About this time, the archbishop of Lima and Gomez de Solis arrived at Panama; both of whom expressed their satisfaction on learning the turn which affairs had taken at that place, and openly declared themselves for the royal party, offering their best services to the president. At this, time likewise, the president sent Don Juan de Mendoza to Mexico, with letters for the viceroy of that kingdom, Don Antonio de Mendoza, requiring the aid of all the soldiers that could be spared from that country. Don Balthazar de Castille was sent at the same time to Guatimala and Nicaragua on a similar mission; and other persons were dispatched to San Domingo, to procure every possible assistance for prosecuting the war in Peru, if that measure should ultimately be necessary.

It has been already mentioned that Pedro Hernandez Paniagua was dispatched by the president with letters for Gonzalo Pizarro. Paniagua arrived at Tumbez about the middle of January 1547, whence he went to San Miguel, where Villalobos then commanded for Gonzalo. Paniagua was immediately arrested by Villalobos, who took from him his dispatches and forwarded them with all speed to Gonzalo at Lima, by means of Diego de Mora the commandant of Truxillo. On learning the arrest of Paniagua, Gonzalo sent a confidential person to conduct him to Lima, with strict orders not to permit any person to converse with him by the way. On his arrival at Lima, Gonzalo, in presence of all his confederate officers, restored to Paniagua his credentials and dispatches, desiring him to declare every thing that had been confided to him by his employer, and assuring him of entire personal safety in regard to every thing connected with his commission: But, if he should presume to converse either publickly or privately with any other person on any subject connected with the president, he might rest assured of losing his head. Accordingly, Paniagua boldly explained the subject of his mission. When he had withdrawn from the council of officers, some were for putting him to death, alleging that he had previously communicated his sentiments to some confidential persons. Gonzalo Pizarro did not communicate to his officers either of the two letters formerly mentioned, which were addressed to himself, by the king and the president. In this consultation, it was the universal opinion of the insurgent leaders, that they ought on no account to admit the president into Peru; many of the officers, in expressing their sentiments on this occasion, spoke of the president in a very abusive manner, and even mentioned his majesty with very little respect, at which Gonzalo seemed well pleased.

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro wrote to his lieutenant-general Carvajal, who still remained in La Plata, directing him to come immediately to Lima, and bring thither along with him all the treasure he could procure, and all the musquets and other arms that were in that place. These orders did not proceed from any idea that these were necessary for defence, as the transactions at Panama were still unknown in Peru; but on account of the many complaints which had been made of the continual murders and confiscations which were perpetrated by Carvajal. Some alleged that he was summoned to the capital to receive deserved punishment for his cruel and tyrannical conduct; while others said it was on purpose to strip him of more than 150,000 crowns which he had amassed by pillage. At this time Lima was so entirely occupied with suspicions, that no one dared to confide in any other, or to speak a single word respecting the present state of affairs; as the slightest misplaced word, or the most trifling pretext or suspicion, was sufficient to place the life of any one in imminent danger. Gonzalo took the greatest possible precautions for his safety, of which the following is a remarkable instance. He had noticed on many occasions that the oydor Zarate was by no means attached to his interests, although his daughter was married to the brother of Pizarro: And though Zarate was sick, it was confidently asserted that Gonzalo procured him to be poisoned, by means of certain powders which he sent him under pretence of a remedy. In the sequel this rumour was confirmed by the testimony of several persons who were in the service of Pizarro at the time. Whether Pizarro were really guilty of this crime or innocent, it is a certain fact that he expressed much satisfaction on learning the death of Zarate.

In the mean time, Paniagua procured permission, through the intermediation of the licentiate Carvajal, to return to Panama, though contrary to the opinion of the other insurgent officers, who were clear for detaining him; and he may assuredly be reckoned fortunate in having got away from Lima before intelligence arrived there that the fleet and army at Panama had submitted to the president. Although this circumstance had not reached the knowledge of the insurgents, it began to be vehemently suspected, in consequence of receiving no reports from that place for so long a time; insomuch that Gonzalo sent off orders to Pedro de Puelles, who commanded in Quito, and all his other captains, to keep themselves vigilantly on their guard, and to hold all their troops in continual readiness for taking the field.

