A History of Sarawak under Its Two White Rajahs 1839-1908

by S. Baring-Gould; C. A. Bampfylde

ON THE LAWAS RIVER.

But undue importance has been placed upon the ill-feeling the Sultan had formerly borne to the Rajah, and the fact that a complete reconciliation had taken place long before this time appears to have been ignored. Apart from this, however, the likings and dislikings of an isolated, and now defunct, old tyrant were not quite a sufficient basis upon which to establish a policy antagonistic to the natural fate of Bruni and the pronounced wishes of the people. But, many months before it was proposed to establish a British Residency in Bruni, the Sultan, completely at the end of his resources, had confided to the British Consul his unfortunate situation; had expressed his deep regret for the estrangement between himself and the Rajah, and his desire for a reconciliation, which he begged the Consul would bring about, for he had no one else to turn to for the help he so sorely needed, and which he knew the Rajah would not refuse him.

The Rajah, who had never lost his kindly feeling towards the Bruni rulers, at once visited Bruni, and exchanged visits with the Sultan, which were marked by extreme cordiality and confidence on the part of the latter. But by no method short of a clean sweep of its debased Government and corrupt officials, of whom the Sultan was the most corrupt, could any improvement be effected in the sad condition of Bruni, or in the Sultan's miserable plight, and therefore the Rajah, through the British Consul, offered terms for the transfer of Bruni to his Government, and these were far more generous to the Sultan than those which the Foreign Office, with full knowledge of this offer, subsequently forced the Sultan to accept.

The terms offered by the Rajah were placed before the Sultan by the British Consul, and were well received by him and his family, and they were anxious to accept these at once. They were, however, completely in the power of three of the members of Council,—the Juwatan[^[324]] Abu Bakar, Orang Kaya Laksamana, and Orang Kaya di Gadong, who had battened on the Sultan by lending him large sums of money on extortionate interest, and who, seeing their way to further affluence, prevented the Sultan accepting the Rajah's offer until he should have assigned to them all the benefits it would convey to him, when he would have been called upon to accept it for their advantage.

All who have read these pages will agree there can be no possible doubt that the Sultan and his ministers had well deserved to have their powers curtailed, even to the extent of absolute deprivation of all control in the affairs of their country, but not a few will naturally wonder why the Foreign Office had not arrived at such an obvious conclusion many years ago. Then the reasons for interference were tenfold more weighty than now. Successive years have seen the Sultanate stripped of its territories, and the capacity of the Sultan and his bureaucracy to do evil lessened in proportion to the loss of population, revenues, and power. Then the British Government would have become possessed of a large territory, nearly as large as England, with a numerous population, and would have had a reasonable prospect before it of establishing a State or Colony which might at this time be as flourishing as any of those in the Malay peninsula; now they have unnecessarily hampered themselves with a miserable bankrupt remnant of a formerly large State, some 3000 square miles in area only, with a total population of not more than 15,000; with no internal resources to develop, and with revenues so slight as to be inconsiderable, an experiment which appears to be proving costly.

To contend that the governmental system of the Federated Malay States would be a good example to Sarawak is to presume a superiority in that system, and to infer that the conditions prevailing in the former and latter States are on a parity. So far there has been no convincing evidence of the superiority of this system in its application to Bruni, though that is not surprising, as the British Resident can hardly be expected to make bricks without straw; and Sarawak, which has the credit of having "the best form of government for a country populated by an Oriental people of various races," would scarcely be wise to exchange the simple methods that have been gradually built up to meet the requirements of her population for an elaborated system, which, however successful it has been in the States for which it was formed, might not be altogether conformable to existing conditions in Sarawak. There is almost as much difference between the populations of the Malay States and Sarawak, as there is between that of the latter and Java or Ceylon, and the same difference exists in regard to Bruni. To argue that a form of government, because it is eminently adapted to the circumstance of one country would necessarily be suitable to another, is to be optimistic, and shows a want either of common sense, or of knowledge of the respective conditions of the countries indicated.

Perhaps the mysterious profession of the Foreign Secretary in regard to the future interests of all the British Protectorates in Borneo, which has been noticed, conceals the real motives, yet to be revealed, for this sudden departure, which red tapeism can hardly explain away, and which has given rise to a political position that is peculiar, whether viewed in the light of expediency or as a matter of sheer justice. The professed motives appear to be scarcely logical, for this fresh policy involved no obvious advantages to the Empire, was displeasing to the natives, and unfair to the interests of Sarawak. But, unfortunately, evidence is not wanting that there are other motives, which are not only illogical but unwarrantable, and it is only by keeping these in view that the policy of the British Government becomes intelligible. It is a policy that has not originated at the Foreign or the Colonial Office, but has been adopted by both "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people"—how, when, and by whom acquired, it would be interesting to learn.

Whether Bruni was governed from Singapore or absorbed by Sarawak was a question of little importance to the public, and should have been one of minor importance to the Foreign Office, for either way its position as a British Protectorate would remain unaffected. No one can assert that it is possible to find a man with greater qualifications as a ruler of natives or with a greater knowledge of Bruni and its people than the Rajah of Sarawak, or one whose counsel would have greater weight with chiefs and people, to whom the task of reforming and regenerating that country might with wisdom have been entrusted. Then comes the question of means, so necessary to the establishment of an effective government. To set up such a government in Bruni, and to maintain it, requires a considerable outlay, and an ever-recurring yearly subsidy. This the Rajah knew, and this he was willing and able to bear, but those "with entire knowledge of place and people" thought differently, with the result that the overflowing Treasury chest of the Federated Malay States has had to be drawn upon,[^[325]] and within two years yet another burden in the shape of a debt of some £24,000 has been needlessly put upon an already bankrupt State; and still, with a newly-imposed tariff, which is scarcely in harmony with that of the Federated Malay States, or of Sarawak, Bruni is unable to make both ends meet, and has the pleasant prospect before it of having to negotiate a further loan with no security to offer. So much for expediency.

That the Sultan was not averse to Bruni being incorporated with Sarawak has been shown, and the fact must not be overlooked that he was averse to the appointment of a British Resident, and the acceptance of the agreement by himself and his Prime Minister and brother-in-law, the Pangiran Bandahara, was obtained only under pressure, and was granted in opposition to the forcibly expressed wishes of his own immediate relations, of his chiefs, and of his people. He died shortly afterwards, at a great age, though he retained his faculties until the end, and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad-ul-Alam, a minor, who was placed under the regency of his uncle, the Pangiran Bandahara.