Secondly. At the Revolution, the House of Commons acquired its just weight in the constitution; and, for some years afterwards, it was often giving much trouble to men in power. Of late, it is well known, that means have been tryed and a system adopted for quieting it.—I will not say with what success—But I must say, that the men whose policy this has been, have struck at the very heart of public liberty, and are the worst traitors this kingdom ever saw.—“If ever, (says Judge Blackstone) it should happen, that the independency of any one of the three branches of our legislature should be lost; or that it should become subservient to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of our constitution. The legislature would be changed from that which was originally set up by the general consent and fundamental act of the society; and such a change, however effected, is according to Mr. Locke (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government, and the people are thereby reduced to a state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative power.”[74]
Thirdly. Soon after the Revolution, bills for triennial parliaments passed both Houses, in opposition to the court[75]. At the Accession, septennial parliaments were established. Since this last period, many attempts have been made, by the friends of the constitution, to restore triennial parliaments; and, formerly, it was not without difficulty that the ministry were able to defeat these attempts. The division in the House of Commons in 1735, on a bill for this purpose, was 247 to 184.—I need not say, that now all such attempts drop of themselves. So much are the sentiments of our representatives changed in this instance, that the motion for such a bill, annually made by a worthy member of the House of Commons, can scarcely produce a serious debate, or gain the least attention.—For several years, at the beginning of the last reign, the House of Commons constantly passed pension and place bills, which were as constantly rejected by the House of Lords. At present, no one is so romantic as ever to think of introducing any such bills into the House of Commons.
Fourthly. Standing armies have in all ages been destructive to the Liberties of the states into which they have been admitted.—Montesquieu[76] observes, that the preservation of Liberty in England requires, that it should have no land forces.—Dr. Ferguson calls the establishment of standing armies “A fatal Refinement in the present state of civil government.”[77]—Mr. Hume pronounces “our standing army a mortal distemper in the British constitution, of which it must inevitably perish.”[78]—Formerly, the nation was apprehensive of this danger; and the standing army was a constant subject of warm debate in both Houses of Parliament. The principal reason then assigned for continuing it was, the security of the House of Hanover against the friends of the Pretender. This is a reason which now exists no more; the House of Hanover being so well established as not to want any such security.—The standing army also is now more numerous and formidable than ever; and yet all opposition to it is lost, and it is become in a manner a part of the constitution.
Fifthly. For many years after the accession the national debt was thought an evil so alarming, that the reduction of it was recommended every year from the throne to the attention of Parliament as an object of the last importance. The Fund appropriated to this purpose was called the ONLY HOPE of the kingdom; and when the practice of alienating it begun, it was reckoned a kind of sacrilege, and zealously opposed in the House of Commons, and protested against in the House of Lords. But now, though the debt is almost tripled, we sit under it with perfect indifference; and the sacred fund, which repeated laws had ordered to be applied to no other purpose than the redemption of it, is always alienated of course, and become a constant part of the current supplies, and much more an encouragement to dissipation than a preservative from bankruptcy.
Sixthly. Nothing is more the duty of the representatives of a nation than to keep a strict eye over the expenditure of the money granted for public services.—In the reign of King William, the House of Commons passed almost every year bills for appointing commissioners for taking, stating and examining the public accounts; and, particularly, the army and navy debts and contracts. In the reign of Queen Ann such bills became less frequent. But since the accession, only two motions have been made for such bills; one in 1715, and the other in 1741; and both were rejected.
Seventhly. I hope I may add, that there was a time when the kingdom could not have been brought to acquiesce in what was done in the case of the Middlesex election. This is a precedent which, by giving the House of Commons the power of excluding its members at discretion, and of introducing others in their room on a minority of votes, has a tendency to make it a self-created House, and to destroy entirely the right of representation: And a few more such precedents would completely overthrow the constitution.
Lastly. I cannot help mentioning here the addition which has been lately made to the power of the Crown, by throwing into its hands the East-India Company. Nothing more unfavourable to the security of public Liberty has been done since the Revolution: And should our statesmen, thus strengthened by the patronage of the East, be farther strengthened by the conquest and patronage of the West, they will indeed have no small reason for triumph; and there will be little left to protect us against the encroachments and usurpations of power. Rome sunk into slavery, in consequence of enlarging its territories, and becoming the center of the wealth of conquered provinces, and the seat of universal empire. It seems the appointment of Providence, that free states, when, not contented with self-government, and prompted by the love of domination, they make themselves masters of other states, shall lose Liberty at the same time that they take it away; and, by subduing, be themselves subdued. Distant and dependent provinces can be governed only by a military force. And a military force which governs abroad, will soon govern at home. The Romans were so sensible of this, that they made it treason for any of their generals to march their armies over the Rubicon into Italy. Cæsar, therefore, when he came to this river, hesitated; but he passed it, and enslaved his country.
“Among the circumstances (says Dr. Ferguson) which in the event of national prosperity and in the result of commercial arts, lead to the establishment of despotism, there is none perhaps that arrives at this termination with so sure an aim as the perpetual enlargement of territory. In every state the freedom of its members depends on the balance and adjustment of its interior parts; and the existence of any such freedom among mankind depends on the balance of nations. In the progress of conquest those who are subdued are said to have lost their liberties. But, from the history of mankind, to conquer or to be conquered has appeared in effect the same.”[79]