It is quite unnecessary, sir, to observe to this assembly, that there are now, as at all times, great numbers of sailors in every part of the world, and that they, at least, equally deserve our regard with those who are under the more immediate influence of the government.
These seamen have already contracted for the price of their labour, and the recompense of their hazards, nor can we, in my opinion, without manifest injustice, dissolve a contract founded upon equity, and confirmed by law.
It is, sir, an undisputed principle of government, that no person should be punished without a crime; but is it no punishment to deprive a man of what is due to him by a legal stipulation, the condition of which is, on his part, honestly fulfilled?
Nothing, sir, can be imagined more calamitous than the disappointment to which this law subjects the unhappy men who are now promoting the interest of their country in distant places, amidst dangers and hardships, in unhealthy climates, and barbarous nations, where they comfort themselves, under the fatigues of labour and the miseries of sickness, with the prospect of the sum which they shall gain for the relief of their families, and the respite which their wages will enable them to enjoy; but, upon their return, they find their hopes blasted, and their contracts dissolved by a law made in their absence.
No human being, I think, can coolly and deliberately inflict a hardship like this, and, therefore, I doubt not but those who have, by inadvertency, given room for this objection, will either remove it by an amendment, or what is, in my opinion, more eligible, reject the clause as inexpedient, useless, and unjust.
Sir William YONGE spoke next to this effect:—Sir, this debate has been protracted, not by any difficulties arising from the nature of the questions which have been the subject of it, but by a neglect with which almost all the opponents of the bill may be justly charged, the neglect of distinguishing between measures eligible in themselves, and measures preferable to consequences which are apprehended from particular conjunctures; between laws made only to advance the publick happiness, and expedients of which the benefit is merely occasional, and of which the sole intention is to avert some national calamity, and which are to cease with the necessity that produced them.
Such are the measures, sir, which are now intended; measures, which, in days of ease, security, and prosperity, it would be the highest degree of weakness to propose, but of which I cannot see the absurdity in times of danger and distress. Such laws are the medicines of a state, useless and nauseous in health, but preferable to a lingering disease, or to a miserable death.
Even those measures, sir, which have been mentioned as most grossly absurd, and represented as parallel to the provision made in this clause only to expose it to contempt and ridicule, may, in particular circumstances, be rational and just. To settle the price of corn in the time of a famine, may become the wisest state, and multitudes might, in time of publick misery, by the benefit of temporary laws, be preserved from destruction. Even those masts, to which, with a prosperous gale, the ship owes its usefulness and its speed, are often cut down by the sailors in the fury of a storm.
With regard to the ships which are now in distant places, whither no knowledge of this law can possibly be conveyed, it cannot be denied that their crews ought to be secured from injury by some particular exception; for though it is evident in competitions between publick and private interest, which ought to be preferred, yet we ought to remember that no unnecessary injury is to be done to individuals, even while we are providing for the safety of the nation.
Mr. FAZAKERLY spoke to this effect:—Sir, though I cannot be supposed to have much acquaintance with naval affairs, and, therefore, may not, perhaps, discover the full force of the arguments that have been urged in favour of the clause now under consideration, yet I cannot but think myself under an indispensable obligation to examine it as far as I am able, and to make use of the knowledge which I have acquired, however inferiour to that of others.