Answ. I must entreat the reader carefully to distinguish here, 1. Between God's law forbidding rulers to do evil; and his law forbidding subjects or private men.
2. Between obedience formally so called; which is, when we therefore obey in conscience, because it is commanded, and the commander's authority is the formal reason and object of our obedience: and obedience material only, which is properly no obedience, but a doing the thing which is commanded upon other reasons, and not at all because it is commanded.
3. Between formal obedience to the office of the ruler in general, and formal obedience to him, as commanding this very matter in particular.
4. Between such authority in the ruler as will warrant his impositions before God for his own justification; and such authority as may make it my duty to obey him. And so I answer,
1. We shall not be judged by those laws of God which made the ruler's duty, but by that which made our own. It is not all one to say, Thou shalt not command it, and to say, Thou shalt not do it.
2. Whatever God absolutely forbiddeth men to do, we must not do, whoever command it.
3. There are many of the things forementioned absolutely and always unlawful, as being evil of themselves, which no man may either command or do; and there are some of them, which are only evil by accident, which may not be commanded, but may be done when contrary, weightier accidents do preponderate.
4. Many such things may be done materially on other reasons, (as for the church's good, the furtherance of the gospel, the winning of men to God, the avoiding of scandal, or of hurt to others or ourselves, &c.) when they are not to be done in formal obedience, out of conscience to the authority imposing (as if it be commanded by one that hath no just power).
5. Our actions may participate of obedience in general, as being actions of subjects, when they are not obedience in the full and perfect formality as to the particular. The last leaf of Richard Hooker's eighth book of Eccles. Polit. will show you the reason of this. He that hath not just power to command me this one particular act, yet may be my ruler in the general, and I am bound to honour him in general as my ruler; and to disobey him in a thing lawful for me to do, though not for him to command, may be dishonouring of him, and an appearance of disobedience and denial of his power.[383] A parent is forbidden by God to command his child to speak an idle word, or to do a vain and useless action (much more a hurtful). Yet if a parent should command a child to speak an idle word, or do a vain action, the duty of obedience would make it at that time not to be vain and idle to him; yea, if he bid him throw away a cup of wine, or a piece of bread, which is evil when causeless, the child may be bound to do it: not only because he knoweth not but the parents may have lawful ends and reasons for their command, (as to try and exercise his obedience,) but also if he were sure that it were not so; because he is a subject, and the honouring of a parent is so great a good, and the dishonouring him by that disobedience may have such ill consequences, as will preponderate the evil of the loss of a cup of wine, &c. Yet in this case, the act of obedience is but mixed: it is an act of subjection or honour to a parent, because in general he is a governor: but it is but materially obedience in respect of that particular matter, which we know he had no authority to command.
6. In this respect, therefore, a ruler may have so much power as may induce on the subject an obligation to obey, and yet not so much as may justify his commands before God, nor save himself from divine punishment.