That some temporary disturbances may be produced is not improbable; the discontent of the sailors may, for a short time, rise high, and our trade be suspended by their obstinacy; but obstinacy, however determined, must yield to hunger, and when no higher wages can be obtained, they will cheerfully accept of those which are here allowed them. Short voyages, indeed, are not comprehended in the clause, and therefore the sailors will engage in them upon their own terms, but this objection can be of no weight with those that oppose the clause, because, if it is unjust to limit the wages of the sailors, it is just to leave those voyages without restriction; and those that think the expedient here proposed equitable and rational, may, perhaps, be willing to make some concessions to those who are of a different opinion.
That the bill will not remove every obstacle to success, nor add weight to one part of the balance without making the other lighter; that it will not supply the navy without incommoding the merchants in some degree; that it may be sometimes evaded by cunning, and sometimes abused by malice; and that at last it will be less efficacious than is desired, may, perhaps, be proved; but it has not yet been proved that any other measures are more eligible, or that we are not to promote the publick service as far as we are able, though our endeavours may not produce effects equal to our wishes.
Sir John BARNARD then spoke, to this effect:—Sir, I know not by what fatality it is that nothing can be urged in defence of the clause before us which does not tend to discover its weakness and inefficacy. The warmest patrons of this expedient are impelled, by the mere force of conviction, to such concessions as invalidate all their arguments, and leave their opponents no necessity of replying.
If short voyages are not comprehended in this provision, what are we now controverting? What but the expedience of a law that will never be executed? The sailors, however they are contemned by those who think them only worthy to be treated like beasts of burden, are not yet so stupid but that they can easily find out, that to serve a fortnight for greater wages is more eligible than to toil a month for less; and as the numerous equipments that have been lately made have not left many more sailors in the service of the merchants than may be employed in the coasting trade, those who traffick to remoter parts, must shut up their books and wait till the expiration of this act, for an opportunity of renewing their commerce.
To regulate the wages for one voyage, and to leave another without limitation, in time of scarcity of seamen, is absolutely to prohibit that trade which is so restrained, and is, doubtless, a more effectual embargo than has been yet invented.
Let any man but suppose that the East India company were obliged to give only half the wages that other traders allow, and consider how that part of our commerce could be carried on; would not their goods rot in their warehouses, and their ships lie for ever in the harbour? Would not the sailors refuse to contract with them? or desert them after a contract, upon the first prospect of more advantageous employment?
But it is not requisite to multiply arguments in a question which may not only be decided without long examination, but in which we may determine our conclusions by the experience of our ancestors. Scarcely any right or wrong measures are without a precedent, and, amongst others, this expedient has been tried by the wisdom of former times; a law was once made for limiting the wages of tailors, and that it is totally ineffectual we are all convinced. Experience is a very safe guide in political inquiries, and often discovers what the most enlightened reason failed to foresee.
Let us, therefore, improve the errours of our ancestors to our own advantage, and whilst we neglect to imitate their virtues, let us, at least, forbear to repeat their follies.
Mr. PERRY spoke to this purpose:—Sir, there is one objection more which my acquaintance with foreign trade impresses too strongly upon my mind to suffer me to conceal it.
It is well known that the condition of a seaman subjects him to the necessity of spending a great part of his life at a distance from his native country, in places where he can neither hear of our designs, nor be instructed in our laws, and, therefore, it is evident that no law ought to affect him before a certain period of time, in which he may reasonably be supposed to have been informed of it. For every man ought to have it in his power to avoid punishment, and to suffer only for negligence or obstinacy.