Inasmuch as I must apply my principles to some one ground, I have chosen the Elementary, rather than the Grammar School course, because it is the very lowest, and the first to be dealt with, and because the considerations that apply to it may easily be transferred afterwards to the Grammar School or any other studies. The points I propose to deal with are such as the following: At what age a child should be sent to school, and what he should learn there; whether all children should be sent to school; whether physical exercise is a necessary part of upbringing; whether young maidens ought to be set to learning; how young gentlemen should be brought up; how uniformity can be introduced into teaching. I shall also speak of courtesy and correction, of public and private education, of the choice of promising scholars, of places and times for learning, of teachers and school regulations, and of the need for restricting the numbers of the learned class. In my views on these and kindred matters I shall seek to win the approval of my countrymen, before I proceed to deal with particular precepts and the details of the upbringing of children. In my discussion of all these matters, while in method I shall follow the example of the best writers, I will, in the substance of my argument, make appeal only to nature and reason, to custom and experience, where there is a clear prospect of advantage to my country, avoiding any appearance or suspicion of fanciful and impracticable notions. I may hope that the desire to see things improved will not be accounted fanciful, unless by those who think themselves in health when they are sick unto death, and while feeling no pain because of extreme weakness, hold their friends foolish in wishing them to alter their mode of life.
The Use of Authority.
Some well-meaning people, when they wish to persuade their fellow-countrymen either by pen or by speech, to adopt a certain course, if they can claim the authority of any good writers favouring their opinions, straightway assume that their own arguments are sufficiently supported to ensure their proposal being carried out. This assurance, however, is checked sometimes by reflection, sometimes by experience. Wise reflection may foresee that the special circumstances of the country will not admit of the proposed change, or after some trial the unsuitability may be shown by experience. So that in cases where authorities persuade, and circumstances control, those who would use earlier writers to maintain their credit must always keep in view the application to particular conditions. I see many people of good intelligence, considerable reading, and facility of expression, both abroad and at home, fall into great error by neglecting special circumstances, and overstraining the force of authority. In dealing with education, must I entreat my country to be content with this because such a one commends it, or force her to that because such a State approves of it? The show of right deceives us, and the likeness of unlike things doth lead us where it listeth. For the better understanding with what wariness authority is to be used, let it be considered that there are two sorts of authors that we deal with in our studies. Of the one kind are writers on the mathematical sciences, who proceed by the necessity of a demonstrable subject, and enforce the conclusions by inevitable argument. Of the other kind are writers on the moral and political sciences, who, dealing with human affairs, must have regard to the circumstances of every particular case. With the former the truth of the subject-matter maintains itself, without the need for any personal authority, and is beyond debate; it is with the latter that controversy arises, the writer’s credit often authorising the thing, and in this case great injustice may be done by quoting without discrimination as to difference of circumstance. It is no proof that because Plato praiseth something, because Aristotle approveth it, because Cicero commends it, because Quintilian or anyone else is acquainted with it, therefore it is for us to use. What if our country honour it in them, and yet for all that may not use it herself, because the circumstances forbid? Nay, what if the writers’ authority be cited without considering in what circumstances the opinion was originally expressed? Is not a great wrong done by him who wresteth the meaning of the author he quotes? He that will deal with writers so as to turn their conclusions to the use of his country must be very well advised, and diligently mark that their meaning and his application are consistent, and must consider how much of their opinion his country will admit. Whether I shall myself be able to carry out what I demand from others, I dare not warrant, but I will do my best to use my author well, and to take circumstances into account, never, if I can help it, to offer anything that has not all the foundations that I promised before, namely, nature to lead it, reason to back it, custom to commend it, experience to approve it, and profit to prefer it.
I think a student ought rather to invest himself in the habit of his writer than to stand much upon his title and authority in proof or disproof, as it is well understood that all our studies are indebted to the original devisers and the most eloquent writers. Therefore, to avoid undue length, I will neither give authorities nor examples, as it is not a question of a man’s name, but of the real value of the argument. I shall not busy myself with citing authors, either to show what I have read or how far I am in agreement with others. It is not needful to heap up witnesses where nothing is doubtful; the natural use of testimony is to prove where there is doubt, not to cloy where all is clear. In such cases, for want of sound judgment, a catalogue of names and a multitude of sentences, which only say what no one denies, are forced on to the stage to seem to arm the quoter, who is fighting without a foe, and flying when there is no cause for fear.
