That they might pass under the protection of the Rajah and share with his subjects the liberties and privileges the latter have gained, has always been and still is the desire of the people. With the methods of his government they are familiar and in sympathy. They and their chiefs, from the Regent downwards, have petitioned to be so placed. To them the Rajah's name is a household word, and by them he is trusted. When the change came in 1905, many of the principal nobles begged him to become the guardian of their children, to safeguard their inheritance and welfare. His great influence, acquired by an intercourse of half a century, has always been exerted for their benefit, and it is an influence that, together with his knowledge of the people and what is best for them, can scarcely be equalled by ever-changing officials.
Between the populations of Sarawak and Bruni there exists community of origin, and relationship of ideas and customs. Formerly the two countries were one. Then in a corner of that country arose the little independent raj of Sarawak, which gradually expanded up to, around, and beyond Bruni. Now Bruni is but an enclave within Sarawak, and socially, politically, and commercially, as well as geographically, is undoubtedly within the sphere of her influence.
A short description of Brooketon has already been given, showing how the prosperity of that flourishing little settlement is dependent upon the working of its colliery, and that this has been the Rajah's main reason for continuing to work it, though with a recurring annual loss which in the aggregate during the past twenty years has exceeded $800,000; of course exclusive of purchase money and interest thereon. In no one year have the receipts exceeded the expenditure, and the chances of financial improvement appear to be vastly remote; yet, in October, 1906, the Colonial Office decided, presumably "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people," to further hamper this industry by imposing a duty on the coal exported, thereby seriously compromising the welfare of the district by taxing the sole factor in its prosperity.
The levying of such a "harsh and oppressive"[[326]] tax, was not only unjust, but distinctly contrary to the terms of the deed under which the Rajah holds his concession. Whilst protesting against the assumption that the Bruni Government has the right to impose such a duty, the Rajah informed the Colonial Office that if it was insisted upon he would be compelled practically to close down the colliery. In the House, Sir Edward Sassoon pointedly asked the Under-Secretary for the Colonies "on what principle such a tax would be imposed upon a nascent industry which is being created at a sacrifice in an impoverished country, while on the other hand his Majesty's Government has recently withdrawn the duty levied on all coal exported from Great Britain." To this question no direct reply was or could have been given, but it was not until a year afterwards that the Colonial Office decided that the tax would not at present be imposed.
The reason given for the imposition of this tax was that all other sources of revenue at Brooketon having been hypothecated to the Rajah, it was therefore necessary to levy export duties. It has already been stated (p. [357]) how these revenues had reverted to the Rajah, but it must not be supposed that they had been obtained for little or no consideration. To protect his own interests by guarding against any imposition of harassing taxes, the original lessee of the Brooketon Collieries had leased the revenues of the district from the Sultan for an annual sum, and this rent was subsequently capitalised by the payment of a sum of money equivalent to ten years' rent; thus these revenues passed from the Sultan's hands for ever, and subsequently became vested in the Rajah by purchase. A careful consideration of the deed by which these revenue rights were granted, combined with a competent knowledge of the prerogatives of the Sultan, would leave little doubt in an unprejudiced mind that the imposition of any import or export duties at Brooketon by others than the Rajah would be an infringement of the rights conveyed by that deed. The revenues derived by the Rajah under this deed (and he has not exerted his powers to increase them) represent but a very small return as interest on the purchase money; yet in face of such kindly moderation, we find the Colonial Office attempting to impose a tax on the Rajah's property, which would yield to them more than three times the amount of the legitimate revenue arising from a benevolent enterprise.