At this period the lieutenant-general Carvajal arrived at Lima from Las Charcas accompanied by an hundred and fifty soldiers, and bringing with him three hundred musquets and treasure to the value of more than 800,000 crowns. He was received at Lima with extraordinary pomp, Gonzalo going out to meet him with all the inhabitants of the city, accompanied with bands of music and every demonstration of rejoicing. Just at this time intelligence was received from Puerto Viejo, that four ships had been seen near the coast, as if reconnoitering, which had stood out again to sea without coming to anchor or sending on shore for water or provisions, as was usual with ships navigating in these seas. This was looked upon as a sign of hostile intentions. It was a considerable time after this, before Gonzalo was entirely certified of the intention of these four ships, which in fact were those under Aldana, both because they were exceedingly cautious of coming near the land, and because Diego de Mora, his lieutenant at Truxillo, detained certain letters which had been sent through his hands on the subject. Yet their suspicious appearance on the coast gave great uneasiness to Gonzalo, and occasioned him to take every means of precaution for his security; ordering continual watch to be kept up day and night, both by the soldiers and the inhabitants, all of whom appeared to do so with much care and satisfaction. Some time after the appearance of the ships off Puerto Viego, they arrived at the harbour of Malabrigo, five or six leagues to the northwards of Truxillo, and Diego de Mora learnt their arrival by the same messenger who was charged with the news of their appearance at Puerto Viejo. As he was quite ignorant of the persons who were embarked in these ships, and of their intentions, he went on board a vessel in the harbour of Truxillo, accompanied by several inhabitants of that city, intending to seek for these four vessels wherever they might happen to be, and carried along with him a considerable supply of provisions and warlike stores. He considered it quite safe to board these strange vessels; as, if they belonged to the partisans of Gonzalo, it was easy for him to allege that he came in quest of news, and to supply them with refreshments; whereas if they should be of the royal party, so much the better, as he was resolved to join them with all his followers. He fortunately came up with Aldana on the very day in which he left the harbour of Truxillo; and, having entered into mutual explanations, joined company to the reciprocal satisfaction of both, supplying Aldana with such refreshments as were needed for his ships.

Next night, Aldana and De Mora with all the ships came to anchor in the harbour of Truxillo, where it was not deemed proper to land the troops; but it was agreed that De Mora and all the inhabitants of Truxillo should retire into the province of Caxamarca, in which place they could remain in safety till their assistance might be required, and where they might endeavour to assemble all that were favourable to the royal cause. At the same time messengers were dispatched with letters and orders from the president in the kings name, to Chachapoyas, Guanuco, and Quito, and to the frontier posts commanded by Mercadillo and Porcel, inviting all who were inclined to serve his majesty to declare themselves. Intelligence of these proceedings at Truxillo were speedily carried to Gonzalo by a monk of the order of Mercy, who had always favoured the Pizarrian faction; but who could only relate the departure of De Mora and the inhabitants of Truxillo, without being able to give any distinct account of their intercourse and agreement with those on board the fleet. Accordingly, Gonzalo concluded, from the information brought by the monk, that De Mora and the inhabitants of Truxillo had gone off for Panama to join the president. Gonzalo therefore sent off the licentiate Garcias de Leon, who had always accompanied him hitherto, with the commission of lieutenant-governor of Truxillo, accompanied by fifteen or twenty soldiers, to whom he gave grants of the lands and Indians which had belonged to the citizens of Truxillo who had gone off with De Mora. Along with De Leon, Gonzalo sent the superior of the order of Mercy, with orders to embark the wives of all the inhabitants of Truxillo who had gone off, and to carry them to their husbands at Panama, whither he supposed they were gone; and he sent at the same time proper persons to be married to the widows who remained in Truxillo, commanding that such of these widows as refused compliance should be deported along with the married women to Panama. Various and specious pretexts were alleged for this procedure; but the true reason was, that Gonzalo wished to be entire master of the country, and to dispose at his pleasure of the lands, Indians, houses, and properties of all who had fled from his usurped power.

As Garcias de Leon was sent on this expedition by sea, he fell in, a few days after his departure, with the four ships commanded by Aldana, and joined himself to them with all his followers, embracing the party of his majesty. On this occasion, the superior of the order of Mercy was sent by land to Lima, with directions to inform Gonzalo of what had happened, and the purpose of these four ships making their appearance on the coast. He was likewise desired to communicate the intelligence to several of the loyal inhabitants of Lima; and to tell them, if they were at any time able to go to the port belonging to that city, they would find boats ready to carry them on board the ships. On receiving this news, Gonzalo sent orders to the superior to keep out of the way, and on no account to have intercourse with any person whatever, either publickly or privately, as he valued his life. Gonzalo complained loudly against Aldana for deserting him; saying that if he had followed the advice of his principal officers, he would have put him to death long before.

When the arrival and intention of the fleet was certainly known and understood, by which it appeared necessary to prepare for war, Gonzalo began immediately to put every thing in proper order, and to assemble his troops; having hitherto believed himself in perfect security against any hostile attack. He appointed the licentiates Carvajal and Cepeda to be captains of cavalry, as persons in whose attachment he could confide, considering the weighty obligations they had received from him. Juan de Acosta, Juan Velez de Guevara, and Juan de la Torre were made captains of musqueteers; and Ferdinand Bachicao, Martin de Robles, and Martin de Almendras captains of pikemen. Francisco de Carvajal, who had hitherto enjoyed that office, was nominated lieutenant-general, having an hundred of the musqueteers he had brought with him from Las Charcas appointed for his guard. It was proclaimed by beat of drum, that all the inhabitants of Lima, and all strangers residing there, of whatever quality or condition, were to enrol themselves among the troops under pain of death; and money was issued to the several captains for the pay and equipment of their companies. The two captains of horse received 50,000 crowns, with which they were each ordered to levy and equip fifty horsemen; besides which, several merchants and others, very unfit for warfare, enrolled themselves. It was well known that these men were quite unfit for being soldiers; but they were constrained to enlist on purpose to exact money from them for their discharge, which in fact they purchased by furnishing horses, arms, and money to such as were in want. Martin de Robles received 25,000 crowns with which he was to enlist and equip a company of 130 pikemen. Ferdinand Bachicao had 20,000 to raise 120 pikemen; and Juan d'Acosta a similar sum for an equal number. Martin de Almendras had 12,000 crowns to raise 45 pikemen; and Juan de la Torre 12,000, to levy 50 musqueteers, who were to form the ordinary guard of Gonzalo. Antonio Altamirano, one of the principal inhabitants of Cuzco was appointed to carry the grand standard, with a troop of 80 horse; and he received 12,000 crowns for some particular purpose, as his men had no need of pay or equipments, being all chosen from among the rich inhabitants of the country.

