Perhaps the other powers say to themselves, and to one another, Why should we keep that treaty which Britain is violating? Why should we expose ourselves to danger, of which that mighty nation, so celebrated for courage, is afraid? Why should we rush into war, in which our most powerful ally seems unwilling to support us?
Thus the same argument, an argument evidently false, and made specious only by interest, may be used by all, till some one, more bold and honest than the rest, shall dare to rise in vindication of those rights which all have promised to maintain; and why should not the greatest nation be the first that shall avow her solemn engagements? Why should not they be most diligent in the prosecution of an affair who have most to lose by its miscarriage?
I am always willing to believe, that no member of this assembly makes use, in any solemn debate, of arguments which do not appear rational to himself, and yet it is difficult to conceive that any man can imagine himself released from a promise, because the same promise is broken by another, or that he is at liberty to desert his friend in distress, because others desert him, whose good offices he has equal reason to expect, and that the more his assistance is needed, the more right he has to deny it.
Surely such arguments as these deserve not, need not a confutation. Before we regulate our conduct by that of others, we must either prove that they have done right, which proof will be a sufficient defence without the precedent, or own that they are more capable of judging than we, and that, therefore, we pay an implicit submission to their dictates and example; a sacrifice which we shall not willingly make to the vanity of our neighbours.
In the present case it is evident that if other nations neglect the performance of their contracts, they are guilty of the breach of publick faith; of a crime, that, if it should generally be imitated, would dissolve society, and throw human nature into confusion, that would change the most happy region into deserts, in which one savage would be preying on another.
Nor are they only propagating an example, which in some distant times may be pleaded against themselves, but they are exposing themselves to more immediate dangers; they are forwarding designs that have no tendency but to their ruin, they are adding strength to their inveterate enemies, and beckoning invasion to their own frontiers.
Let us, therefore, instead of hardening ourselves in perfidy, or lulling ourselves in security by their example, exert all our influence to unite them, and all our power to assist them. Let us show them what they ought to determine by our resolutions, and teach them to act by our vigour; that, if the house of Austria be preserved, our alliance may be strengthened by new motives of gratitude; and that, if it must be that the liberties of this part of the world be lost, we may not reproach ourselves with having neglected to defend them.
Mr. PELHAM spoke next to this purpose:—Sir, it is not to be supposed that such members of this assembly as are not engaged in publick affairs, should receive very exact intelligence of the dispositions of foreign powers, and, therefore, I do not wonder that the conduct of the Dutch has been misrepresented, and that they are suspected of neglecting their engagements at a time when they are endeavouring to perform them.
The Dutch have now under consideration the most proper methods of assisting the queen of Hungary, and maintaining the Pragmatick sanction; it may be, indeed, justly suspected, from the nature of their constitution, that their motions will be slow, but it cannot be asserted, that they break their engagements, or desert their confederates.
Nor is there any reason for imagining that the other princes, who have incurred the same obligations, will not endeavour to perform their promises; it may be easily conceived that some of them are not able at a sudden summons to afford great assistance, and that others may wait the result of our deliberations, and regulate their conduct by our example.