Mr F[o]x.
Mr F[o]x now rose; and, with that extent of information, refined perspicuity, and vehemence of eloquence, by which he so invariably commands the attention and admiration of the House, entered at large into the subject of debate.
To do justice to the force of his reasoning, or elegance of his stile, is totally beyond the utmost efforts of the editor.—All that he can attempt is, to give an imperfect sketch of an inimitable original.⸺He began with lamenting the accomplishment of that ruin, which, from time to time, he had too justly predicted. He confessed, that little merit could be ascribed to those prophecies; which, however chimerical and visionary ministers had affected to consider them, were, in fact, no more than plain deductions of what must necessarily ensue from their own measures. He proceeded to recapitulate the conduct of Administration since the prorogation of Parliament; particularly observing on the impolitic removal of the troops from Philadelphia at the moment, when, if ever, their continuance there might have effected some good purpose. The concealment of that intended evacuation, even from the Commissioners themselves, was a part (he said) of that system of duplicity and deception which pervaded the whole of ministerial conduct. Possibly, indeed, Ministers were aware, that gentlemen of high character and esteem would not have become the executive tools of a plan so wretchedly concerted. The Commissioners therefore were not suffered to participate in counsels, which, if they had known, they must have despised. Nor was folly more conspicuous in the origin than in the prosecution of this paltry disingenuous plan. Sir Henry Clinton, to whose courage and conduct every praise is due, was ordered to return to New-York. Encumbered with baggage, and pursued by an army superior in numbers, he made his way thro’ the almost impervious forests of that country; and, by almost a miraculous effort, not only secured his retreat, but in the Jerseys had the good fortune to resist the enemy with some success—a success however, which, without disparaging the British troops, must in great part be attributed to General Lee; who, in consequence of his misconduct in that affair, was immediately put in arrest, and afterwards suspended for the space of a year.
He went on with indicating the circumstance of a fleet of Victuallers having been sent to Philadelphia, after the army, which was to be supplied by that fleet, had been ordered to evacuate Philadelphia.—That fleet, he said, had narrowly escaped being taken in the Delaware; and, thence, he argued Ministers were as culpable, as if, in consequence of the capture of that fleet, the army, then arrived at New-York, had famished for want of those provisions, on which their future subsistance was wholly dependant.
He said, he was yet to learn what plan Administration could pretend to alledge they had followed, or meant to follow, in America. Upon what grounds could they attempt to prosecute an offensive war? Or, taking the alternative, how can they presume to say they have acted on the defensive?⸺As to the first, they have thirty thousand men to conquer the continent of America: admitting then the superiority of their army and their navy, still he contended that superiority had been, and ever must be ineffectual and useless; because, as long as the English army and navy co-operate, the Americans will never have the unnecessary temerity to give up the advantage of situation, or expose their cause to the hazard of one decisive engagement. The last campaign was the clearest proof of that position; and, now, though our fleet was superior to the French, yet D’Estaign is safe at Boston.—It was, on that principle, he doubted not, the gallant and experienced Commanders of the last campaign had formed their conduct: It was their policy, and, in his opinion, the best policy, to keep a collected force, and to avoid any inferior exertions, that might require a separation, or weaken that superiority, which, in case of a decisive action, they rightly judged could alone have been fatal to American resistance.—It remained for General Clinton to pursue a contrary policy.—Yet, though (he declared) no man in that house entertained a higher respect for the personal and professional merit of that able Commander, (who from his particular talent for military enterprise, and his education under the Prince of Brunswick, was best calculated for effecting such a plan) yet, from the minutest investigation of the late Gazettes, he could not collect any very auspicious presage of his military career. If indeed, from his observation, of what had already happened, he might hazard an opinion of what may happen, we had no reason to rejoice at the revival of that plan of separation, which had proved so fatal in the Northern expedition. He was sorry he had mentioned that expedition—It led him to a subject he wished to avoid.—He had been accused of an asperity of reflexion on the conduct of the noble Lord who planned that expedition. He would strive, in future, to overcome his indignation, by indulging his contempt for the Adviser of it.—Yet, thus much he would say; though unhappy for this country, it was happy for our troops, happy for our officers, to be directed and controlled by a Minister, to whose wisdom not even Envy could ascribe one particle of their success, in whose imbecillity even Justice would afford them an asylum from every disgrace.
Having thus stated the impracticability of an offensive war in America, either on the former plan of united force, or on the present separate efforts, he recurred to the other part of his argument, whether Administration could pretend to alledge their having adopted the alternative, and formed even a defensive plan for America and the West-Indies?⸺If they dared to assume that merit, how could they expect the House to attend, with any degree of patience, to such a mockery of all truth? On any rational plan of mere defence, would they not have left a force at New-York, Rhode-Island, and Halifax, fully able to prevent any attack in that quarter; at the same time, detaching a sufficient force to protect the West-India Islands?—Upon such a plan, would not any spirited Minister have grafted some degree of activity and enterprise? Would He not have attacked Martinique, Guadaloupe, or St. Domingo? Such conduct would have struck terror to France, we should have been enriched by new acquisitions, or, at least, have prevented the disgrace of our own losses.
But, admitting that this defensive plan may have been but recently adopted, how are Administration to regain the time they have lost, or what resources of finance are still unexhausted to prosecute even this plan? Are all the Country Gentlemen equally disposed to devote fifteen shillings in the pound to carry on this defensive war? Are they all equally delighted with the great and growing ruin of an accumulating debt and a decreasing revenue? Or do they rest their hopes on the wealth of our East-India trade? Do they know that, there too, the French are undermining the foundation of our commerce? Or is it studiously concealed from them, that the French ministry have sent Monsieur Vaugelin to Canton, in the quality of their Consul at the Chinese Court?⸺He had heard much of a sudden increase of national wealth by our late captures, but, at best, the prizes of privateers are a partial benefit; they can enrich but a few individuals; they afford no diminution of the general burthens of a whole people. In the present instance, the truth was these boasted prizes were, in fact, public losses; the French having had the art to insure their most valuable ships, particularly the Indiamen, by English policies—besides that, several of the richest captures were actually freighted with consignments to English merchants.
But, supposing this extraordinary spirit of bounty should become general among the Country Gentlemen, and that, to support a war which had totally lost the original object of revenue, for which they had been tempted to engage in it; supposing they were all well inclined to a land-tax of fifteen shillings in the pound, and determined to overflow the Exchequer with an extraordinary redundance of profusion, yet would they be particularly happy that all that wealth should be portioned out to subsidise Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hanau, Waldeck, Brandebourg-Anspach, and all the mercenaries of Germany? Or that it should wholly be devoted to satiate the monopolising avarice of a Russian alliance? You have no force at home—you are almost defenseless.⸺
Col. Tffn[e]ll.