The dispute, sir, between the king of Prussia and the queen of Hungary, is of a different kind; nor is it our duty to engage in it, either as parties or judges. He lays claim to certain territories usurped, as he alleges, from his ancestors by the Austrian family, and asserts, by force, this claim, which is equally valid, whether the queen be emperess or not. We have no right to limit his dominions, or obligation to examine the justice of his demands. If he is only endeavouring to gain what has been forcibly withheld from him, what right have we to obstruct his undertaking? And if the queen can show a better title, she is, like all other sovereigns, at liberty to maintain it; nor are we necessarily to erect ourselves into judges between sovereigns, or distributors of dominions.
The contest seems to have very little relation to the Pragmatick sanction: if the king of Prussia succeeds, he will contribute to support it; and if the queen is able to frustrate his designs, she will be too powerful to need our assistance.
But though, sir, the Pragmatick sanction were in danger of violation, are we to stand up alone in defence of it, while other nations, equally engaged with ourselves by interest and by treaties, sit still to look upon the contest, and gather those advantages of peace which we indiscreetly throw away? Are we able to maintain it without assistance, or are we to exhaust our country, and ruin our posterity in prosecution of a hopeless project, to spend what can never be repaid, and to fight with certainty of a defeat?
The Dutch, whose engagements and whose interests are the same as our own, have not yet made any addition to their expenses, nor augmentation of their troops; nor does a single potentate of Europe, however united by long alliances to the house of Austria, or however endangered by revolutions in the empire, appear to rouse at the approach of alarm, or think himself obliged to provoke enemies by whom he is not yet injured.
I cannot, therefore, persuade myself that we are to stand up single in the defence of the Pragmatick sanction, to fight the quarrel of others, or live in perpetual war, that our neighbours may be at peace.
I shall always think it my duty to disburse the publick money with the utmost parsimony, nor ever intend, but on the most pressing necessity, to load with new exactions a nation already overwhelmed with debts, harassed with taxes, and plundered by a standing army.
For what purpose these numerous forces are maintained, who are now preying on the publick; why we increase our armies by land when we only fight by sea; why we aggravate the burden of the war, and add domestick oppressions to foreign injuries, I am at a loss to determine. Surely some regard should be had to the satisfaction of the people, who ought not, during the present scarcity of provisions, to be starved by the increase of an army, which seems supported only to consume them.
As, therefore, part of our present expense is, in my opinion, unnecessary, I shall not contribute to aggravate it by a new grant, for purposes of which I cannot discover that they will promote the advantage of the publick.
Sir Robert WALPOLE replied to the following effect:—Sir, the Pragmatick sanction, which we are engaged to support, is not confined to the preservation of the order of succession, but extends to all the rights of the house of Austria, which is now attacked, and by a very formidable enemy, at a time of weakness and distraction, and therefore requires our assistance.
That others, equally obliged by treaty and by interest to lend their help on this occasion, sit reluctive, either through cowardice or negligence, or some prospect of temporary advantage, may, perhaps, be true; but is it any excuse of a crime, that he who commits it is not the only criminal? Will the breach of faith in others excuse it in us? Ought we not rather to animate them by our activity, instruct them by our example, and awaken them by our representations?