Builders of United Italy

by Rupert Sargent Holland

In February, 1856, peace was declared. Austria, which had remained neutral, was apparently the greatest gainer by the war. At home the Sardinian government had been seriously disturbed over the question of suppression of the religious houses, a measure which Cavour and a majority of the people favored, but which the King was very loath to accept. After the Chamber of Deputies had passed the measure by an overwhelming majority, and it was being considered by the Senate, two ecclesiastics wrote to the King, promising to pay into the national treasury the sum the government expected to realize from the suppressions. Victor Emmanuel, who was an ardent Churchman, conceived that this would be a most satisfactory settlement of the whole matter, and suggested to Cavour that he agree. Cavour saw the impossibility of compromise at that hour, and declined, offering at the same time his resignation. The King, who was never quite at his ease with Cavour, and who thought he was now in a position to dispense with his services, accepted the resignation.

When the people heard of the proposed compromise they were brought to an angry crisis, and for a moment it looked as though all the past careful efforts to establish a stable government might go for nothing. Then D’Azeglio, with rare courage, wrote to the King, and pointed out the dangers that lay in his new course. He entreated him not to align himself with the reactionaries, he pointed out how such a step had caused the downfall of both Stuart and Bourbon thrones. The people desired the measure, it was too late now to withdraw it from the Senate. Victor Emmanuel heeded the words of his old counselor, recalled Cavour to office, and allowed the bill, practically as at first presented, to become law. This was the next great step in the progress towards a united Italy.

At the time of his last visit to Paris Cavour had been asked by Napoleon to submit a note of what France could do for Italy. This Cavour now prepared, asking little at this time, the main object being the Austrian evacuation of Bologna. Cavour found himself in a very difficult position, the war had closed before Austria had been drawn into it, and Sardinia was not in a sufficiently strong position to make many requests. Both the King and Cavour had confidently hoped that Austria would be forced to side with Russia. Now it was extremely doubtful what decisions the coming Congress of Paris would make, and Cavour had been privately given to understand that the Sardinian envoy to the Congress would only be allowed to attend those sessions which concerned Sardinia, and not to take his place with the envoys of the great Powers. He was exceedingly anxious that D’Azeglio should attend, but the latter refused point-blank when he learned of the subservient position he would in all probability have to take. Under these circumstances Cavour saw no alternative but to go himself, and so with considerable misgiving he set out for Paris, intent on observing and planning rather than on asking favors that might be unceremoniously refused.

The Congress of Paris of 1856 produced results far different from those the various plenipotentiaries intended. Austria came to Paris in the enviable position of the great European peace-maker, she left as tyrannical upholder of the old régime. Cavour came as the representative of a small state with interests far inferior to those of the other nations, he left as the moral champion of the much abused peninsula of Italy. Austria actually conceded no territory and Sardinia gained none, but Austria was discredited in the eyes of England and France, and Sardinia more than justified. Cavour achieved a great moral victory, perhaps the greatest result any statesman can gain from a treaty of peace. He did not take a very prominent part in the actual meetings, he was very reserved, a good listener, a courteous and always affable companion. He was loyal to both his English and his French allies, he won over the Russian Count Orloff, and contrived to keep on good terms with the Austrian Count Buol, whom he had formerly known at Turin. He waited with indomitable patience until the major matters of the Congress had been discussed and disposed of, then he addressed a note to the English and French envoys inquiring into the rights of Austria to remain in occupation of the Roman Legations. The question was most important, it struck at the discussion of the temporal power of the Pope, inasmuch as that power in Romagna was dependent upon Austrian support. Moreover it gave notice that Sardinia was concerning itself with the affairs of the other Italian states.