Previously to the appointment of a British Resident at Bruni, the Rajah had, as we have noticed, administered the government in the Muara district, with the full approval of the Sultan. In compliance with the Rajah's desire, the Sultan had placed a Malay chief, as his representative, at Brooketon, but even his salary had to be paid by the Rajah. It has already been shown that certain judicial powers have been vested in the Rajah under the revenue concession, in regard to which the then British Consul at Bruni had occasion to write to the Rajah's agent at Labuan in July, 1900, that "the acting High Commissioner for Borneo believes in and acknowledges the right of Sarawak to exercise magisterial powers in Brooketon." Nevertheless, on the appointment of the British Resident at Bruni the Colonial Office called upon the Rajah to withdraw his officials and police from Brooketon, and notified him that the administration of the district would be carried on by the Resident, in the Sultan's name. In a written reply to a question by Sir Edward Sassoon, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies denied that by the deed the Rajah was authorised to maintain a police force in Bruni (sic), but passed over in silence the main point of Sir Edward's question as to the Rajah's powers to adjudicate as well as to impose fines throughout the district of Muara.
In a leading article which appeared in the issue of the Straits Budget (Singapore) of January 10, 1907, the editor attempts to refute the issues raised in the questions put by Sir Edward Sassoon in the House of Commons, and the arguments advanced in an editorial article which appeared in the Standard dealing with the above matters. He writes authoritatively in reply to Sir Edward and "the special pleading" of the Standard, and presumably his article is therefore an inspired one, for his own knowledge of Bornean affairs is restricted to what "the man in the street" can tell him, and his leader displays a deeper insight into the political aspect than can usually be found outside of a Government office. He tells us that: "Bruni wanted better administration. There were three possible ways of obtaining this—the Protectorate might have been transferred to the British North Borneo Company; it might have been handed over to the neighbouring Rajah of Sarawak; or it might have been incorporated in the territories administered by the Colonial Office through the Straits Settlements. Of the three alternatives the Foreign Office chose the last. No doubt Sarawak is an object lesson in administration, but it must not be forgotten that it has been fortunate in having two successive rulers of marked capacity for dealing with native races. It may not always be so fortunate, and perhaps the Foreign Office, having this possibility in view, hesitated to add to the territory of Sarawak. On the other hand, the experience of the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements warranted the handing over of Bruni to the Colonial Office, and we are sure that when consideration is given to the larger interests involved it will have to be admitted, one day, that the Foreign Office took the wiser course. There may come a day when British interests in Borneo will have to be amalgamated and concentrated under one administration; but until then Bruni affairs can be best administered and the interests of the natives safeguarded under the arrangement now in force."
The editor has ignored the fact that the natives of Bruni of all races—and the small population is a very diversified one—desired incorporation in Sarawak, and had petitioned for it; and he has overlooked the fact that such incorporation, whilst saving the Straits Settlements both money and trouble, could in no way have affected the position of Bruni as a British Protectorate, or have interfered with any policy which the Foreign Office may possibly have in view. So far as Sarawak is concerned, "the possibility in view" can mean only one thing: future interference with its independence, arising out of anticipated maladministration by the present Rajah's successor. Such an inuendo is as uncalled for, as it is unjust, however the suggestion may be disguised; and it behoves the Foreign and Colonial Offices to dissociate themselves from such expressions, which unfortunately have derived some colour from their subsequent actions.
That the system of government in vogue in the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements is irreproachable cannot be denied; but at the same time it cannot fairly be contended—in the face of all evidence to the contrary—that it is as well adapted to the requirements of Bruni as is that in vogue in Sarawak, a system which the editor admits "is an object lesson in administration," and which his local contemporary, the Singapore Free Press, has before described as "a government for natives second to none."
What are "the larger interests involved" which appear, in the editor's opinion, to have necessitated the handing over of Bruni, against the wishes of the people, to a government foreign to them? The editor answers the question with a prophecy, which, unless it emanates from his own fertile brain, throws light on the policy of the British Government, and hints at a possible disregard of fair-play and treaties, which has only been made possible by the acceptance of British protection by Sarawak. The British Government as far back as 1863 fully acknowledged the independence of Sarawak under the rule of its white Rajah, and the agreement of 1888, by which the State was placed under British protection, was not intended, nor accepted, as one which would militate against that independence, and such a possibility can scarcely be construed as following in the train of that agreement.