Fourthly, They must be chosen for short terms; and, in all their acts, be accountable to their constituents. Without this a people will have no controul over their representatives; and, in chusing them, they will give up entirely their Liberty; and only enjoy the poor privilege of naming, at certain intervals, a set of men whom they are to serve, and who are to dispose, at their discretion, of their property and lives.
The causes of internal slavery now mentioned prevail, some of them more and others less, in different communities. With respect, in particular, to a government by representation; it is evident, that it deviates more or less from Liberty, in proportion as the representation is more or less imperfect. And, if imperfect in every one of the instances I have recited; that is, if inadequate and partial; subject to no controul from the people; corruptly chosen for long terms; and, after being chosen, venal and dependent;—in these circumstances, a representation becomes an imposition and a nusance; and government by it is as inconsistent with true Liberty as the most arbitrary and despotic government.
I have been so much misunderstood[52] on this subject, that it is necessary I should particularly observe here, that my intention in this account has been merely to shew what is requisite to constitute a state or a government free, and not at all to define the best form of government. These are two very different points. The first is attended with few difficulties. A free state is a state self-governed in the manner I have described. But it may be free, and yet not enjoy the best constitution of government. Liberty, though the most essential requisite in government, is not the only one. Wisdom, union, dispatch, secresy, and vigour are likewise requisite; and that is the best form of government which best unites all these qualities; or which, to an equal and perfect Liberty, adds the greatest wisdom in deliberating and resolving, and the greatest union, force and expedition in executing[53].
In short, my whole meaning is, that the will of the Community alone ought to govern; but that there are different methods of obtaining and executing this will; of which those are the best which collect into it most of the knowledge and experience of the community, and at the same time carry it into execution with most dispatch and vigour.
It has been the employment of the wisest men in all ages to contrive plans for this purpose; and the happiness of society depends so much on civil government, that it is not possible the human understanding should be better employed.
I have said in the Observations on Civil Liberty, that “in a free state every man is his own legislator.”—I have been happy in since finding the[54] same assertion in Montesquieu, and also in Mr. Justice Blackstone’s Commentaries. It expresses the fundamental principle of our constitution; and the meaning of it is plainly, that every independent agent in a free state ought to have a share in the government of it, either by himself personally, or by a body of representatives, in chusing whom he has a free vote, and therefore all the concern and weight which are possible, and consistent with the equal rights of every other member of the state.—But though the meaning of this assertion is so obvious, and the truth of it undeniable, it has been much exclaimed against, and occasioned no small part of the opposition which has been made to the principles advanced in the Observations on Civil Liberty.—One even of the most candid, as well as the ablest of my opponents, (whose difference of opinion from me I sincerely lament) has intimated, that it implies, that, in a free state,[55] thieves and pick-pockets have a right to make laws for themselves.—The public will not, I hope, wonder that I chuse to take little notice of such objections.
It has been said, that the liberty for which I have pleaded, is “a right or power in every one to act as he likes without any restraint.”—However unfairly this representation has been given of my account of liberty, I am ready to adopt it, provided it is understood with a few limitations.—Moral Liberty, in particular, cannot be better defined than by calling it “a power in every one to do as he likes.” My opponents in general seem to be greatly puzzled with this; and I am afraid it will signify little to attempt explaining it to them by saying, that every man’s will, if perfectly free from restraint, would carry him invariably to rectitude and virtue; and that no one who acts wickedly acts as he likes, but is conscious of a tyranny within him overpowering his judgment, and carrying him into a conduct, for which he condemns and hates himself. The things that he would he does not;[56] and the things that he would not, those he does. He is, therefore, a slave in the properest sense.
Religious Liberty, likewise, is a power of acting as we like in religion; or of professing and practising that mode of religious worship which we think most acceptable to the Deity.—But here the limitation to which I have referred must be attended to. All have the same unalienable right to this Liberty; and consequently, no one has a right to such a use of it as shall take it from others. Within this limit, or as far as he does not encroach on the equal liberty of others, every one has a right to do as he pleases in religion.—That the right to religious Liberty goes as far as this every one must allow, who is not a friend to persecution; and that it cannot go farther, is self-evident; for if it did, there would be a contradiction in the natures of things; and it would be true, that every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to destroy.—If, therefore, the religious faith of any person leads him to hurt another because he professes a different faith; or if it carries him, in any instances, to intolerance, Liberty itself requires he should be restrained, and that, in such instances, he should lose his liberty.
All this is equally applicable to the Liberty of man in his civil capacity; and it is a maxim true universally, “that as far as any one does not molest others, others ought not to molest him.”—All have a right to the free and undisturbed possession of their good names, properties and lives; and it is the right all have to this that gives the right to establish civil government, which is or ought to be nothing but an institution (by laws and provisions made with common consent) for guarding this right against invasion; for giving to every one, in temporals and spirituals, the power of commanding his own conduct; or, of acting as he pleases, and going where he will, provided he does not run foul of others.—Just government, therefore, does not infringe liberty, but establish it.—It does not take away the rights of mankind, but protect and confirm them.—I will add, that it does not even create any new subordinations of particular men to one another, but only gives security in those several stations, whether of authority and pre-eminence, or of subordination and dependence, which nature has established, and which must have arisen among mankind whether civil government had been instituted or not. But this goes beyond my purpose in this place, and more will be said of it presently.
To sum up the whole—Our ideas of Civil Liberty will be rendered more distinct by considering it under the three following views:—The Liberty of the citizen—The liberty of the government—And the liberty of the community.—A citizen is free when the power of commanding his own conduct and the quiet possession of his life, person, property and good name are secured to him by being his own legislator in the sense explained in [page 10][57].—A government is free when constituted in such a manner as to give this security.—And the freedom of a community or nation is the same among nations, that the freedom of a citizen is among his fellow-citizens.—It is not, therefore, as observed in [page 3], the mere possession of Liberty that denominates a citizen or a community free; but that security for the possession of it which arises from such a free government as I have described; and which takes place, when there exists no power that can take it away.—It is in the same sense that the mere performance of virtuous actions is not what denominates an agent virtuous; but the temper and habits from whence they spring; or that inward constitution, and right balance of the affections, which secure the practice of virtue, produce stability of conduct, and constitute a character.