A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics

by Richard Baxter

The same determination holdeth as to all contracts and promises made to such persons, who by injurious force constrained us to make them. There is on us an obligation to veracity, though none to them in point of justice, because they have no proper right; nor may they lawfully take our payment or service promised them. And in case that the public good unexpectedly cross our performance, we must not perform it: such like is the case of conquerors, and those that upon conquest become their vassals or subjects upon unrighteous terms. But still remember, that if it be not only a covenant with man, but a vow to God, which maketh him a party, the case is altered, and we remain obliged.

Quest. XII. But may I promise the thief or bribe-taker to conceal his fault? And am I obliged to the performance of such a promise?

Answ. This is a promise of omitting that which else would be a duty. It is ordinarily a duty to reveal a thief and bribe-taker that he may be punished. But affirmatives bind not ad semper; no act (especially external) is a duty at all times, therefore not this, of revealing an offender's fault. And if it be not always a duty, then it must be none when it is inconsistent with some greater benefit or duty; for when two goods come together, the greater is to be preferred: therefore in case that you see in just probability, that the concealment of the sinner will do more hurt to the commonwealth or the souls of men, than the saving of your life is like to do good, you may not promise to conceal him, or if you sinfully promise it, you may not perform it; but in case that your life is like to be a greater good than the not promising to conceal him, then such a promise is no fault, because the disclosing him is no duty. But to judge rightly of this is a matter of great difficulty. If it be less than life which you save by such a promise, it oft falls out that it is a lesser good than the detecting of the offence.

But it will here be said, If I promise not to conceal a robber, I must conceal him nevertheless; for when he hath killed me, I cannot reveal him: and I must conceal the bribe-taker; for till I have promised secrecy, I cannot prove him guilty. And he that promiseth to forbear a particular good action whilst he liveth, doth yet reserve his life for all other good works; whereas if he die, he will neither do that nor any other. But this case is not so easily determined: if Daniel die, he can neither pray nor do any good on earth. And if he live he may do much other good, though he never pray; and yet he might not promise to give over praying to save his life. I conceive that we must distinguish of duties essential to the outward part of christianity, or of constant, indispensable necessity; and duties which are alterable, and belong only to some persons, times, and places; also between the various consequents of omissions. And I conceive that ordinarily a man may promise for the saving of his life, that he will forbear a particular, alterable duty or relation; as to read such a commentary, to speak with such a minister, to be a magistrate or a minister, &c. in case we have not before bound ourselves never to give over our calling till death; and in case that the good which will follow our forbearance, is likely (to a judicious person) to be greater than the evil. But no man may promise to omit such a duty as God hath made necessary during life; as not to love God, or fear, or trust him; not to worship him, and call upon him, and praise him; not to do good to men's souls or bodies in the general; or not to preach or pray while I am a minister of Christ; or not at all to govern while you are a governor; for all these contradict some former and greater promises or duties. Nor may you omit the smallest duty to save your life, at such a time when your death is like to do more good, than your life would do without that one duty. Apply this to the present case.

Quest. XIII. If another man deceive me into a promise or covenant against my good, am I bound to perform it when I have discovered the deceit?

Answ. Yes, 1. In case that the law of the land, or other reasons for the public good, require it. 2. Or in case that you were faulty by negligence, heedlessness, or otherwise guilty of your own deceit, in any considerable and avoidable degree. Otherwise, in that measure that he deceived you, and in those respects, you are not obliged.

Quest. XIV. If the contracting parties do neither of them understand the other, is it a covenant? Or if it be, whose sense must carry it?

Answ. If they understand not each other in the essentials of the contract, it is no contract in point of conscience; except where the laws for the public safety do annex the obligation to bare external act. But if they understand not one another in some circumstances, and be equally culpable or innocent, they must come to a new agreement in those particulars; but if one party only be guilty of the misunderstanding, he must bear the loss, if the other insist on it.

Quest. XV. Am I bound to stand to the bargains which my friend, or trustee, or servant maketh for me, when it proveth much to my injury or loss?

Answ. Yes, 1. If they exceed not the bounds of that commission or trust which they received from you. 2. Or if they do, yet if by your former trusting and using them, or by any other sign, you have given the other party sufficient cause to suppose them intrusted by you to do what they do, so that he is deceived by your fault, you are bound at least to see that he be no loser by you; though you are not bound to make him a gainer, unless you truly signified that you authorized them to make the contract. For if it be merely your friend's or servant's error, without your fault, it doth not bind you to a third person. But how far you may be bound to pardon that error to your friend or servant, is another question; and how far you are bound to save them harmless. And that must be determined by laying together all other obligations between them and you.