That the Pragmatick sanction is generally understood to be unjust, appears sufficiently from the conduct of those powers who, though engaged by solemn stipulations to support it, yet look unconcerned on the violation of it, and appear convinced, that the princes who are now dividing among themselves the Austrian dominions, produce claims which cannot be opposed without a manifest disregard of justice.
The pretensions of these princes ought, indeed, to have been more attentively considered, when this guaranty was first demanded; for it is evident, that either no such compact ought to have been made, or that it ought now to be observed; and that those who now justify the neglect of it, by urging its injustice, ought to have refused accession to it for the same reason. But it is probable, that they will urge in their defence, what cannot easily be confuted, that their consent was obtained by misrepresentations; and that he who has promised to do any thing on the supposition that it is right, is not bound by that promise, when he has discovered it to be wrong.
But though justice may, my lords, be pretended, I am far from doubting that policy has, in reality, supplied the motives upon which these powers proceed. Since the world is evidently governed more by interest than virtue, I think it not unreasonable to imagine, that they form their measures according to their own expectations of advantage; and as I do not believe our countrymen distinguished from the rest of mankind by any peculiar disregard of themselves, it may not be improper to examine, even in this place, whether by restoring the house of Austria to its ancient greatness, we shall promote our own happiness, or that of the empire, or of the rest of Europe.
To ourselves, my lords, I do not see what assistance can be given in time of danger by this house, however powerful, or however friendly; for, I suppose, we shall never suffer it to grow powerful by sea as well as by land, and by sea only can we receive benefits or injuries. What advantages the rest of Europe may promise themselves from the restoration of the Austrian power, may be learned, my lords, from the history of the great emperour, Charles the fifth, who for many years kept the world in continual alarms, ranged from nation to nation with incessant and insatiable ambition, made war only for the extinction of the protestant religion, and employed his power and his abilities in harassing the neighbouring princes, and disturbing the tranquillity of mankind.
Nor did his successours, my lords, though weakened by the division of his dominions, enjoy their power with greater moderation, or exert it to better purposes. It is well known, that they endeavoured the subversion of both the liberties and religion of the subordinate states of the empire, and that the great king of Sweden was called into Germany, as well for the preservation of the protestant religion, as of the rights of the electors.
This, my lords, is so generally known and confessed, that Puffendorf, the best writer on the German constitution, has declared it disadvantageous to the empire to place at its head a prince too powerful by his hereditary dominions, since they will always furnish him with force to oppress the weaker princes; and it is not often found, that he who has the power to oppress, is restrained by principles of justice.
It appears, therefore, to me, my lords, that the late election of an emperour was made with sufficient regard to the general good; and that, therefore, neither policy nor equity oblige us to act in a manner different from the other powers who are joined in the same engagements, of whom I do not learn, by any of the common channels of intelligence, that any of them intend the support of the Pragmatick sanction; for no newspaper or pamphlet has yet informed us, that any of the other powers are hiring auxiliaries, or regulating the march of their troops, or making any uncommon preparations, which may foretoken an expedition against the emperour or his allies.
Yet, my lords, they are not restrained from attacking the emperour, by so strong objections as may be made to the present design; for they owe him no obedience as their sovereign, nor have contributed to the acquisition of his honours; they have not, like his majesty, given their votes for his exaltation to the imperial seat, nor have acknowledged his right by granting him an aid. They might, therefore, without charge of disloyalty or inconsistency, endeavour to dethrone him; but how his majesty can engage in any such design, after having zealously promoted his advancement, and confirmed his election by the usual acknowledgment, I am not able to understand. It is evident, that the king of Prussia believes himself restrained by his own acts, and thinks it absurd to fight against an emperour, who obtained the throne by his choice; he, therefore, has, with his usual wisdom, refused to engage in the confederacy, nor have either promises or concessions been able to obtain more from him than a bare neutrality.
Whether, indeed, any more than a neutrality be intended, even by this pompous armament, for which we are now required to provide, I maybe allowed to doubt; since the troops that are hired at so high a rate, are such as cannot act against the enemies of the queen of Hungary, without breach of the imperial constitutions.
It has been already justly observed in this debate, that when the emperour has obtained from the diet an aid of fifty months, that act is considered as an authentick recognition of his title; nor can any of the German princes afterwards make war against him, without subjecting his dominions to the imperial interdict, and losing the privileges of his sovereignty.