Gonzalo, by the advice of his lieutenant-general and other confidential officers, took additional measures to justify their conduct, and to satisfy the soldiers and inhabitants in the goodness of their cause. In an assembly of all the men learned in the law who were then in Lima, they arraigned the president as having acted criminally, in taking possession of the ships belonging to the colony, and by invading the country in a warlike manner, contrary to the tenor of the commission and instructions he had received from the king; endeavouring at the same time to convince the assembly, that it was just and proper to proceed judicially against the president, and those captains and others who adhered to him and abetted him in these proceedings, and that they ought to be proceeded against in a formal manner, by legal process. The persons composing this assembly of men of learning, dared not to contradict Gonzalo on this occasion or to oppose his will in any respect: A process was accordingly instituted in due form, informations taken and recorded, and judgment pronounced in the following tenor: "Considering the crimes established by the judicial informations given against the licentiate De la Gasca and those captains who adhere to him; they are found guilty and deserving of condemnation; wherefore, the said licentiate De la Gasca is hereby adjudged to be beheaded, and the captains Aldana and Hinojosa to be quartered." The other captains and officers serving under the president, were at the same time condemned to various punishments, according to the measure of guilt which Gonzalo and the leaders of his faction were pleased to charge against them; and the sentences were ordered to be signed in due form by the oydor Cepeda, and other men of letters at Lima.

Among these persons of the law who were desired to sign on the present occasion, was a licentiate from Valladolid named Polo Hondegardo, who had the boldness to wait upon Gonzalo, and to represent to him, that the promulgation of such a sentence was by no means advisable or politic; as it might possibly happen hereafter that those officers who were now in the service of the president might incline to revert to his party, which they would not dare to do when once this cruel sentence was pronounced against them. He represented farther, that it was necessary to keep in mind the sacred character of the president as a priest; in consequence of which circumstance all who might sign a sentence of death against him would incur the pains and penalties of the greater excommunication. By this remonstrance, these strong measures were arrested in their progress, and the intended sentence was not promulgated.

About this time, intelligence was brought to Pizarro, that the squadron under Lorenzo de Aldana had quitted the port of Truxillo and was approaching along the coast towards Lima. On this intelligence, Gonzalo sent off Juan d'Acosta with fifty mounted musqueteers, with orders to keep in view of the ships, to prevent the royalists from being able to land for provisions or water. On arriving at Truxillo, Acosta only ventured to remain one day at that place, being afraid that Diego de Mora might bring a superior force against him from Caxamarca. He learnt likewise, that the royalists squadron had gone to the port of Santa, to which place he accordingly marched. Aldana got notice of his coming from some Spanish inhabitants of that place, and laid an ambuscade for him, consisting of an hundred and fifty musqueteers, in a place overgrown with tall reeds on the side of the road by which Acosta had to march in his way to Santa. Acosta had certainly fallen into the snare, if he had not fortunately made prisoners of some spies who had been sent on shore from the squadron, whom he was about to have hanged, when they prevailed on him to save their lives by giving him notice of the ambushment, and by farther informing him that he might make prisoners of some sailors who were taking in fresh water for the ships, by quitting the common road and going nearer the shore. He accordingly took that road and made the sailors prisoners, whom he sent to Gonzalo at Lima. Those belonging to Aldana, who were in ambush, learnt this transaction; but, being all on foot, and the insurgent party all horsemen, they could not attempt to rescue the prisoners from Acosta, as that part of the country consisted of very deep sands. Acosta returned to the port of Guavera, where he waited fresh orders from Lima.

Gonzalo treated the prisoners sent to him by Acosta with much kindness, supplying them with clothes and arms, and gave them their choice of any of the companies of his troops in which they might think proper to serve. From these men, he received exact information of all the late events which had occurred at Panama, of the succours which the president expected to receive from different parts of America, and of the force which accompanied Aldana on the present expedition. They informed him likewise that Aldana had set on shore Pedro de Ulloa, a Dominican friar, disguised in a secular habit, who had orders to distribute copies of the amnesty in every direction. In consequence of this information, he was sought for and soon found; and Gonzalo had him confined in a dungeon near the fish-ponds in his garden, which was infested with toads and vipers, where he remained till he recovered his liberty on the arrival of the fleet some time afterwards.

About this time, it was determined to dispatch the licentiate Carvajal with three hundred mounted musqueteers, together with the detachment under Juan d'Acosta, to scour the coast to the northwards, and to attack Diego de Mora who had withdrawn into the province of Caxamarca. When every thing was in readiness for this expedition, the lieutenant-general Carvajal went one morning early to Gonzalo, and represented to him, that it was by no means safe to entrust so important a command to the licentiate, as a person in whom they could not repose implicit confidence. That although he had hitherto attached himself to their party, it was obviously for the sole purpose of being revenged of the late viceroy; and, as that purpose was now accomplished, it did not appear that his fidelity could be depended upon. It was proper to recollect, he added, that all the brothers of the licentiate were greatly attached to his majesty, particularly the bishop of Lugo who enjoyed several high employments; so that it was not to be imagined the licentiate would act cordially in the interest of a party which was diametrically opposed to that in which all his nearest relations were engaged. Besides all which, this person had formerly been made a prisoner by themselves, without any just foundation, and had even been so nearly punished capitally, that he had been ordered to make his testament and to confess himself in preparation for death, which injurious treatment he could not be supposed to have forgotten. Gonzalo was so much convinced by these arguments, that he countermanded the order given to the licentiate Carvajal, and sent off Juan d'Acosta on the expedition to Caxamarca, with a force of two hundred and eighty men. D'Acosta accordingly set out on this intended service, taking the road for Truxillo; but on arriving at Baranza, about twenty four leagues from Lima, he halted at that place for reasons which will appear in the sequel.

