The Footprints of the Jesuits

by Richard W. Thompson

If all these reforms were necessary—and that they must have been is indicated by the fact that they were granted—public affairs were undoubtedly in a most deplorable condition during the pontificate of Gregory XVI. But whether they were or not, a glance at them will show that none of them reached the questions which brought on the revolution. They were, in an essential degree, necessary measures of domestic policy, and whatsoever valuable results may have been produced by them, they still left the entire temporal power in the hands of the pope, so that the people would in the future have nothing to do with making the laws, but would be bound to obey such as the pope alone should dictate. And in order to make any advance towards constitutional government impossible, the proposed Board of Councilors were to be practically selected by the pope. This Board was considered by the papal party as a great concession to the people, but it was only relatively so; that is, it was one step in advance of the old system previously existing. The public were disposed to accept it from the pope, if not the belief that it would produce beneficial results; and consequently its first meeting was hailed with anxiety. Its probable action was discussed with more freedom than Rome had been accustomed to, as even the limited freedom of the press had caused a considerable increase in the number of newspapers, and a corresponding desire to discuss public questions. The inevitable effect of such a discussion was to invite public attention to the fact, which soon became apparent, that, instead of the Board of Councilors being such a reform as the people had hoped for and expected, its actual meaning was to perpetuate the temporal power of the pope, and to prevent, so long as that existed, the possibility of constitutional government. Whilst matters were in this unsettled condition, Pius IX—unfortunately for himself—was prompted, either at his own or the suggestion of others, to remove all doubt from the subject by informing the Board of Councilors, in a speech, that he had "not the slightest intention of lessening the power of the pontifical sovereignty," and that the Councilors had nothing to do "beyond giving an opinion when asked to do so." At a subsequent time, in a proclamation issued by his cardinal secretary of state, he announced that the only progress he proposed to authorize was "within those limits determined by the conditions essential to the sovereignty and the temporal government of the head of the Church."[181]

The old issue was thus revived by the pope himself, in such form and with so much directness that everybody understood it. Discussions of it immediately became common in the public assemblages of Rome. If the extreme revolutionists were able to excite the people by their eloquent and stirring appeals, it was unquestionably owing to the unwise and injudicious avowal of his purposes by the pope. If he had permitted his administrative reforms to work out their legitimate results, they might have strengthened his cause and that of the papacy. But he failed to do this, and thereby increased, rather than diminished, his own embarrassment. He soon realized the necessity of adopting precautionary measures to suppress a popular tumult in the event that the people could be held in check in no other way. For this purpose he created a "civic guard," which was understood to mean, and in fact was, a military force, to be moved against the people whensoever he deemed it expedient. It was in reality a papal army, "to consist of every male inhabitant throughout the States of the Church, between twenty-one and sixty, who possessed property, or kept a shop, or was at the head of an industrial establishment."[182] This measure could not be viewed in any other light than as immediate preparation for an aggressive military movement against all who did not submit to the papal policy—in other words, as a contemplated act of war. Looking at it as such, the pope's cardinal secretary of state, who did not favor it, resigned his office, withdrew from the papal service, and left the pope to the counsel of others. This conspicuous secession from his cause necessarily produced the most serious results, and was mainly influential in exciting all the discontented. Those who had been induced to acquiesce in the measures of the pope, with the hope that they would lead to pacification, were then brought to realize that there was no longer any real ground for this hope. On the other hand, they could see nothing in them but what indicated the purpose of the pope to maintain his temporal power by means of civil war, if he should find that necessary. The issue, consequently, became too distinct and direct to be longer evaded or misunderstood; and from that time the unification of Italy and the abolition of the temporal power became the watchwords of all who desired a constitution, as they soon after became also their battle-cry. At a public assemblage to celebrate the birthday of Pius IX, processions of people, marching through the streets of Rome, prepared tablets with these mottoes, among others, upon them: "Liberty of the press!" "Banishment of the Jesuits!" "Abolition of arbitrary action on the part of the police!" "Codes of useful and impartial laws!" "Publication of the acts of the Consulta!" "Faith in the people!" As a shower of rain prevented the public exhibition of these tablets, they were sent to the cardinal secretary of state, so that the pope should be enabled to interpret the mottoes upon them and understand their meaning and significance. In every direction the signs of popular discontent increased.

It has been said of Pius IX that he was "vainglorious," which is unquestionably true. This quality is not inconsistent with integrity of purpose, but often unfits its possessor for efficacious action in a great crisis. It causes one to rely too much upon personal influence and popularity, as was the case with him. When he met assemblages of the people, he addressed and bestowed benedictions upon them with apparent self-satisfaction, supposing that their shouts were intended to express unbounded veneration for him, whereas they were the result of respect for his sacred office, which restrained many who desired to see the temporal power abolished from openly and publicly avowing it. Those who appealed to and played upon his vanity misled him. Who these were it is not difficult to tell. They were the allied sovereigns, who, in obedience to the policy of the "Holy Alliance," had dictated the measures of Gregory XVI, and maintained them by the arms of Austria, the retrogressive cardinals, and the Jesuits—the latter, as always, thrusting themselves forward, ready to strike, whensoever a blow was needed, at the cause of constitutional government. This powerful combination was enabled to dictate to the kind-hearted pope, by appeals so artfully made that he became as pliable as wax in their hands. Under their controlling influence he composed his Council of Ministers to aid in administering public affairs, exclusively of ecclesiastics; thereby teaching the people that they could have no part whatsoever in those matters which immediately concerned their temporal welfare. To such an extent was this method of procedure carried that it soon became evident that Italy was, in fact, governed by foreign and alien influences, to which the pope had allowed himself to become entirely subjected. As Austria stood at the head of these influences, the Italian people regarded her with both suspicion and dread. And when the Austrian army was moved into Modena, thereby inducing the belief that the military occupation of the States of the Church was intended, the popular indignation became so great that the people demanded of Pius IX that he should declare war against Austria, notwithstanding her immense military strength. The circle of influences surrounding him was now growing more and more complicated, evidently adding to his embarrassment. He knew that he was under the suspicion of Austria because of his former tendency towards liberalism at the beginning of his pontificate, but could not venture to break his alliance with her, being assured, if he did, that it would lead to movements elsewhere in the Italian States that would shake the papacy to its center, and inevitably cost him the loss of his temporal power, which he dreaded more than all else.

