantation, six miles below Centreville. If we defeat these two commands we form a junction with our forces near Vicksburg. By pursuing our success to Alexandria, we may capture General Mouton's force, and with little loss, unless it form a junction with Sibley. If it forms a junction, we will meet them near Iberia and engage them in open field, and with a proper force can defeat them. General Emory's whole division (moved to Brashear City) and my brigade can do this work. Let the light transportation, now with General Emory, and all destined for and collected by me be collected at Brashear City. Let two of the brigades be moved to and landed at Indian Bend, while the other two are crossed and attack in front. If Mouton escapes (which I think, if properly conducted, will be doubtful) we form a junction at Indian Bend. We proceed to attack and with much superior force, because I do not believe Mouton and Sibley united will exceed 6,000 men. We can defeat them, pursue our success to Alexandria and of course get Butte à la Rose; our gunboats to facilitate its fall, attacking it as they cannot accompany us farther up than Saint Martinville. I believe this to be the true and only correct plan of the campaign."

These views were unquestionably sound; they were such as might have been expected of an officer of Weitzel's skill and experience and special knowledge of the theatre of operations. Supported by the strong current of events, they were now to be carried into effect.

At the date of this despatch, Emory's division had been for several weeks near the head of the Bayou Plaquemine, with headquarters at Indian Village, endeavoring to find or force a waterway to the Atchafalaya, while Weitzel was holding his brigade in readiness to co-operate by a simultaneous movement against Taylor on the Teche. Many attempts were made by Emory to carry out the object confided to him, yet all proved failures. Bayou Sorrel, Lake Chicot, Grand River, and the Plaquemine itself, from both ends of the stream, were thoroughly explored, but only to find the bayous choked with driftwood impossible to remove, and until removed rendering the streams impassable. Two of these drifts in Bayou Sorrel were carefully examined by Captain Henry Cochen, of the 173d New York. The first he reported to be about a mile in length, "composed of one mass of logs, roots, big and small trees, etc., jammed tightly for thirty feet, the whole length of my pole." The second drift, just beyond, was found nearly as bad, and farther on lay another even worse. Moreover, a thorough reconnoissance showed the whole country, between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya above the Plaquemine, to be impracticable at that season for all arms. After more than a month of this sort of work, Emory was called across the river to Baton Rouge to take part in the events narrated in the last chapter.

Banks returned to New Orleans on the 24th of March, and the next day ordered Grover to embark and move down the river to Donaldsonville, and thence march down the Bayou La Fourche to Thibodeaux. At the same time Emory was ordered, as soon as Grover's river transports should be released, to embark his command for Algiers, and thence move by the railway to Brashear. Meanwhile, on the 18th of March, Weitzel learned of the presence of the Queen of the West and Webb in the Atchafalaya, and as this seemed to indicate an intention to attack him, and the navy had no more light-draught gunboats to spare for his further security, to avoid having his hand forced and the game spoiled, he discreetly fell back on the 21st to the railway bridge over Bayou Boeuf, and took up a position where he was not exposed, as at Brashear, to the risk of being cut off by any sudden movement of the enemy.

On the 28th of March the Diana was sent to reconnoitre the Confederate position and strength on the lower Teche; but continuing on down the Atchafalaya, instead of returning by Grand Lake as intended, and thus running into the arms of the enemy, she fell an easy prey. The Calhoun went to her relief, but ran aground, and the Estrella had to go to the assistance of the Calhoun. Acting-Master James L. Peterson, commanding the Diana, was killed, and Lieutenant Pickering D. Allen, aide-de-camp to General Weitzel, was wounded. With the Diana there fell into the enemy's hands nearly one hundred and fifty prisoners. This gave the Confederates three rather formidable boats in the Atchafalaya and the Teche.

The movement of the troops was necessarily slow, as well by reason of the extremely limited facilities for transportation, as because of the state of the roads, but by the 8th of April every thing was well advanced, and on that day Banks moved his headquarters to Brashear. Weitzel, who had been reinforced by the siege-train, manned by the 1st Indiana heavy artillery, had already re-occupied his former front on Berwick Bay. Emory was in bivouac at Bayou Ramos, about five miles in the rear of Weitzel, and Grover at Bayou Boeuf, about four miles behind Emory. Thus the whole movement was almost completely masked from the Confederates, who from their side of the bay saw only Weitzel, and knew little or nothing of the gathering forces in his rear. So little, indeed, that Taylor, with his usual enterprise, seems to have thought this a favorable moment for attempting upon Weitzel the same operation that Weitzel had been so long meditating for the discomfiture of Taylor.

Emory marched early in the morning of the 9th of April and closed up on Weitzel, who, an hour later, about ten o'clock, began to cross. No enemy was seen save a small outpost, engaged in observing the movement. This detachment retired before Weitzel's advance, without coming to blows. Weitzel at once sent his Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain John B. Hubbard, with Perkins's and Williamson's troops of cavalry and one section of Bainbridge's battery to discover the enemy's position. The Confederates were found to be in some force in front of Pattersonville, with their cavalry pickets advanced to within a mile of Weitzel's front.

As soon as Weitzel had completed his crossing, and released the boats, Emory followed him. The four brigades bivouacked in front of the landing-place that night. The gunboats, having done the greater share of the ferriage, went back to the east bank for Grover.