A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics

by Richard Baxter

Quest. VII. Am I obliged by the words or writings which usually express a covenant, without any covenanting or self-obliging intention in me, when I speak or write them?

Answ. Either you utter or write those words with a purpose to make another believe that you intend a covenant; or at least by culpable negligence, in such a manner as he is bound so to understand you, or justified for so understanding you: or else you so use the words, as in the manner sufficiently to signify that you intend no covenant or self-obligation. In the former case you bind yourself (as above said); because another man is not to be a loser, nor you a gainer or a saver, by your own fraud or gross negligence. But in the latter case you are not bound, because an intent of self-obliging is the internal efficient of the obligation; and a signification of such an intent, is the external efficient, without which it cannot be. If you read over the words of a bond, or repeat them only in a narrative, or ludicrously; or if a scrivener write a form of obligation of himself, to a boy for a copy, or to a scholar for a precedent, these do not induce any obligation in conscience, nor make you a debtor to another. Thus also the case of the intent of the baptizer or baptized (or parent) is to be determined.

Quest. VIII. May a true man promise a robber money, for the saving of his life, or of a greater sum, or more precious commodity?

Answ. Yes, in case of necessity, when his life or estate cannot better be preserved; and so taxes may be paid to an enemy in arms, or to a plundering soldier (supposing that it do no other hurt, which is greater than the good). Any man may part with a lesser good to preserve a greater; and it is no more voluntary or imputable to our wills, than the casting of our goods into the sea to save the vessel and our lives.

Quest. IX. May I give money to a judge, or justice, or court officer, to hire him to do me justice, or to keep him from doing me wrong; or to avoid persecution?

Answ. You may not, in case your cause be bad, give any thing to procure injustice against another; no nor speak a word for it nor desire it: this I take as presupposed. You may not give money to procure justice, when the law of the land forbiddeth it, and when it will do more hurt accidentally to the others than good to you: when it will harden men in the sin of bribery, and cause them to expect the like from others. But except it be when some such accidental greater hurt doth make it evil, it is as lawful as to hire a thief not to kill me: when you cannot have your right by other means, you may part with a smaller matter for a greater.

Quest. X. But if I make such a contract, may the other lawfully take it of me?

Answ. No: for it is now supposed that it is unlawful on his part.

Quest. XI. But if under necessity of force I promise money to a robber, or a judge, or officer, am I bound to perform it when my necessity is over?

Answ. You have lost your own propriety by your covenant, and therefore must not retain it; but he can acquire no right by his sin: and therefore some say that in point of justice you are not bound to give it him, but to give it to the magistrate for the poor; but yet prudence may tell you of other reasons a fine to give it the man himself, though justice bind you not to it; as in case that else he may be revenged and do you some greater hurt; or some greater hurt is any other way like to be the consequent; which it is lawful by money to prevent. But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to the thief or officer himself; because it is a lawful thing to do it, though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning, or the signification of your words in your covenant with him; and if it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do it, otherwise your promise is a lie. To this, those of the other opinion say, that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him that it was made to, is not to be accounted false if he perform it not; so is it as to the thief or officer in question; because he having no right, is to you as the other that hath quit his right. And this answer indeed will prove, that it is not strict injustice not to pay the money promised; but it will not prove that it is not a lie to make such a promise with an intent of not performing it, or that it is not a lie to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it when you may. Though here a Jesuit will tell you that you may say the words of a promise, with an equivocation or mental reservation to a thief or persecuting magistrate (of which see more in the chapters of lying, vows, and perjury). I am therefore of opinion that your promise must be sincerely made, and according to the true intent of it you must offer the money to the thief or officer; except in case the magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lie against it, which you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.