CAPTURE OF BLOCKHOUSE, ALLATOONA CREEK, OCTOBER 5, 1864.
Here the fortifications, for the first time, were seen, and instead of two redoubts there were disclosed to us three redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on the east with outer works and approaches defended to a great distance by abatis, and nearer the works by stockades and other obstructions. The railroad emerges from the Allatoona Mountain by crossing this ridge through a cut sixty-five feet deep. Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending Gen. Sears's Brigade to the north side or rear of the works, Gen. F. M. Cockrell's (Missouri) Brigade to rest with its center on the ridge, while Gen. W. H. Young, with the four Texas regiments, was found in the rear of Gen. Cockrell.
Maj. Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force should interfere, or until he heard the volleys of musketry.
Gen. Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when musketry was heard Gen. Cockrell was to move down the ridge, supported by Gen. Young, and carry the works by (as it were) a flank attack. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be gotten into position until about 9 A.M., when I sent a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seventeen minutes to return an answer. The time expired without any answer being received, whereupon Maj. D. W. Sanders, impatient at the delay, broke off the interview and returned. No reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault by directing the advance of Cockrell's Brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column, and in a murderous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the dead they became masters of the second redoubt.
The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was further crowded by those that were coming out of the fort on the east side of the road, from the attack of Gen. Sears. They had to cross the deep cut, through which our artillery poured a steady and deadly fire. The Federal forces were now confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch and almost entirely silenced their fire, and were preparing for the final attack.
Pending the progress of these events I had received a note from Gen. F. C. Armstrong, dated 7 A.M., asking me at what time I would move toward New Hope, and informing me also that the enemy had moved up east of the railroad above Kennesaw and encamped there last night. I had observed this movement when at Acworth, but at 12 M. I received another dispatch from him, written at 9 A.M., saying: "My scouts report the enemy's infantry advancing up the railroad. They are now entering Big Shanty. They have a cavalry force east of the railroad."
On the receipt of this second note from Gen. Armstrong I took my guide aside and particularly asked him if, after the capture of the place, I could move to New Hope Church by any other route than the one by the blockhouse at Allatoona creek and thence by the Sandtown road to the Acworth and Dallas road, and he said I could not. Here, then, was Gen. Sherman's whole army close behind me, and the advance of his infantry moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile distant at the base of the hills, by men, and I was satisfied that it would take two hours to get it up and distribute it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from prisoners that before daylight the place had been reënforced by a brigade under Gen. Corse. I knew the enemy was at Big Shanty at 9 A.M. By noon he could reach Acworth and be within two miles of the road on which I was to reach New Hope Church. I knew Gen. Stewart had been ordered to near Lost Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all the night of the 3d destroying the railroad; that they had worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the entire third day and night without rest or sleep if we remained to assault the remaining works? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return.
He was, in the morning, but three hours distant, and had been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender before night. Yet, however desirous I was of remaining before the last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying this interior work by assault, I deemed it of more importance not to permit the enemy to cut my division off from the army. After deliberately surveying matters as they presented themselves to me, I sent to Gen. Sears to withdraw his men at once, moving by the route he went in, and directed Gen. Cockrell to commence withdrawing at 1:30 P.M.