Cavour had other projects, he was anxious to reunite Parma and Modena with Piedmont, he was eager to have their Lombard estates returned to those Italians concerned in the last revolt against Austria. He planned and plotted to accomplish both these ends, and waited. The treaty of peace was signed on March 30, and then the French President of the Congress, Count Walewski, called another session by order of the Emperor. This session was to deal with the Austrian and French occupation of Naples. The difficulty with regard to Cavour’s original note was that in questioning Austria’s right to uphold the Pope in Romagna it also questioned France’s right to occupy Rome for the same purpose. Cavour spoke on the Austrian occupation, but passed over the French. It seems, however, that Napoleon, who had originally taken Rome to please the clerical party, was now willing to withdraw from Rome if he could do so without offending that party, and at the same time cause Austria to withdraw. Lord Clarendon, the British plenipotentiary, urged the withdrawal of both Powers, which he claimed stood on the same footing. He objected to both occupations as disturbing to the balance of power, he denounced the government of the King of Naples, he found occasion to say what the most ardent Italian would have liked to say, and his unreserved ardor gained added force from the caution of Cavour. The effect of the Englishman’s speech was striking, he put into words all Cavour’s contentions, and left the Italian in the enviable position of having demanded nothing, but of having all the claims of justice on his side. The Austrian envoy was indignant, and the session adjourned without tangible result. The impression left upon every one’s mind, however, was that Sardinia had championed Italy against Austria, and that it intended to prepare to make its championship more definite than by diplomatic notes.

Cavour returned to Turin with the satisfaction of having placed Italy’s wrongs openly before the world. The redress of these wrongs was now matter for European consideration, no longer the mere object of secret society plots. Patriots in all the Italian states were quick to realize this, they saw that at last their national rights had been forced into attention, Cavour’s note had cemented all their local causes. There were still many in Piedmont who did not understand his policy, and many who would have preferred his winning of a single duchy to Sardinia rather than urging the withdrawal of Austria from the Papal States, but in spite of these doubters the great majority acclaimed his cause, and felt that, whether they understood him or not, he was the one man who could lead them to deliverance. On his return his policy became more clear, he was aiming at an Italian nation under one king, he was looking far ahead, and the other great nationalists who had been puzzled by his conflicting declarations in the past saw that his goal was theirs. The goal had unquestionably been in his thoughts throughout all his political career, now he came out frankly, no longer simply Prime Minister of Sardinia, but spokesman for Italy.

War must come as the next step. Cavour now for the first time took account of the practical use to be made of those great waves of popular feeling that were continually recurring, those heroic forces Mazzini had been calling into being. He met Garibaldi, and found that he was a great practical man, likely to be of infinite value to the country. He went among the people and studied how their enthusiasms could be turned to best account, he planned with leaders of earlier revolts and convinced them that he was simply patient until the time came to strike, no more a reactionary than they.

In addition to the Foreign Office Cavour assumed the Ministry of Finance. He was unwilling to trust too much to other men, he was anxious to know exactly how all the affairs of the nation stood. The army he knew was rapidly improving, he studied how he might increase the finances without imposing too heavy taxes. He moved the arsenal from Genoa to Spezia, he insisted on completing the tunneling of Mont Cenis, and all these steps showed that he was concerned now with the affairs of the whole peninsula rather than with the guidance of one small state. As one of his political opponents said of him in detraction at this time, “the Prime Minister had all Italy in view, and was preparing for the future kingdom.” He had made himself practically the entire government, from King to peasant all classes followed him with a blind faith in his triumphant destiny as a leader. Still he waited, preparing for the hour to strike.

On the evening of January 14, 1858, Felice Orsini, a Romagnol revolutionist, attempted to assassinate the French Emperor with a bomb as he was driving to the opera. It was expected that this act would cause a bitter estrangement between France and Italy, but, although for a short time there was a considerable diplomatic interchange of notes, the ultimate result was quite the reverse. We must remember that the wrongs under which Italy labored were in reality always on Napoleon’s mind, that he sincerely desired to free and reunite the Italian nation, although at times his ideas of expediency made him appear more of an enemy than a friend. As a young man he had himself been a revolutionary, probably at one time a member of the Carbonari, he had thrilled long ago at Mazzini’s call, and he was an ardent nationalist. When he heard Orsini’s last words to him, “Free my country, and the blessings of twenty-five million Italians will go with you!” he knew that it was not hatred of himself, but the desire in some way to bring about Italian independence that had inspired the assassin. The words and acts of Napoleon wind in and out of this story of Italian liberation in a manner only too often difficult to reconcile, but it would seem that his interest was in reality sincere, and that he wished to help Italy as much as he could without jeopardizing the interests of France.