[36] Est autem Quaternio iste regnorum Danielis (quod imprimis observari velim) CHRONOLOGIA QUÆDAM PROPHETICA, non tam annorum quàm regnorum intervallis distincta, ubi regnorum in præcipuâ orbis terrarum parte, simul ecclesiam et populum Dei complexâ, sibi invicem succedentium serie, monstratur tempus quo Christi regnum à tot seculis promissum et primùm inchoandum sit, idemque demum certis temporibus consummandum.
—Ex his, quæ dicta sunt, ratio elucet, quare, ex omnibus mundi regnis, quatuor hæc sola selegit Spiritus sanctus, quorum fata tam insigni ornaret prophetiâ; nempe quia ex his solis inter omnia mundi regna periodus temporum ejusmodi contexi potuit, qua rectâ serie et ordinatâ successione perduceret ad tempora et momenta regni Christi. Non verò quia nulla istis paria imperia, forsan et aliquibus majora, per omnia secula orbis visurus esset. Nam neque Saracenorum olím, neque hodie Turcarum, neque Tartarorum regna ditionis amplitudine Persico aut Græco, puto nec Assyrio, quicquam concedunt; imò, ni fallor, excedunt.
Mede’s Works, B. III. p. 712. Lond. 1672.
[37] To this purpose the late learned and ingenious author of the Discourses on Prophecy—“A figurative and dark description of a future event will be figurative and dark still, when the event happens.” And again—“No event can make a figurative or metaphorical expression to be a plain or literal one.” Bishop Sherlock, Disc. II. p. 32 and 36. London, 1749.
[38] Le dessein de Dieu est plus de perfectionner la volonté, que l’esprit. Or, la clarté parfaite ne serviroit qu’à l’esprit, & nuiroit à la volonté. Pascal.
[39] Rom. iv. 17.
[40] Ταῦτα ὁ Θεὸς προεμήνυσε διὰ τοῦ προφητικοῦ πνεύματος μέλλειν γίνεσθαι, ἵν’, ὅταν γένηται, μὴ ἀπιϛηθῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ προειρῆσθαι πιϛευθῇ.
J. Martyr, Apol. I. c. 74.
[41] Yet hear in how decisive a tone a certain writer, of no small account with the infidel party, reprobates this argument:—“Je dis de plus, qu’aucune prophétie ne sauroit faire autorité pour moi.” [Rousseau, Œuvres, T. III. p. 156. La Haye, 1762.] “I say,” says Mr. Rousseau, “that the argument from prophecy can have no weight with me.” If you ask his reason, it follows. “Because, to give it any authority, three conditions are required, the concurrence of which is impossible. First, I must have been, myself, a witness of the prophecy, when delivered. Secondly, I must have been, myself; a witness of the event: And lastly, I must have it demonstrated to me that the agreement between the prophecy and the event could not have been fortuitous. For though the prophecy were clearer, and more precise, than a geometrical axiom, yet as the clearness of a prediction, made at hazard, does not render the accomplishment of it impossible, this accomplishment, allowing it to take place, proves nothing, strictly speaking, in favour of the person who foretold it.”
First, he says, He must himself have been a witness of the prophecy. But why so? Is there no way of being reasonably assured that a prophecy has been delivered, unless one has been actually present at the delivery of it? Does any one doubt, whether Socrates told his friend that he should die within three days’ time, because he did not hear these words from the mouth of the philosopher? But, there is less reason still to doubt whether Jesus uttered the prophecies, ascribed to him in the Gospel.
Next, He must have been, himself, a witness of the event. With just as good reason, as of the prophecy. However, it so happens that we are, or may be, if we please, witnesses of the events, foretold in many prophecies. What does he think of the dispersion of the Jews, for instance? Is he not a witness of this event?
But lastly, He must have it demonstrated to him that the agreement between the prophecy and the event could not have been fortuitous. What, will nothing less than demonstration satisfy him? Will not a high degree of probability serve him to form a conclusion upon, nay, and to regulate his conduct? And will he stand out against the strongest degree of evidence, short of mathematical, or a proof à la rigueur, as he terms it, in a subject, where, from the nature of it, mathematical certainty is not to be had?