Here it is of divine institution, 1. That there be holy assemblies for the public worship of God.
2. That these assemblies be societies, constituted of the people with their pastors, who are to them as captains to their troops under the general, or as mayors to cities under the king.[306]
3. That these pastors have the power of the keys, or the special guidance and governance (by the word, not by the sword) of their own particular charge, in the matters of faith, worship, and holy living; and that the flocks obey them. And when all this is jure divino, why should any say, that no form of government is jure divino?
3. Moreover it is of divine appointment, that these churches hold the nearest concord, and help each other as much as they can; whether by synods, or other meet ways of correspondency. And though this be not a distinct government, it is a distinct mode of governing.
Object. But that there be pastors with fixed churches or assemblies is not of the law of nature.
Answ. 1. Hath Christ no law but the law of nature? Wherein then differ the christian religion and the heathenish? 2. Suppose but Christ to be Christ, and man to be what he is, and nature itself will tell us that this is the fittest way for ordering the worship of God. For nature saith, God must be solemnly and ordinarily worshipped, and that qualified persons should be the official guides in the performance, and that people who need such conduct and private oversight besides, should where they live have their own stated overseers.
Object. But particular congregations are not de primaria intentione divina: for if the whole world could join together in the public worship of God, no doubt that would be properly a church. But particular congregations are only accidental, in reference to God's intention of having a church, because of the impossibility of all men's joining together for ordinances, &c.
Answ. 1. The question with me is not whether they be of primary intention, but whether stated churches headed with their proper bishops or pastors be not of God's institution in the Scripture?
2. This objection confirmeth it, and not denieth it. For, 1. It confesseth that there is a necessity of joining for God's worship: 2. And an impossibility that all the world should so join: 3. But if the whole world could so join, it would be properly a church. So that it confesseth that to be a society joined for God's public worship, is to be properly a church. And we confess all this: if all the world could be one family, they might have one master; or one kingdom, they might have one king. But when it is confessed, that, 1. A natural impossibility of a universal assembly necessitateth more particular assemblies; 2. And that Christ hath instituted such actually in his word, what more can a considerate man require?
3. I do not understand this distinction, de primaria intentione divina, and accidental, &c. The primary intention is properly of the ultimate end only: and no man thinketh that a law de mediis, of the means, is no law, or that God hath made no laws de mediis: for Christ as a mediator is a means. But suppose it be limited to the matter of church laws; if this be the meaning of it, that it is not the principal means, but a subordinate means, or that it is not instituted only propter finem ultimum, no more than propter se, but also in order to a higher thing as its immediate end, we make no question of that. Assemblies are not only that there may be assemblies; but for the worship and offices there performed: and those for man; and all for God. But what of all this? Hath God made no laws for subordinate means? No christian denieth it.