These complications created others, which added to the uncertainties of the future. Under the existing emergencies a skillful statesman would have found a broad field for the display of ability in escaping the pitfalls before him. But Pius IX was not a statesman in any sense, and knew but little of public affairs as they existed in the Italian provinces, except what centered in the papacy, and nothing of international relations, except that as pope he was tied to the car of the reigning sovereigns, and was compelled, nolens volens, to share their fortunes. If he had possessed broad and comprehensive views—sufficient to have enabled him to see beyond the narrow circle in which he was moving—he might have realized that, whilst the people of Italy were willing and anxious to award him full credit for such reforms as he had introduced, they fell far short of the popular desire, because they did not reach the evils complained of, which had existed so long as to have become festering sores. He might also have seen that it was not a mere fitful fever of excitement which led to the demand for the expulsion of the Austrians, but the fixed and resolute purpose of an incensed population that they would no longer submit to the degradation of being held in subjugation by foreign bayonets. A skillful pilot would have pointed out to him the method of avoiding shipwreck; but he could find no such pilot among the ecclesiastics who were trained in the same school as himself, and he would have no other. To them he submitted everything, as his only advisers; and yet, at the same time, he seemed to suppose that, in his own personality, he possessed the power to suppress the most violent popular tumult. He frequently addressed assembled multitudes in Rome, and never failed to elicit "evvivas" and other tokens of personal respect, but neglected to observe the significant fact that, underlying all these, the sentiment most deeply imbedded in the popular mind was expressed by such cries as these: "Viva Pio Nono, solo!" "Hurrah for Pio Nono, without his advisers!" "Hurrah for Italian independence!" and others of like meaning. At one time he quieted the people by assuring them that he was on good terms with the King of Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and that he would soon replace his ecclesiastical advisers by laymen. At another time he endeavored to impress their minds with the idea that the security of the papacy was not seriously threatened, because there were "two hundred millions of brothers of all languages and all nations" upon whose assistance he could safely rely! What degree of sincerity accompanied this avowal, it is not necessary to inquire. It would seem, however, to have been suggested by a heated imagination as the best means of rounding off an eloquent period, for which Pius IX acquired deserved celebrity. One would scarcely think that a statesman with a practical mind could have expected to satisfy the supporters of his policy that all the Roman Catholics in the world would come to their defense against the patriotic Italians who were demanding to be relieved from foreign aggression, and the abolition of the temporal power, with a view to their own national independence. Nor is it probable that any other man but Pius IX would have risked such an avowal in the face of the facts that the Roman Catholic populations of the three great nations, France, Spain, and Portugal, and other smaller States, had secured their own independence by the very methods he was condemning. Preposterous as the suggestion was, it may have quieted the apprehensions of some whose unenlightened minds and passive indifference to results were the fruits of the retrogressive policy of the papacy. But there were numerous others whose intelligence enabled them to see through the thin disguise and gauzy eloquence of the pope, and to comprehend the leading thought which burdened his mind. And especially may it be supposed that this result was produced when Pius IX immediately followed his boastful promise of assistance from the whole "two hundred millions" of Roman Catholics throughout the world, by saying that Rome was safe "as long as this Apostolic See shall remain in the midst of her!"[183] Thoughtful people, understanding when he spoke of the Apostolic See in this connection that he meant only the temporal power and kingship of the pope, rightfully interpreted this declaration as opposed to Italian independence and as a denial of their right to a constitutional form of government. And such, in fact, it was, as became more apparent every day. Even the most illiterate soon came to comprehend it, and to understand the actual condition of affairs. At an immense assemblage in the Quirinal a few days after, the people again shouted "evviva" for Pius IX, and immediately after cried out, "Italy, freed from the Austrians!" "A Constitution!" "Down with the priests!" Being stirred by these popular shouts, and being doubtless led to believe that his personal popularity was unbounded, he exclaimed, with the utmost energy and emphasis: "Be faithful to the pontiff. Do not ask what is contrary to the Church and to religion! Certain voices, and certain cries reach my ears, proceeding not from the many, but from the few, which I neither will nor can admit!"[184]

Events which might have moved somewhat tardily before, were, after this explicit declaration of the pope in favor of the Austrians and against a constitution, hastened into great activity. Everything demonstrated that the people were acting under the influence of a settled conviction that all their best and dearest interests required that they should establish an independent constitutional government at whatsoever cost. And the resoluteness with which the purpose to accomplish this end was formed and maintained by the Italian people will fully appear in the sequel of their history, which furnishes a conspicuous instance of the manner in which the example of the people of the United States reacted upon the modern populations of the European States.

FOOTNOTES:

[169] De Montor, Vol. II, p, 780.

[170] Life of Victor Emmanuel. By Edward Dicey. Putnam's Sons, New York. Page 65.

[171] Ibid., p. 132.

[172] De Montor, Vol. II, p. 781.