First, All governments purely despotic. These may be either monarchical, aristocratical. The latter are the worst, agreeably to a common observation, that it is better to have one master than many. The appetites of a single despot may be easily satiated; but this may be impossible where there is a multitude.
Secondly, All provincial governments.—The history of mankind proves these to be the worst of all governments; and that no oppression is equal to that which one people are capable of practising towards another. I have mentioned some of the reasons of this in the Observations on Civil Liberty, Part I. sect. 3. Bodies of men do not feel for one another as individuals do. The odium of a cruel action, when shared among many, is not regarded. The master of slaves working on a plantation, though he may keep them down to prevent their becoming strong enough to emancipate themselves, yet is led by interest, as well as humanity, to govern them with such moderation, as to preserve their use: But these causes will produce more of this good effect, when the slaves are under the eye of their proprietor, and form a part of his family, than when they are settled on a distant plantation, where he can know little of them, and is obliged to trust them to the management of rapacious servants.
It is particularly observable here, that free governments, though happier in themselves, are more oppressive to their provinces than despotic governments. Or, in other words, that the subjects of free[71] states are worse slaves than the subjects of states not free. This is one of the observations which Mr. Hume represents as an universal axiom in politicks[72].—“Though, says he, free governments have been commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, yet are they the most oppressive and ruinous to their provinces; and this observation may be fixed as an universal axiom in politics. What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the world during the time of their commonwealth?—After the dissolution of the commonwealth the Roman yoke became easier upon the provinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be observed, that many of the worst Emperors (Domitian, for instance) were very careful to prevent all oppression of the provinces.—The oppression and tyranny of the Carthaginians over their subject states in Africa went so far, as we learn from Polybius (Lib. i. cap. 72.) that not content with exacting the half of all the produce of the ground, which of itself was a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes.—If we pass from antient to modern times we shall always find the observation to hold. The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states.”
Thirdly, Among the worst sorts of governments I reckon all governments by a corrupt representation.—There is no instance in which the trite observation is more true than in this, “that the best things when corrupted become the worst.” A corrupt representation is so far from being any defence against oppression, that it is a support to it. Long established customs, in this case, afford no security, because, under the sanction of such a representation, they may be easily undermined or counteracted; nor is there any injury to a people which, with the help of such an instrument, may not be committed with safety. It is not, however, every degree of corruption, that will destroy the use of a representation, and turn it into an evil so dreadful. In order to this, corruption must pass a certain limit. But every degree of it tends to this, saps the foundation of Liberty, and poisons the fountain of Legislation. And when it gets to its last stage, and has proceeded its utmost length: When, in particular, the means by which candidates get themselves chosen are such as admit the worst, but exclude the best men; a House of Representatives becomes little better than a sink into which is collected all that is most worthless and vile in a kingdom.—There cannot be a greater calamity than such a government.—It is impossible there should be a condition more wretched than that of a nation, once free, so degenerated.
CONCLUSION.
It is time to dismiss this subject. But I cannot take a final leave of it, (and probably of all subjects of this kind) without adding the following reflections on our own state in this kingdom.
It is well known, that Montesquieu has paid the highest compliment to this country, by describing its constitution of government, in giving an account of a perfect government; and by drawing the character of its inhabitants, in giving an account of the manners and characters of a free people.—“All (he says) having, in free states, a share in government, and the laws not being made for some more than others, they consider themselves as monarchs, and are more properly confederates than fellow-subjects.—No one citizen being subject to another, each sets a greater value on his Liberty than on the glory of any of his fellow-citizens.—Being independent, they are proud; for the pride of kings is founded on their independence.—They are in a constant ferment, and believe themselves in danger, even in those moments when they are most safe.—They reason; but it is indifferent whether they reason well or ill. It is sufficient that they do reason. Hence springs that Liberty which is their security.—This state, however, will lose its Liberty. It will perish, when the Legislative power shall become more corrupt than the executive.”[73]
Such is the account which this great writer gave, many years ago, of the British constitution and people. We may learn from it, that we have nothing to fear from that disposition to examine every public measure, to censure ministers of state, and to be restless and clamorous, which has hitherto characterized us.—On the contrary; we shall have every thing to fear, when this disposition is lost. As soon as a people grow secure, and cease to be quick in taking alarms, they are undone. A free constitution of government cannot be preserved without an earnest and unremitting jealousy. Our Constitution, in particular, is so excellent, that it is the properest object of such a jealousy. For my own part, I admire so much the general frame and principles of it, that I could be almost satisfied with that representation of the kingdom, which forms the most important part of it, had I no other objection to this representation than its inadequateness. Did it consist of a body of men, fairly elected for a short term, by a number of independent persons, of all orders in every part of the kingdom, equal to the number of the present voters; and were it, after being elected, under no undue influence; it would be a security of such importance, that I should be less disposed to complain of the injustice done, by its inadequateness, to the greatest part of the kingdom by depriving them of one their natural and unalienable rights. To such a body of representatives we might commit, with confidence, the guardianship of our rights, knowing, that having one interest with the rest of the state, they could not violate them; or that if they ever did, a little time would bring the power of gaining redress without tumult or violence.—Happy the people so blessed.—If wise, they will endeavour, by every possible method, to preserve the purity of their representation; and, should it have degenerated, they will lose no time in effecting a reformation of it.—But if, unhappily, infection should have pervaded the whole mass of the state, and there should be no room to hope for any reformation, it will be still some consolation to reflect, that slavery, in all its rigour, will not immediately follow. Between the time in which the securities of Liberty are undermined, and its final subversion, there is commonly a flattering interval during which the enjoyment of Liberty may be continued, in consequence of fundamental laws and rooted habits which cannot be at once exterminated. And this interval is longer or shorter, according as the progress of corruption is more or less rapid; and men in power more or less attentive to improve favourable opportunities.—The government of this country, in particular, is so well balanced, and the institutions of our common law are so admirable, and have taken such deep root, that we can bear much decay before our liberties fall.—Fall, however, they must, if our public affairs do not soon take a new turn. That very evil, which, according to the great writer I have quoted, is to produce our ruin, we see working every where and increasing every day.—The following facts, among many others, shew too plainly whither we are tending and how far we are advanced.
First. It seems to me, that a general indifference is gaining ground fast among us.—This is the necessary effect of increasing luxury and dissipation; but there is another cause of it, which I think of with particular regret.—In consequence of having been often duped by false patriots; and found, that the leaders of opposition, when they get into places, forget all their former declarations; the nation has been led to a conviction, that all patriotism is imposture, and all opposition to the measures of government nothing but a struggle for power and its emoluments. The honest and independent part of the nation entertain at present most of this conviction; and, therefore, having few public men to whom they can look with confidence, they give up all zeal, and sink into inactivity and despondence.