In points of learning which are beyond controversy, I appeal to the judgment of those who have gone over the same ground, and can test the truth of what I say without being told the name of the author, whom they will admit to have been well cited when they find me saying as he saith, whether it be through recollection of what I have read or from coincidence of judgment where I have not read. I do honour good writers, but without superstition, being in no way addicted to titles. But seeing that Reason doth honour them, they must be content to remain outside themselves, and use every means to bring her forward, as their lady and mistress, whose authority and credit procure them admission when they come from her. It is not so because a writer said so, but because the truth is so, and he said the truth. Indeed, the truth is often weakened in the hearer’s opinion, though not in itself, by naming the writer. If truth did depend upon the person, she would often be brought into a miserable plight, being constrained to serve fancy and alter at will, whereas she should bend to no one, however opinionative people may persuade themselves. This is known to the learned and wise, whose courtesy I crave. As for the unlearned, I must entreat them, for their sakes if not for mine, not to debate with me on points where they cannot judge. In matters that are intelligible to both, I must pray them to weigh my words well, and ever to give me credit for good intentions.
The Ideal and the Possible.
Those ancient writers, who have depicted ideal commonwealths, and have imagined the upbringing of such paragons as should be fitted for a place in them, before asking when their youth should begin to learn, have commonly laid down the conditions of their training from a very early stage. They begin by considering how to deal with the infant while he is still under his nurse, discussing whether he should be nursed by a stranger or by his mother, what playfellows should be chosen for him while he is still in the nursery, and what exquisite public or private training can be devised for him afterwards. These and other considerations they fall into, which do well beseem the bringing up of such an one as may indeed be wished, though scarcely hoped for, but can by no means be applied to our youth and our education, wherein we wish for no more than we can hope to have. Nay, these writers go further, as mere wishers may, and appoint the parents of this so perfect a child, to be so wise and learned that they may indeed fit into an ideal scheme, but too far surpass the model that I can have in view. Wherefore leaving on one side these ideal measures and people, I mean to proceed from such principles as our parents do actually build on, and as our children do rise by to that mediocrity which furnisheth out this world, and not to that excellence which is fashioned for another. And yet there is a value in these fine pictures, which by pointing out the ideal let us behold wherein the best consisteth, what colours it is known by, what state it keepeth, and by what means we may best approach it. It may perhaps be said that despair of obtaining the very best is apt to discourage all hope, for by missing any one of these rare conditions—and our frailty will fail either in all or in most—we mar the whole mould. Howbeit we are much bound to the excellent wits of those divine writers who, by their singular knowledge approaching near to the truest and best, could most truly and best discern what constitution they were of, and being anxious to serve their race thought it their part to communicate what they had seen, if only for this, that while we might despair of hitting the highest, yet by seeing where it lodged we might with great praise draw near unto it.
But to return from this question of ideals to our ordinary education, I persuaded myself that all my countrymen wish themselves as wise and learned as these imaginary parents are surmised to be, though they may be content with so much, or rather with so little, of wisdom and learning as God doth allot them, and that they will have their children nursed as well as they can, wherever or by whomsoever it may be, so that the beings whom they love so well as bequeathed to them by nature, may be well brought up by nurture; and that till the infant can govern himself, they will seek to save it from all such perils as may seem to harm it in any kind of way, either from the people or the circumstances that surround it, and that this will be done with such forethought as ordinary circumspection can suggest to considerate and careful parents; and finally, that for his proper schooling, all who can will provide it, even if it be at some cost.
When School Education should begin.
One of the first questions is at what age children should be sent to school, for they should neither be delayed too long, so that time is lost, nor hastened on too soon, at the risk of their health. The rule therefore must be given according to the strength of their bodies and the quickness of their wits jointly. If the parents be not wanting in means, and there is a convenient place near, wherein to have the child taught, and a teacher with sufficient knowledge, and with discretion to train him up well by correction and teaching him good manners, and fit companions, such as so good a master may be able to choose; and if the child also himself have a good understanding and a body able to bear the strain of learning, methinks it were then best that he began to be doing something as soon as he can use his intelligence, without overtaxing his powers either of mind or body, as the wise handling of his teacher will direct. What the age should be I cannot say, for ripeness in children does not always come at the same time, any more than all corn is ripe for one reaping, though it is pretty nearly at the same time. Some are quick, some are slow; some are willing when their parents are, and others only when they are inclined themselves, according as a wise upbringing has disposed them to do well, or foolish coddling has made them prefer their play.