This account, so encouraging and flattering, was generally understood to be given in designed opposition to another account very different, which had been given in the Observations on Civil Liberty.—It cannot, therefore, I hope, be thought too presuming in me to offer the following remarks in my own defence.

I have grounded my opinion of the hazardous state of the kingdom, partly on the smallness of the surplus in the revenue, and the nature and circumstances of our paper-circulation, compared with the quantity of specie in the kingdom, and the weight of our debts and taxes.

The surplus of the revenue I have made out in two different methods; and by a deduction so minute, that it is, I think, scarcely possible it should be materially wrong. One of these methods brings it out 338,759l. per ann.[81]: and the other, 300,000l. per ann. supposing the expence of calling in the gold coin, and the profits of lotteries excluded; the land-tax at three shillings in the pound; and the peace establishment the same that it has been at a medium for eleven years, from 1764 to 1775.

Nothing more was said in opposition to this, than a general intimation, that had it not been for the war with America, the peace-establishment for the navy would have been reduced, and a sufficient surplus gained (including lotteries) to enable parliament to pay off a million every year of the public debt.

I am very sensible that reductions of the public expences and improvements in the revenue are practicable, which would give such a surplus. But I am afraid, they will never take place. Nor can I think it proper, in determining what permanent surplus we possess, to include those pernicious profits of lotteries, by which infinitely more is upon the whole lost than gained; or, to form our judgment of the expence of future years, by any other rule than the medium expence of past years.—It would, however, give little consolation, were there a certainty that, had peace continued, a MILLION annually of the public debt would have been discharged. This would have made a very slow progress in discharging our debts. A million every year discharged in peace, and eight or ten millions every year added in war, would leave us under the necessity of breaking at last. But hitherto we have not proceeded in a course so favourable. The great person to whom I refer, must know, that in 1772, he announced in the House of Commons, his intention to pay off a million and a half every year, and SEVENTEEN MILLIONS in ten years; that yet only 2.800,000l. was paid off in the three subsequent years; and that, on account of the increase of the navy and civil-list debts, there has not been in fact the ability (without the help of lotteries) to pay half that sum.

In page 74th of the Observations on Civil Liberty, I have said, “that it has appeared lately, that the gold specie of the kingdom, is no more than about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.”—This assertion has been much controverted; and it is therefore necessary I should give a distinct account of the reasons on which it was grounded.

I had learnt from unquestionable authority, that the quantity of gold coin brought into the mint, by the Acts of Parliament and Proclamations in 1773 and 1774, was about NINE MILLIONS[82]; or as much as, when recoined, amounted nearly to that sum.—I find also, that it was expected by the best judges, that the proclamation lately issued would bring in about three millions. These two sums make up twelve millions; and they include the gold coin of Ireland. Let this be estimated at a[83] million; and the whole gold coin of Britain, to be brought in by all the calls, will be ELEVEN millions; and none will remain, except that part which was deficient less than a grain in a guinea, and remained in the kingdom, at the time the coin Act took effect in June 1773. We are here left entirely to conjecture. But it should be remembered, that for many years before 1773, the heavy coin was catched up as soon as issued, and either clipped, or melted down and exported; and that from hence arose such a scarcity of heavy coin, that, in some counties, heavy guineas might be disposed of at a premium.—In such circumstances, an allowance of about a million and a half, for the coin deficient less than a grain in a guinea before the coin Act in 1773, seems to be sufficient; and therefore, it might, I think, with reason be said, that it appeared that the gold coin of the kingdom was about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.

But there is another reason, by which I have been convinced, that this is a moderate estimate.

The quantity of gold coin, deficient between three and six grains in a guinea, was 4.800,000l. and this, when recoined, made 4.600,000l.—The coin deficient less than three grains could not have been so much, for the following reasons. First, new coin being rougher, wears faster than old coin; and therefore, does not remain so long in any given degree of deficiency.—Secondly, coin, deficient less than three grains, is subject to several peculiar causes of diminution and destruction.—Clipping and sweating remove part of it to greater degrees of deficiency; and part is destroyed by being melted down and exported; whereas, lighter coin is diminished only by being worn[84].