First, What it is?—And Secondly, How far it is of value?
There is no difficulty in answering the first of these questions.—To be Free, is “to be able to act or to forbear acting, as we think best;” or “to be masters of our own resolutions and conduct.”—It may be pretended, that it is not desirable to be thus free; but, without doubt, this it is to be free; and this is what all mean when they say of themselves or others that they are free.
I have observed, that all the different kinds of Liberty run up into the general idea of self-government[50].—The Liberty of men as agents is that power of self-determination which all agents, as such, possess.—Their Liberty as moral agents is their power of self-government in their moral conduct.—Their Liberty as religious agents is their power of self-government in religion.—And their Liberty, as members of communities associated for the purposes of civil government, is their power of self-government in all their civil concerns. It is Liberty, in the last of these views of it, that is the subject of my present enquiry; and it may, in other words, be defined to be “the power of a state to govern itself by its own will.”—In order, therefore, to determine whether a state is free, no more is necessary than to determine whether there is any will, different from its own, to which it is subject.
When we speak of a state, we mean the whole state, and not any part of it; and the will of the state, therefore, is the will of the whole.—There are two ways in which this will may be expressed. First, by the suffrages of all the members given in person. Or secondly, by the suffrages of a body of Representatives, in appointing whom all the members have voices.—A state governed by its own will in the first of these ways enjoys the most complete and perfect Liberty; but such a government being impracticable, except in very small states, it is necessary that civil communities in general should satisfy themselves with that degree of Liberty which can be obtained in the last of these ways; and Liberty so obtained may be sufficiently ample, and at the same time is capable of being extended to the largest states[51].
But here, before I proceed, I must desire, that an observation may be attended to, which appears to me of considerable consequence.—A distinction should be made between the Liberty of a state, and its not suffering oppression; or between a free government, and a government under which freedom is enjoyed. Under the most despotic government liberty may happen to be enjoyed. But being derived from a will over which the state has no controul, and not from its own will; or from an accidental mildness in the administration, and not from a constitution of government; it is nothing but an indulgence of a precarious nature, and of little importance.—Individuals in private life, while held under the power of masters, cannot be denominated free, however equitably and kindly they may be treated. This is strictly true of communities as well as of individuals.—Civil Liberty (it should be remembered) must be enjoyed as a right derived from the Author of nature only, or it cannot be the blessing which merits this name. If there is any human power which is considered as giving it, on which it depends, and which can invade or recall it at pleasure, it changes its nature, and becomes a species of slavery.
But to return—The force superseding self-government in a state, or the power destroying its Liberty, is of two kinds. It may be either a power without itself, or a power within itself. The former constitutes what may be properly called external, and the latter internal slavery.—Were there any distant state which had acquired a sovereignty over this country, and exercised the power of making its laws and disposing its property, we should be in the first kind of slavery; and, if not totally depraved by a habit of subjection to such a power, we should think ourselves in a miserable condition; and an advocate for such a power would be considered as insulting us, who should attempt to reconcile us to it by telling us, that we were one community with that distant state, though destitute of a single voice in its legislature; and, on this ground, should maintain, that all resistance to it was no less criminal than any resistance within a state to the authority of that state.—In short, every state, not incorporated with another by an equal representation, and yet subject to its dominion, is enslaved in this sense.—Such was the slavery of the provinces subject to antient Rome; and such is the slavery of every community, as far as any other community is master of it; or as far as, in respect of taxation and internal legislation, it is not independent of every other community. Nor does it make any difference to such a community, that it enjoys within itself a free constitution of government, if that constitution is itself liable to be altered, suspended or over-ruled at the discretion of the state which possesses the sovereignty over it.
But the slavery most prevalent in the world has been internal slavery.—In order better to explain this, it is proper to observe, that all civil government being either the government of a whole by itself, or of a whole by a power extraneous to it, or of a whole by a part; the first alone is Liberty, and the two last are Tyranny, producing the two sorts of slavery which I have mentioned. Internal slavery, therefore, takes place wherever a whole community is governed by a part; and this, perhaps, is the most concise and comprehensive account that can be given of it.—The part that governs may be either a single man, as in absolute Monarchies; or, a body of grandees, as in Aristocracies. In both these cases the powers of government are commonly held for life without delegation, and descend from father to son; and the people governed are in the same situation with cattle upon an estate, which descends by inheritance from one owner to another.—But farther. A community may be governed by a body of delegates, and yet be enslaved.—Though government by representation alone is free, unless when carried on by the personal suffrages of all the members of a state, yet all such government is by no means free. In order to render it so, the following requisites are necessary.
First, The representation must be complete. No state, a part of which only is represented in the Legislature that governs it, is self-governed. Had Scotland no representatives in the Parliament of Britain, it would not be free; nor would it be proper to call Britain free, though England, its other part, were adequately represented. The like is true, in general, of every country subject to a Legislature in which some of its parts, or some classes of men in it, are represented, and others not.
Secondly, The representatives of a free state must be freely chosen. If this is not the case, they are not at all representatives; and government by them degenerates into government by a junto of men in the community, who happen to have power or wealth enough to command or purchase their offices.
Thirdly, After being freely chosen, they must be themselves free. If there is any higher will which directs their resolutions, and on which they are dependent, they become the instruments of that will; and it is that will alone that in reality governs the state.