On this occasion the several captains had standards or colours painted according to their respective fancies, the grand standard alone carrying the royal arms. Among these, Bachicao had the letters G.P. or the cypher of Gonzalo Pizarro, interlaced upon his colours, surmounted by a royal crown. Every thing being in order, posts were assigned to each officer, of which they were to take especial care by day and night. Gonzalo Pizarro made liberal donations to several soldiers who were unfit for service, as well as to those who took the field; giving them, besides what they were entitled to for their equipment, considerable sums according to their respective merits and occasions. In a general review, he mustered a thousand men, as well armed and equipped and furnished with all necessaries, as any that had been seen in the most prosperous campaigns in the Italian war. Besides their arms, which were all excellent, most of the soldiers were clothed in silken hose and doublets, and many had theirs of cloth of gold, or embroidery of gold silver or silk, with gold embroidery on their hats, their ammunition pouches, and the covers of their musquets. The army was well supplied with excellent powder; and Gonzalo gave orders that every soldier should have either a horse or a mule to ride upon during a march. In the equipment of this army, Gonzalo expended above half a million of crowns.

Besides these preparations, Gonzalo sent Martin Silveira to the city of La Plata, to bring from thence all the men and money that could be procured in that quarter. Antonio de Robles was sent to Cuzco, to conduct to Lima all the troops that were there under the charge of Alfonzo de Hinojosa, the lieutenant-governor of that city. He wrote to Lucas Martinez, his lieutenant at Arequipa, desiring him to join him immediately with all the soldiers he could raise. He sent orders to Pedro de Puelles, his lieutenant at Quito, to join him as soon as possible with all the troops from that province; and likewise ordered Mercadillo and Percel to abandon the passes of which they had the charge, bringing all their men along with them to Lima, and sent similar orders to Saavedra the lieutenant-governor of Guamanga. By these means Gonzalo exerted himself to the uttermost to collect a respectable force; and he particularly enjoined all his officers not to leave behind them any horses or arms, or any other conveniencies for those who remained to enable them to join the president. He endeavoured to justify his present conduct, by representing that Aldana, whom he had sent to give an account to the king of all that had occurred in Peru, had leagued with the president, and now employed against himself and the colony those vessels which had been confided to his charge, and which had cost more than 80,000 crowns in their equipment. He alleged that the president, who had been sent expressly by his majesty to restore peace and tranquillity to the kingdom, had raised troops of his own authority, and now proposed to come in arms into Peru, to punish all who had taken part in the late commotions, so that all were equally interested in opposing him. That no one ought therefore to reckon upon the pardon and amnesty with which the president was said to be entrusted, and which it was reported he was to extend to all who joined him; but rather that this ought to be considered as a fraudulent contrivance to divide and ruin the colonists. Even admitting the truth of the reported amnesty; it could only refer to the original opposition to the obnoxious regulations and tyrannical conduct of the viceroy, and could have no reference to those who were engaged in the battle of Quito, and the consequent death of the viceroy; as these transactions could only be known in Spain after the departure of the president, and nothing respecting them could therefore be included in his instructions and powers. Therefore, until his majesty were fully informed of the whole series of events, and had issued new orders on the subject, it became necessary to prevent the president from coming into Peru, more especially as Gonzalo Pizarro was informed by letters from Spain, that the president was not authorized by his majesty to deprive Gonzalo of the government, but merely to preside in the royal court of audience. He pretended to be perfectly assured of this circumstance, by letters from Francisco Maldonado, whom he had sent to the king, and that the president had even in some measure acknowledged this in the letter which was brought from him by Paniagua. He alleged farther, that the captains in his own employment, who had been sent into the Tierra Firma for the defence of Peru, having revolted to the president, had now persuaded him to change his tone and to invade Peru by force of arms; at which procedure his majesty would be assuredly much displeased, when informed. By these and other arguments of a similar nature, Gonzalo endeavoured to demonstrate that the president was highly to blame in detaining those persons whom he, Gonzalo, had sent to Spain, and that it was justifiable on these grounds to oppose him by force of arms.