At this period, the Captain Saavedra, who was lieutenant-governor of Guanuco for Gonzalo, received letters from Aldana urging him to quit the insurgent party and to declare for his majesty. He accordingly determined to do so; and under pretence of obeying the orders he had received from Gonzalo of joining his army at Lima, along with Hernando Alonzo, he assembled all the soldiers he could procure in that province, with whose assistance he fortified the city of Guanuco, and informed them of his resolution to exert his best endeavours in the service of the king. All his soldiers agreed to follow his example, except three or four who fled and informed Gonzalo of the defection of their governor. Saavedra retired immediately to Caxamarca, with forty horsemen, where he joined Diego de Mora and those who had withdrawn along with him from Truxillo, where both declared themselves for the royalist party. On learning the defection of Saavedra and the principal inhabitants of Guanuco, Gonzalo sent an officer to that place at the head of thirty soldiers; with orders to pillage and destroy the city: But the Indians of the neighbourhood, having armed themselves and taken possession of the place by the orders of their masters, made so resolute a defence that the insurgent detachment was beaten off, and constrained to return to Lima, being unable to procure any other plunder except some mares cattle and other animals belonging to the settlers.

On the arrival of Antonio de Robles at Cuzco, whom Gonzalo had sent to take the command in that city and province, Alfonso de Hinojosa, who had hitherto been lieutenant-governor there, resigned the command of the city and troops, but as was believed with much dissatisfaction. De Robles immediately collected as much money as he could procure, and enlisted all the soldiers that were to be found in that neighbourhood, with whom he marched to Xaquixaguana, about four leagues from Cuzco. At that place he learned that Diego Centeno; who had concealed himself for more than a year in a cave among the mountains, had recently left his concealment, on learning the arrival of the president, and had collected several of his former partisans, who had hidden themselves from the fury of Gonzalo in various parts of the woods and mountains. By this time Centeno had collected about forty men, mostly on foot, though some of them still had the horses with which they had made their escape. Although these men were neither so well armed or equipped as they could have wished, Centeno resolved to make an attempt upon Cuzco, shewing as much confidence as if he had been at the head of five hundred well armed troops. His principal followers were Luis de Ribera, Alfonso Perez de Esquival, Diego Alvarez, Francisco Negral, Pedro Ortiz de Zarate, and Friar Dominic Ruiz, commonly called Father Viscayno. With this small band of followers, Centeno drew nigh to Cuzco, being doubtless invited to that step by some of the principal inhabitants, for the purpose of freeing them from the tyranny of De Robles, a young man of low origin and little ability. It was even said that Alfonso de Hinojosa, from resentment against Gonzalo for superseding him in the government, had sent privately to offer his assistance to Centeno. Both of these reports are highly probable; as otherwise it would have been a most inexcusable rashness in Centeno, to call it no worse, to have presumed upon attacking Cuzco with the small number of men he had collected; as, besides the inhabitants of the city, there were more than five hundred soldiers there and in the environs, while he had only forty ill armed men, most of whom had swords or daggers fastened to poles, instead of pikes or lances.

On learning the approach of Centeno, De Robles returned to Cuzco, where he made such preparations as seemed necessary; and, on hearing that Centeno was within a days march, he took the field with three hundred men, sending forwards Francisco de Aguira to procure intelligence. This person was brother to one Peruchio de Aguira who had formerly been put to death by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, and was consequently a secret enemy to the insurgent party. Instead therefore of executing the commission confided to him by De Robles, he went immediately to join Centeno, whom he informed of every thing that was going on at Cuzco and of the state of affairs in that city. In the night before the festival of Corpus Christi of the year 1547, Centeno advanced toward the city of Cuzco, by a different road from that in which De Robles and his troops were posted; and, having turned one of his flanks, made an unexpected assault with great resolution, as resolved to conquer or die. Completely surprised and thrown into confusion, the troops of De Robles were unable to get into any order for defence, and even in several instances turned their arms against each other, insomuch that a good many of them were slain by their own comrades. On this occasion Centeno used the following stratagem, which succeeded admirably: Having taken off the saddles and bridles from the horses belonging to his small band of followers, he ordered them to be driven by his attendant Indians along the road which led to the front of the enemies camp, to call off their attention from his real attack on their flank and rear. By this means, as the horses were urged on by the Indians behind, they threw the troops of De Robles into confusion, and enabled Centeno to penetrate into the camp unperceived and unopposed, where he and his men exerted themselves so courageously that the insurgents were completely defeated and put to flight. [Illustration: Map: VICEROYALTY OF PERU]

By this successful exploit Centeno acquired great honour; it having been seldom seen that so small a number had defeated so disproportioned a force of infinitely better armed troops. It has been reported that, on this occasion, some men belonging to Alfonso de Hinojosa were the first to fly, in consequence of secret orders for that purpose: But these men never acknowledged the truth of this allegation, as disgraceful to themselves; and Centeno denied the story, as detracting from the glory of his victory.

After the derout of De Robles, Centeno took possession of Cuzco, where he was immediately elected captain-general of that city and province for his majesty. Next day, he caused Antonio de Robles to be beheaded, and distributed 100,000 crowns, which he found in that city belonging to Gonzalo, among his followers. He in the next place took measures for raising a respectable force; appointing Pedro de Rios and Juan de Vargas, the brother of Garcilasso de la Vega, captains of infantry, and Francisco Negral captain of Cavalry; Luis de Ribera being named major-general. Having armed and equipped about four hundred men, he set out for La Plata, with the intention of persuading Alfonso de Mendoza, who commanded at that place for Gonzalo, to declare for the king, or otherwise to take possession of that place by force.