We continued about a week at this island, watering our ships, and providing the squadron with wine and other refreshments. While here, on the 3d November, Captain Richard Norris signified to the commodore, by letter, his desire to quit the command of the Gloucester, in order to return to England for the recovery of his health. The commodore complied with this request, and was pleased to appoint Captain Matthew Mitchell to command the Gloucester in his room, to remove Captain Kidd from the Wager to the Pearl, and Captain Murray from the Tryal sloop to the Wager, giving the command of the Tryal to Lieutenant Cheap. These promotions being settled, with other changes in the lieutenancies, the commodore, on the 4th November, gave to the captains their orders, appointing St Jago, one of the Cape Verd islands, to be the first place of rendezvous in case of separation; and, if they did not meet the Centurion there, directing them to make the best of their way to the island of St Catharine on the coast of Brazil. The water for the squadron being that day completed, and each ship supplied with as much wine and other refreshments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon, and took leave of Madeira. But, before continuing the narrative of our transactions, I think it necessary to give some account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the measures they had taken to render all our designs abortive.

On visiting the governor of Madeira, Mr Anson was informed by him, that for three or four days in the latter end of October, there had appeared to the westward of the island seven or eight ships of the line and a patache, which last was sent close in with the land every day. The governor assured our commodore, upon his honour, that no person on the island had either given them intelligence, or had any sort of communication with them. He believed them to be either French or Spanish, but was rather inclined to suppose the latter. On this intelligence, Mr Anson sent an officer in a clean sloop eight leagues to the westwards, to reconnoitre them, and, if possible, to discover what they were: But the officer returned without having seen them, so that we still remained in uncertainty; yet we could not but conjecture that this fleet was intended to put a stop, if possible, to our expedition; and, had they cruized to the eastward of the island, instead of the westward, they could not have failed in doing so: for, as in that case they must infallibly have fallen in with us, we should have been under the necessity of throwing overboard vast quantities of provisions, to clear our ships for action; and this alone, independent of the event of the action, would have effectually prevented our progress. This was so obvious a measure, that we could not help imagining reasons which might have prevented them from pursuing it. We supposed, therefore, that this French or Spanish squadron, having advice that we were to sail in company with Admiral Balchen and Lord Cathcart's expedition, might not think it adviseable to meet with us till we had parted company, from apprehension of being over-matched, and supposed we might not separate before our arrival at this island. These were our speculations at the time, from which we had reason to suppose we might still fall in with them, in our way to the Cape de Verd islands. We were afterwards persuaded, in the course of our expedition, that this was the Spanish squadron commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro, sent out purposely to traverse the views and enterprizes of our squadron, to which they were greatly superior in strength. As this Spanish armament was so nearly connected with our expedition, and as the catastrophe, if underwent, though not effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation produced in consequence of our equipment; I have, in the following section, given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first setting out from Spain in 1740, till the Asia, the only ship of the whole squadron that returned to Europe, got back to Corunna in the beginning of the year 1746.

Footnote 1: [(return)]

The charts are however the most accurate, as that is the long. of the centre of Madeira, in our best modern maps.E.

SECTION III.

History of the Spanish Squadron commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro.

The squadron fitted out by the court of Spain, to attend our motions, and traverse our projects, we supposed to have been the ships seen off Madeira. As this force was sent out particularly against our expedition, I cannot but imagine that the following history of its casualties, so far as has come to my knowledge, by intercepted letters and other information, is an essential part of the present work. For it will from hence appear, that we were the occasion of a considerable part of the Spanish naval power being diverted from prosecuting the ambitious views of that court in Europe; and whatever men and ships were lost by the enemy in this undertaking, were lost in consequence of the precautions they took to secure themselves against our expedition.

This squadron, besides two ships bound for the West Indies, which did not part company till after they left Madeira, was composed of the following men-of-war, commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro. The Asia of 66 guns and 700 men, the admiral's ship; the Guipuscoa of 74 guns and 700 men; the Hermiona of 54 guns and 500 men; the Esperanza of 50 guns and 450 men; the St Estevan of 40 guns and 350 men; and a patache of 20 guns.

Over and above their complements of sailors and marines, these ships had on board an old Spanish regiment of foot, intended to reinforce the garrisons on the coast of the South-Sea. Having cruised some days to leeward of Madeira, as formerly mentioned, they left that station in the beginning of November, and steered for the Rio de la Plata, where they arrived on the 5th of January O.S. and coming to anchor in the bay of Maldonado, at the mouth of that river, their admiral sent immediately to Buenos Ayres for a supply of provisions, having left Spain with only four months provisions on board. While waiting this supply, they received intelligence, by the treachery of the Portuguese governor of St Catharines, of Mr Anson having arrived at that island on the 21st December preceding, and that he was preparing to put to sea again with the utmost expedition. Notwithstanding his superior force, Pizarro had his reasons, and some say his orders, for avoiding our squadron any where short of the South-Sea. He was, besides, extremely desirous of getting round Cape Horn before us, imagining that alone would effectually baffle all our designs; wherefore, hearing that we were in his neighbourhood, and that we should be soon ready to proceed for Cape Horn, he weighed anchor with his five large ships, the Patache being disabled and condemned, and the men taken out of her; and, after a stay of seventeen days only, got under sail without his provisions, which arrived at Maldonado within a day or two after his departure. Notwithstanding this precipitation, we put to sea from St Catharines four days before he did from Maldonado; and at one part of our passage to Cape Horn the two squadrons were so near, that the Pearl, one of our ships, being separated from the rest, fell in with the Spanish fleet, and, mistaking the Asia for the Centurion, got within gun-shot of the Asia before the mistake was discovered, and narrowly escaped being taken.

As it was the 22d January when the Spaniards weighed from Maldonado, they could not expect to get into the latitude of Cape Horn before the equinox; and, as they had reason to apprehend very tempestuous weather in doubling it at that season, while the Spanish sailors, for the most part accustomed to a fair-weather country, might be supposed averse from so dangerous and fatiguing a navigation, the better to encourage them, some part of their pay was advanced to them in European goods, which they were to have leave to dispose of in the South-Seas, that so the hopes of the great profits they were to make of their ventures, might animate them in their duty, and render them less disposed to repine at the labours, hardships, and perils they might in all probability meet with, before their arrival on the coast of Peru.

Towards the latter end of February, Pizarro and his squadron got into the latitude of Cape Horn, and then stood to the westwards in order to double that southern promontory. But, in the night of the last of February O.S. while turning to windward with this view, the Guipuscoa, Hermiona, and Espranza were separated from the admiral. On the 6th March following, the Guipuscoa was separated from the other two; and next day, being that after we passed the Straits of Le Maire, there came on a most furious storm at N.W. which, in spite of all their efforts, drove the whole squadron to the eastward, and, after several fruitless attempts, obliged them to bear away for the river of Plate. Pizarro arrived there in the Asia about the middle of May, and was followed a few days after by the Esperanza and Estevan. The Hermiona was supposed to have foundered, as she was never more heard of; and the Guipuscoa was run on shore and destroyed on the coast of Brazil. The calamities of all kinds which this squadron underwent in their unsuccessful attempt to double Cape Horn, can only be paralleled by what we ourselves experienced in the same climate, when buffeted by the same storms. There was indeed some diversity in our distresses, rendering it difficult to decide whose situation was most worthy of commiseration; for, to all the miseries and misfortunes we experienced in common, as shattered rigging, leaky ships, and the fatigues and despondency necessarily attendant on these disasters, there was superadded on board our squadron the ravages of a most destructive and incurable disease; and in the Spanish squadron the devastation of famine.