But not to dwell any longer, my lords, upon particular circumstances of measures, of which the whole scheme is contrary to the apparent interest of this empire, I shall not inquire farther, why auxiliaries are employed on this occasion rather than Britons, rather than those whose bravery is celebrated to the most distant corners of the earth; why, if mercenaries are necessary, those of Hanover are preferred to others: or why, if they are, indeed, preferable, they are now to be hired at a higher rate than at any former time? It appears to me of far more importance to undermine the foundation, than to batter the superstructure of our present system of politicks; and of greater use to inquire, why we have engaged in a war on the continent, than why we carry it on with ridiculous profusion.
It appears to me, my lords, that there are many reasons which, with the same circumstances, would have withheld any nation but this from such a dangerous interposition. The Dutch, we see, are content to look on without action, though they are more interested in the event, and less embarrassed on any other side. We are already engaged in a war, of which no man can foresee the conclusion; but which cannot be ended unsuccessfully, without the utmost danger to our most important interests; and which yet has hitherto produced only losses and disgrace, has impoverished our merchants, and intimidated our soldiers. Whether these losses are the effects of weakness or treachery, is a question which I am not ambitious of endeavouring to decide, and of which the decision is, indeed, by no means necessary in the present debate; since if we are too weak to struggle with Spain, unassisted as she is, and embarrassed with different views, I need not say what will be our condition, when the whole house of Bourbon shall be combined against us; when that nation which stood alone for so many years against the united efforts of Europe, shall attack us, exhausted with taxes, enervated with corruption, and disunited from all allies. Whether the troops of Hanover will assist us at that time, I cannot determine. Perhaps, in the destruction of the British dominions, it may be thought expedient to secure a more valuable and important country by a timely neutrality; but if we have any auxiliaries from thence, we must then necessarily obtain them upon cheaper terms.
If our inactivity in the European seas, and our ill success in those of America be, as it is generally suspected, the consequence of perfidious counsels, and private machinations; if our fleets are sent out with orders to make no attempt against our enemies, or our admirals commanded to retreat before them; surely no higher degree of madness can be imagined, than that of provoking new enemies before we have experienced a change of counsels, and found reason to place in our ministers and statesmen that confidence which war absolutely requires.
This is the conduct, my lords, which I should think most rational, even though we were attacked in some of our real rights, and though the quarrel about which we were debating was our own; I should think the nearest danger the greatest, and should advise patience under foreign insults, till we had redressed our domestick grievances; till we had driven treachery from the court, and corruption from the senate. But much more proper do I think this conduct, when we are invited only to engage in distant war, in a dispute about the dominion of princes, in the bowels of the continent; of princes, of whom it is not certain, that we shall receive either advantage or security from their greatness, or that we should suffer any loss or injury by their fall.
But, my lords, I know it will be answered, that the queen of Hungary has a right by treaty to our assistance; and that in becoming guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, we engaged to support her in the dominions of her ancestors. This, my lords, is an answer of which I do not deny the justness, and of which I will not attempt to invalidate the strength. I allow that such a stipulation was made, and that treaties ought to be observed, at whatever hazard, with unviolated faith. It has been, indeed, objected, that many nations engaged with us in the same treaty, whom interest or cowardice have inclined to neglect it; and that we ought not to become the standing garrison of Europe, or to defend alone those territories, to the preservation of which so many states are obliged to contribute equally with ourselves. But this, my lords, appears to me an argument of which the ill consequences can never be fully discovered; an argument which dissolves all the obligations of contracts, destroys the foundation of moral justice, and lays society open to all the mischiefs of perfidy, by making the validity of oaths and contracts dependant upon chance, and regulating the duties of one man by the conduct of another. I pretend not, my lords, to long experience, and, therefore, in discussing intricate questions, may be easily mistaken. But as, in my opinion, my lords, morality is seldom difficult, but when it is clouded with an intention to deceive others or ourselves, I shall venture to declare with more confidence, that in proportion as one man neglects his duty, another is more strictly obliged to practise his own, that his example may not help forward the general corruption, and that those who are injured by the perfidy of others, may from his sincerity have a prospect of relief.
I believe all politicks that are not founded on morality will be found fallacious and destructive, if not immediately, to those who practise them; yet, consequentially, by their general tendency to disturb society, and weaken those obligations which maintain the order of the world. I shall, therefore, allow, that what justice requires from a private man, becomes, in parallel circumstances, the duty of a nation; and shall, therefore, never advise the violation of a solemn treaty. The stipulations in which we engaged, when we became guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, are, doubtless, to be observed; and it is, therefore, one of the strongest objections against the measures which we are now pursuing, that we shall be perfidious at a greater expense than fidelity would have required, and shall exhaust the treasure of the nation without assisting the queen of Hungary.
To explain this assertion, my lords, it is necessary to take a view of the constitution of the German body, which consists of a great number of separate governments independent on each other, but subject, in some degree, to the emperour as the general head. The subjects of each state are governed by their prince, and owe no allegiance to any other sovereign; but the prince performs homage to the emperour, and having thereby acknowledged himself his feudatory, or dependant, may be punished for rebellion against him. The title of the emperour, and consequently his claim to this allegiance, and the right of issuing the ban against those who shall refuse it, is confirmed by many solemn acknowledgments of the diet, and, amongst others, by the grant of a pecuniary aid; this the present emperour has indisputably received, an aid having been already granted him in the diet, of a subsidy for eighteen months; and, therefore, none of the troops of Germany can now be employed against him, without subjecting the prince to whom they belong to the censure of the ban, a kind of civil excommunication.
To what purpose, then, my lords, are we to hire, at a rate never paid, or perhaps demanded before, troops which cannot serve us without subjecting their prince to the charge of rebellion? Or how shall we assist the queen of Hungary, by collecting forces which dare not act against the only enemy which she has now to fear? Or in what new difficulties shall we be engaged, should the inestimable dominions of Hanover be subjected to the imperial interdiction.
These, my lords, are questions to which, I hope, we shall hear a more satisfactory answer than I am able to conceive; for, indeed, I do not see what remains, but to confess, that these troops are hired only for a military show, to amuse this nation with a false appearance of zeal for the preservation of Europe, and to increase the treasures of Hanover at the expense of Britain.
These are designs, my lords, which no man will avow, and yet these are the only designs which I can yet discover; and, therefore, I shall oppose all the measures that tend to their execution. If the heat of indignation, or the asperity of resentment, or the wantonness of contempt, have betrayed me into any expressions unworthy of the dignity of this house, I hope they will be forgiven by your lordships; for any other degree of freedom I shall make no apology, having, as a peer, a right to deliver my opinion, and as a Briton, to assert the independence of my native country, when I see, or imagine myself to see, that it is ignominiously and illegally subjected to the promotion of the petty interest of the province of Hanover.