(Here he was called to order by Colonel Tuffnell for speaking of the defenceless state of this country.) Col. Tffn[e]ll said, the word defenceless was, to the last degree, improper and disorderly; for that he himself had the command at Dover Castle, opposite Calais, where, though the country all about it was rather flat, he would not wish such a word as defenceless to be sent from that house to Paris, by any friend of Dr. Franklin’s. And, as he was on his legs, he must say, that word defenceless was doubly wrong, from the late state of the camps; where, in spite of French spies, there had been the utmost discipline, unanimity, peace, and quietness; except, indeed, some desertions, much nakedness, frequent floggings, and several duels.
Mr. F[o]x then proceeded, without any remark on this interruption; and observed, that every petty Landgrave and Margrave had already been exhausted; they had no more Chasseurs, no more mercenary boors, to fight, or rather not to fight, our battles. Russia is frozen up for some months; and, not improbably, the courts of Berlin and Vienna would sufficiently engage her in their Bavarian contest; or, at least, not make it adviseable for her to lessen the internal defence of a country surrounded with such powerful armies. As to the Fleet, how could it be recruited with sailors or marines? Though even the spirit of adventure could instantly man every Privateer that had been fitted out, yet the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty had pretended to palliate his own incapacity and criminal neglect, by alledging it was almost impossible, even with an extraordinary bounty, and the utmost rigour of an Impress and an Embargo, to man the Royal Fleet—the fact was, the minds of the people were obstinately bent against this American war; nay, even against a French war, when France became the protector of America.
With such Ministers, such principles, such plans, such internal resources, such prospects of alliance; Gentlemen were now called on to echo the Speech, to panegyrize an Administration too despicable for satire, to plunge this devoted country in aggravated ruin, and, with a remorseless dispair, to desolate what they had found impossible to subdue.
Lord N[o]rth.
L[o]rd N[o]rth.[8] Mr. Sp[eake]r, at the same time that I agree with many Gentlemen who have spoken in the course of this day’s debate, that the present is a very serious moment of deliberation, I can by no means join with them in thinking our situation is desperate, though, I confess, it is distressing.
Sir, in all cases of distress or difficulty there is some relief to be found in comparison. Gentlemen who hear me, will admit that this country, in former wars, has been acquainted with unfortunate events. The loss of some of our possessions, and the failure of enterprizes, marked the onset of last war. Commanders were unsuccessful, perhaps criminal;—I do not mean to draw a complete analogy between that period and the present—I only mean to observe, that there has been no difficulty in modern times, from which this Country has not been able to extricate itself, when rouzed by a sense of its wrongs, and determined to vindicate its justice, its dignity, and its honour.⸺In saying this, I shall be told by Gentlemen that we were indebted to a great Character in the midst of our misfortunes during the last war, and that, by his vigour and enterprizing genius, this Country was extricated from her embarrassing situation. I will join heartily in paying that tribute of truth to his memory⸺Would to God that such a man were alive at this moment, to step forward with the full exertion of the same zeal, and the same talents. I would yield to none as a second in the work, though I confess my inability to be employed as a first.
Sir, the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last, has gone over such a variety of ground, and has given so large a history of the wickedness of Ministers during the American war, that the asperity with which he has delivered it, would be a sufficient reason for my silence, did I not think it necessary, from a duty I owe to this house and to my country, to give some answers to assertions which have fallen from him.
Sir,[9] to the first complaint, which the Honourable Gentleman makes, of the Minister’s concealment from the Commissioners of the removal of the troops from Philadelphia, I shall only answer, that the importance of that proceeding required the nicest secrecy, and (though I do not mean to suggest the least idea disadvantageous to the confidence of the Commissioners) it is perhaps owing to the secret decision upon that matter, that the removal of the fleet and army from the Delaware was so timely, and so effectually executed. And I will add, that (whatever opinions may have been conceived either by the Commissioners or any other persons) the events, which have since happened, amply justify the wisdom of the measure.⸺With respect to the bad policy, as some Gentlemen have called it, of opening a negotiation with a retreating army, will any one tell me, that, had your army and navy been blocked up by Mons. D’Estaign’s fleet, with the prospect of all of the latter being utterly destroyed in the Delaware, the Congress would have been more inclined to treat with your Commissioners, than when all were safe at New-York?—Were they inclined to negotiate with Lord H[o]we and Sir William H[o]we, (who had sufficient powers) at Philadelphia, after the receipt of the bills, and before the arrival of the new Commissioners?⸺No, Sir—no appearances of reconciliation on the part of the Congress were shewn at that time:—their minds, worked up by their leaders to a spirit of enthusiasm, indulged the expectation of destruction to our fleet, at least, from the powers of France.—I am free to confess, Sir, that when I heard Mons. D’Estaign had arrived in America previous to Admiral Byron, (whose fleet had been so unfortunately dispersed) I had little hopes from the temper and inclinations of the Congress, that they would be induced to treat; until some blow had been struck, and that on our part, of a successful nature.—My confidence was, and still is, Sir, in the people there at large—groaning under the worst of all tyrannies, involved in a ruinous, and, I maintain, an unsuccessful war; and driven by their corrupted leaders into a most unnatural connection with France; I say, Sir, if one spark of British sense and honour yet remains, if one drop of blood of this country still flows in the veins of the Americans, they will avail themselves of our liberality, and return to their former happy and enviable subordination to this country.
