The late augmentation of twenty thousand men, which may possibly be mentioned as a proof of their intention, shows nothing but that they pursue their own interest with their usual prudence and attention, and with such as it is to be wished that our ministers would condescend to learn from them; and that they are too wise to suffer the towns from which the Austrians have, by our persuasions, withdrawn their troops to fall into the hands of the French. They have, therefore, substituted new garrisons, but seem to have no regard to the interest of the queen of Hungary, nor any other view than that of providing for their own security, waiting the event of the war, and laying hold of any advantage that may accidentally be offered them.
It may be urged farther by those who are desirous to deceive others, or willing to be deceived themselves, that the province of Holland has passed a vote for assisting the queen of Hungary with twenty thousand men; but if it be remembered, my lords, that this must be the general act of the United States, and that every province has its own particular views to gratify, and its own interest to reconcile with the general good, it may be very reasonably suspected, that this assistance is yet rather the object of hope than expectation; it may justly be feared, that before so many various dispositions will unite, and such different schemes will be made consistent, the house of Austria may be extinguished, that our forces may be destroyed, and Germany enslaved by the French. Then, my lords, what will remain, but that we shall curse that folly that involved us in distant quarrels, and that temerity which sent us out to oppose a power which we could not withstand; and which incited us to waste that treasure in foreign countries, which we may quickly want for the defence of our own?
It must be, indeed, confessed, that if an estimate is to be made of our condition, from the conduct of our ministers, the fear of exhausting our treasure must be merely panick, and the precepts of frugality which other states have grown great by observing, are to be absolutely unnecessary. It may reasonably be imagined that we have some secret mine, or hidden repository of gold, which no degree of extravagance can drain, and which may for ever supply the most lavish expenses without diminution.
For upon what other supposition, my lords, can any man attempt a defence of the contract, by which we have obtained for one campaign the service of the troops of Hanover? What but the confidence of funds that can never be deficient, could influence them to conclude a stipulation, by which levy-money is to be paid for troops of which not a single regiment was raised for our service, or on the present occasion; which were established for the security of the electorate of Hanover, and would have been maintained, though we had not engaged in the affairs of the continent.
What were the reasons which induced our ministry to employ the forces of Hanover, it is, perhaps, not necessary to inquire. The only motive that ought to have influenced them, was the prospect of obtaining them upon cheap terms; for, my lords, if the troops of Hanover cannot be obtained, but at the same expense with those of Britain, I am not able to discover why they should be preferred. I have never heard, my lords, any uncommon instances of Hanoverian courage, that should incline us to trust the cause of Europe rather to that nation than to our own; and am inclined to believe, that Britain is able to produce men equal in all military virtues to any native of that happy country; a country which, though it was thought worthy to be secured by a neutrality, when all the neighbouring provinces were exposed to the ravages of war, I have never heard celebrated for any peculiar excellencies; and of which I cannot but observe, that it was indebted for its security rather to the precaution of its prince, than the bravery of its inhabitants.
This demand of levy-money shocks every Briton yet more strongly, on considering by whom it is required; required by that family whom we have raised from a petty dominion, for which homage was paid to a superiour power; and which was, perhaps, only suffered to retain the appearance of a separate sovereignty, because it was not worth the labour and expense of an invasion; because it would neither increase riches nor titles, nor gratify either avarice or ambition; by a family whom, from want and weakness, we have exalted to a throne, from whence, with virtue equal to their power, they may issue their mandates to the remotest parts of the earth, may prescribe the course of war in distant empires, and dictate terms of peace to half the monarchs of the globe.
I should imagine, my lords, that when a king of the house of Hanover surveys his navies, reviews his troops, or examines his revenue, beholds the splendour of his court, or contemplates the extent of his dominions, he cannot but sometimes, however unwillingly, compare his present state with that of his ancestors; and that when he gives audience to the ambassadours of princes, who, perhaps, never heard of Hanover, and directs the payment of sums, by the smallest of which all his ancient inheritance would be dearly purchased; and reflects, as surely he sometimes will, that all these honours and riches, this reverence from foreign powers, and his domestick splendour, are the gratuitous and voluntary gifts of the mighty people of Britain, he should find his heart overflowing with unlimited gratitude, and should be ready to sacrifice to the happiness of his benefactors, not only every petty interest, or accidental inclination, but even his repose, his safety, or his life; that he should be ready to ease them of every burden before they complained, and to aid them with all his power before they requested his assistance; that he should consider his little territories as only a contemptible province to his British empire, a kind of nursery for troops to be employed without harassing his more valuable subjects.
It might be at least hoped, my lords, that the princes of the house of Hanover might have the same regard to this nation as to kings from whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money was not always required; or if required, was not always received.
There was once a time, my lords, before any of this race wore the crown of Britain; when the great French monarch, Lewis the fourteenth, being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the duke of Hanover, as a prince whose necessities would naturally incline him to set the lives of his subjects at a cheap rate. The duke, pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a monarch, readily promised a supply of troops; and demanded levy-money to be paid him, that he might be enabled to raise them. But Hanoverian reputation was not then raised so high, as that the French king should trust him with his money. Lewis suspected, and made no scruple of declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore, with his usual prudence insisted, that the troops should first march, and then be paid. Thus for some time the treaty was at a stand; but the king being equally in want of men, as the duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps, that it was really impracticable for so indigent a prince to raise troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original demand. The troops were engaged in the service of France; and the duke of Hanover thought himself happy in being able to amuse himself at his leisure with the rattle of money.
Such, my lords, were the conditions on which the troops of Hanover were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced by the love of money, or the awe of a superiour power, might now be expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.