Events began to march, certain ideas were exchanged between influential persons at Paris and Turin; in June Dr. Conneau, an intimate of the Emperor, happened to visit Turin, and saw Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. It was stated that Napoleon intended to make a private visit to Plombières. Shortly after Cavour announced that his health required a change of scene and that he should go away into the mountains. By a strange coincidence he also went to Plombières. Napoleon saw him, they spent two days closeted together; when Cavour left the two men understood each other. The details of what was known as the Pact of Plombières are not positive, the understanding appears to have been that a rising in Massa and Carrara should give a pretext for a war to expel the Austrians. After such expulsion the country in the valley of the Po, the Roman Legations, and the Ancona Marches were to be united in a kingdom of Upper Italy. Savoy was to be given to France, possession of Nice was left unsettled, Victor Emmanuel’s daughter, the Princess Clotilde, was to be given in marriage to Prince Napoleon.

Napoleon had shown his interest in Italy, but Cavour left Plombières fully alive to the fact that actual help was still far distant. Austria would be hard to defeat, and Cavour did not wish France to provide all the forces for war. He already foresaw that it might be difficult to insure France’s withdrawal after victory. Furthermore he realized that England, to which he was always looking, was well content with the present peaceful situation of affairs, and would regard any offensive step by France or Sardinia as unwarrantable. He saw that Prussia and Russia held the same view. No country wanted war except his own, and possibly France, provided it could be made to appear that Austria and not France was the attacking party. It seemed very certain that Austria would stand much before putting herself in the false position of wantonly opening war. Again Cavour had to be patient and plan how Austria might be made to take that step.

While he waited Cavour organized a volunteer Italian army under the name of the Hunters of the Alps, he laid campaign plans with Garibaldi, he knit all the patriots of Italy into one common cause. Even the old conservative leaders came over to him, D’Azeglio wrote him, “To-day it is no longer a question of discussing your policy, but of making it succeed.” The King supported him magnificently, Cavour found that his hardest work now was to hold King and people back. Still he would not open war, he knew too well that he must have the support of other countries than his own.

At the New Year’s Day reception in Paris, 1859, Napoleon made his famous comment to the Austrian Ambassador, “I regret that relations between us are so strained; tell your sovereign, however, that my sentiments for him are still the same.” The words created a sensation, no one was certain what lay back of them in the French Emperor’s mind. Cavour heard them and they gave him hope. When the time came for Victor Emmanuel to open Parliament Cavour prepared the speech from the Throne with the greatest care and had a copy submitted in advance to Napoleon. Napoleon strengthened it, and Victor Emmanuel changed it still further for the better. When the King read it the effect upon his hearers was that of a call to arms in an heroic cause. “If Piedmont, small in territory, yet counts for something in the councils of Europe, it is because it is great by reason of the ideas it represents and the sympathies it inspires. This position doubtless creates for us many dangers; nevertheless, while respecting treaties, we cannot remain insensible to the cry of grief that reaches us from so many parts of Italy.” The European Powers saw that the old treaties of 1815 were in imminent danger. None of them realized who had in reality penned these words.

Cavour was now at one of the great crises of his life work, and bending every effort to secure Napoleon’s consent to a definite treaty. He succeeded in that the Emperor, delighted at the marriage of Prince Napoleon to a princess of one of the oldest houses in Europe, directed the bridegroom to sign an agreement obligating France to come to Piedmont’s aid should the latter nation be subjected to any overt act of aggression on the part of Austria. This agreement was intended to be kept altogether secret, but rumors that a treaty had been signed crept abroad. Cavour now waited for Austria’s aggressive act, and sought to gain national loans at home, and to arouse interest on Piedmont’s behalf abroad. The English government would not enthuse over Italian wrongs, they were zealous to maintain the present footing, but Cavour maintained his diplomatic suavity and kept the English friendship against the day when he might need it against France.

The spring of 1859 saw the natural crisis rapidly approaching, Mazzini’s world forces again ready to break loose. Into Piedmont swarmed the youth of all northern Italy, girt with sword and gun, palpitant for strife. The government could not hold the rising tide much longer. Cavour exclaimed, “They may throw me into the Po, but I will not stop it!” And yet he had to wait. Austria must first act on the offensive. The last week of Lent came and Cavour stood face to face with the climax that was to make or mar his plans.

The story of those two weeks is tremendously dramatic. The Russian government proposed a Congress of the Powers at Paris to adjust the disordered state of Italy. England and Prussia agreed, Austria accepted subject to the two conditions that Piedmont should disarm and that she should be excluded from the Congress. The French Minister, Count Walewski, said for Napoleon that France could not plunge into war on Piedmont’s account, and that Piedmont was not entitled to a voice in the Congress. Napoleon seemed to have listened to the counsels of the Empress and his ministers, who were opposed to war, and Cavour found himself without a spokesman. It was a black hour when he wrote to the Emperor that Italy was desperate; in reply he was called to Paris. He saw Napoleon, but obtained no promise of help. He threatened that Victor Emmanuel would abdicate, he himself go to America and publish all the correspondence between Napoleon and himself. He used every entreaty, but to no effect. He returned to Turin, where he was met with the wildest demonstrations of regard.

Now England made a suggestion, the government proposed that all the Italian states should be admitted to the proposed Congress, and that Austria as well as Piedmont should disarm. The French government considered this a happy proposal, and wrote to Cavour strongly recommending consent. The Minister understood what the disbanding of all his volunteers, the reduction of his army, would mean to Italy, but he saw no choice but to submit. All the Powers were against him, either course seemed to presage absolute defeat. On April 17 he sent a note agreeing to the disarming, and gave himself up to despair. History says that he was on the point of committing suicide, and was only saved by a devoted friend who pleaded with him. At the end of a long stormy scene Cavour controlled himself. “Be tranquil; we will face it together,” he said.

Fortune changed; the very day on which Cavour submitted, the Austrian government replied slightingly to the English proposal and stated that Austria would itself call upon Piedmont to disarm. It was an error of the first magnitude, the act of aggression for which Cavour had so long waited. At the time Austria was probably ignorant of Napoleon’s secret agreement with Piedmont, and also that Cavour had consented to disarm. The fact of Piedmont’s submission to the wishes of France and England, and Austria’s arbitrary note, revolutionized the situation. Piedmont was saved by a marvelous turn of fortune.

April 25, while the Piedmont Chamber was conferring absolute powers on the King, Cavour was handed a note, on which was written: “They are here. I have seen them.” “They” meant the Austrian envoys. Cavour left the Chamber, saying, “It is the last Piedmontese parliament which has just ended; next year we will open the first Italian parliament.” He met the envoys and read their message, the Sardinian army to be put on a peace footing, the Italian volunteers to be disbanded; an answer, yes or no, to be given within three days. If that answer is unsatisfactory to Austria a resort to arms.