With respect to the Fleet of Victuallers, which, the Honourable Gentleman observed, had a narrow escape from the Delaware, it was supposed they had sailed from Corke, some time before the orders were sent from hence for the evacuation of Philadelphia; and it is very lucky they did not sail for New-York; for, if they had, they would have met with Monsieur D’Estaign there.
It has been urged by the Honourable Gentleman, that the American war can be no longer made offensive; and therefore, if a defensive one has been adopted, why not leave a sufficient number of troops for the defence of New-York, Rhode-Island, Halifax, and the Floridas? and strike some blow at the French Settlements in the West-Indies.—Gentlemen will recollect the little time that has elapsed since the evacuation of Philadelphia, the attack and defence of Rhode-Island, and the transactions between Lord Howe’s and D’Estaign’s Fleet, and they will see how difficult it was to be at a great many places at the same time.—With respect to Dominica, Sir, the loss of it is certainly a misfortune, but, I trust, only a temporary one. There can be no blame laid upon the Ministers for that event, because, in the very beginning of the war with France, ships were sent sufficient to make at least a superior force to the French in the West-Indies. I am aware of the force of the argument that will be made use of upon this occasion—Gentlemen will say, You have so many places and possessions to guard, that many of them must be vulnerable; and therefore it is impossible to go on in a war with France and America at the same time, with any reasonable expectations of success.—This argument will lead me to enter a little into what I conceive to be our actual situation at home and abroad.—With respect to this country, Sir, it is protected by a fleet superior to the French.—It contains, to the honour of those who have sacrificed domestic ease to public spirit, a very fine army, including the regulars, of 50,000 men.—Your ships of trade and merchandise have arrived safe and unmolested; whilst the Privateers and Letters of Marque have made considerable havock upon the property of our enemies.⸺And here I must remark upon two observations which have fallen from the Honourable Gentleman who spoke last.—The first, with respect to the number of sailors who have entered on board these ships at a time when there was so much difficulty in manning the fleet, and which is a charge of ignorance in obtaining them upon the Admiralty.—Sir, the bounty which has been given to seamen by individuals, to enter on board Privateers and Letters of Marque, has been enormous—I have been told 10 l.—15 l.—and 20 l. a-man.—This, with the expectation of the larger share of prize-money received by lesser vessels, has been a sufficient inducement to men to enter on board those ships.⸺Upon the other observation, that the prizes we have taken consist chiefly of British property, and are insured here—I shall only remark, that the Merchant here who employs French shipping and French navigation, in preference to the British, ought to suffer.—But, Sir, with respect to insurance, let us see which of the two countries suffers most on that head.—The insurance upon French ships homeward bound has been very high.—Upon the French Indiamen, I have heard, so high as 75 l. per cent.—Then, Sir, this being the case, if the Frenchman arrives safe in France, the Englishman gets 75 l. per cent.—If he is taken, he loses but 25 l. per cent. whilst his neighbour shares the prize entirely.—Surely, therefore, Sir, this country has certainly much the best of the bargain.—This, however, Sir, great as these advantages are, is no reason nor no inducement with me for continuing the war.—I am obliged to recur so often to what has been said, that I beg pardon for deviating from the chief object, at least of my consideration—that of our actual situation at home and abroad.—I have already said, Sir, that we are sufficiently defended by our navy and army at home.—We have certainly a greater superiority of both in North America—of ships in the West-Indies—superior in the East-Indies, and shall be more so when the ships now ready to proceed thither, and with troops, are arrived there.—Sir, there is wealth, I trust there is likewise spirit enough in this country, to support us even in a more embarrassing situation than the present. And, though Gentlemen may have wished to impeach the security of this country, I will fairly tell them, that, such is the confidence, even in the hour of her distress, foreigners of all nations have given, and do give, the preference to our funds;—the falling of which, immediately after the opening of the last budget, is to be imputed entirely to the jobbing of a good purchase at a low bargain, and not to a want of confidence in the nation. I could deduce many reasons to justify me in this opinion; and I could call upon the Dutch, as the best politicians, in support of it.—Nor, Sir, will I admit the prospect of ruin to be before us, until I see that the justice of our cause has left us, and that there no longer exists that zeal and bravery which have distinguished the people of Great Britain, as superior to the rest of the world⸺Sir, a great deal has been said by Gentlemen (who have in my idea gone over, unnecessarily at this time, the whole of the American war) with respect to the conduct of it.⸺I believe, even the most inveterate enemies Ministers may have, will allow that there was transported to a greater distance, than ever was known before, the finest army; that you fed and maintained it at that distance; and that, from its excellence and its superiority, you had a right to expect the most happy advantages. So far the business, as it concerned Ministry, was well transacted. But, Sir, then comes the question—were the plans and the directions to execute them wise and practicable?⸺I cannot but say, Sir, for my own part, and, as far as my Judgment went, they were so⸺I do not mean to suggest any thing invidious towards the Officers to whom commands and responsibility were delegated⸺I am not one of those who easily condemn, certainly never will, before I have just grounds for doing so⸺If our Army and Navy have not done in every part of the world what was expected of them—Parliament can enquire, can approve, or censure⸺This however appears to me but a secondary subject for our consideration.